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The 1967 Amendments to the Minnesota State
Act Against Discrimination and the Uniform
Law Commissioners' Model Anti-Discrimination
Act: A Comparative Analysis and Evaluation
Carl A. Auerbach*
I. INTRODUCTION
In order to lessen the danger that the tragic racial violence
which marred the past four summers will recur, Negroes of all
classes must be convinced that they can realize their hopes for
themselves and their families by lawful means. They must be
shown that their pleas for justice will not be ignored, that their
legitimate grievances will be redressed, and that their lot can be
improved within the existing social and political system. But
efforts of persuasion along these lines cannot even be under-
taken, let alone succeed, unless the laws seeking to satisfy the
claims to equality of Negroes and other racial, religious, and
ethnic minorities are both adequate and effectively implemented.
Unfortunately, the antidiscrimination laws of Minnesota do not
yet meet these tests.
The 1967 Mlinnesota Legislature amended the State Act
Against Discrimination,' effective July 1, 1967, in ways that sig-
nificantly improve its substance and its administrative organi-
zation and procedure. Specifically, the amendments accom-
plished the following changes. They (a) eliminated the exemp-
tion of "the rental, lease or sale of a one-family dwelling, owner
occupied, not defined as a publicly assisted housing accommoda-
tion" from the provisions of the State Act prohibiting discrimina-
tion in real estate transactions; (b) added to the objectives of
the State Act the prohibition of discrimination in public services
* Professor of Law, University of Minnesota. The author wishes to
thank Professor Arthur E. Bonfield of the University of Iowa Law
School for the many conversations which contributed to his under-
standing of the subject matter of this article; Professor Robert J.
Harris of the University of Michigan Law School for putting at his
disposal an unpublished and most helpful memorandum commenting on
the Second Tentative Draft of the Uniform Law Commissioners' Model
Anti-Discrimination Act; and Mrs. Viola M. Kanatz, Deputy Commis-
sioner of the Minnesota Department of Human Rights, for reading and
criticizing the manuscript.
1. The 1967 Amendments are set forth in ch. 897, [1967] Minn.
Laws 1118. The State Act Against Discrimination is set forth in MNxN.
STAT. ch. 363 (1965).
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and in public and private educational institutions; (c) created
a new Department of Human Rights, both to replace the State
Commission against Discrimination (SCAD) as the administra-
tive agency and to assume the duties of the Governor's Commis-
sion on Human Rights2 and the Governor's Commission on the
Status of Women;3 (d) deprived persons charged with unlawful
discriminatory practices of the option of avoiding an administra-
tive adjudication and obtaining a hearing, in the first instance,
in the district court; and (e) eliminated the provisions that the
proceeding in the district court on review of an administrative
adjudication must be de novo and, if the person seeking review
requested it, tried before a jury.
Nevertheless, the State Act, as amended, still contains serious
deficiencies. For example, persons filing charges that they have
been discriminated against have not been afforded adequate re-
lief pending the administrative and judicial proceedings to con-
ciliate and, if necessary, to adjudicate the matter in question.
The new system of administrative adjudication is weak and un-
necessarily divorced from the work of the Department of Human
Rights. The requirement that an administrative adjudication be
reviewed by both the district court and the Minnesota Supreme
Court will unduly prolong proceedings and delay the time when
effective relief can be granted to complainants. Finally, the 1967
amendments deprive complainants, as well as the Commissioner
of Human Rights, of the right to obtain judicial review of an
administrative adjudication favoring the party charged with dis-
crimination.
In amending the State Act, the 1967 Legislature had before
it the Uniform Law Commissioners' Model Anti-Discrimination
Act.4 Many, but by no means all of the provisions of the Model
2. The Governor's Commission on Human Rights was created by
executive order of Governor Orville Freeman in 1955. It was pre-
ceded by the Governor's Interracial Commission, established by execu-
tive order of Governor Edward J. Thye in 1943. See C. RuCKER, THE
GovERNoR's INTERRACIAL CoMMIssIoN o MINNESOTA: Aw ADMINSTRA-
TIVE HISTORY (1955).
Governor LeVander has issued no document abolishing the Com-
mission. The 1967 Legislature, of course, gave it no appropriation.
3. The Governor's Commission on the Status of Women was cre-
ated by executive order of Governor Karl F. Rolvaag in 1963. It was
never given an appropriation by the Legislature. Governor LeVander
has issued no document abolishing it.
4. NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON U=Oi- V STATE
LAws, UNIFORm LAw CommVssIoNERs' IMODEL ANTI-DIscRIiINATIox ACT
(1966) [hereinafter cited as MODEL AxTI-DiscRnuvATIoN ACT]. The Uni-
form Law Commissioners drafted two acts. The first is entitled the
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Act are now included in the State Act. The Model Act is the
product of three years of research, comment, and discussion,5
and was approved at the Annual Conference of the Uniform
Law Commissioners in 1966.6 This Article will compare the
provisions of the Model Act with those of the State Act, in an
effort to launch a discussion that, hopefully, may prepare the
way for improvements of the State Act at the next session of the
Legislature.7
H. THE PROHIBITION OF DISCRIMINATION
IN EMPLOYMENT
The 1967 amendments made no substantive changes in the
preexisting provisions of the State Act prohibiting unfair dis-
criminatory practices in employment.8 On the whole, these pro-
Comprehensive Act and
attempts to provide a complete and strong law against dis-
crimination based on the more than 20 years of experience with
human rights commissions in more than 30 states. The Com-
prehensive Act contains chapters prohibiting discrimination in
employment, public accommodations, education institutions and
real property transactions ...
Id. at 6. The second is entitled the Basic Act and "is designed for
states merely wishing to accept responsibility, pursuant to Titles II and
VII of the CRA, [Federal Civil Rights Act of 1964] for enforcement of
laws prohibiting discrimination in public accommodations and employ-
ment." Id. It is the Comprehensive Act which will be compared with
the State Act and will hereinafter be referred to as the Model Act.
5. Id. at 6.
6. The Committee which acted for the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in preparing the Model Act
consisted of Robert Braucher, Professor of Law, Harvard University,
Massachusetts and Committee Chairman; Joe C. Barrett of Arkansas;
John B. Boatwright, Jr. of Virginia; Martin J. Dinkelspiel of California;
Floyd R. Gibson of Missouri; John W. Wade, Professor of Law, Vander-
bilt University, Tennessee; Sterry R. Waterman of Vermont, Judge,
Circuit of Appeals for the First Circuit; James P. White, Professor of
Law, University of North Dakota; and Robert E. Leflar, Professor of
Law, University of Arkansas.
Professor Norman Dorsen of the New York University School of
Law acted as Reporter-Draftsman.
To date, no state has adopted the Comprehensive Act. In 1966
Kentucky enacted one of the tentative drafts of the Basic Act.
7. The Appendix to this article sets forth the texts of both the
State Act and the Model Act in a manner which will facilitate com-
parison.
8. The following are the only changes made in the preexisting
law: (1) the word "charge" is substituted for the word "complaint" in
§ 363.03(1) (4); (2) the words "the commissioner or any of his em-
ployees" are substituted for the words "the commission or any of its
members," in order to reflect the new administrative organization cre-
ated by the 1967 amendments; and (3) a definition of the term "em-
ployer" is added in § 363.01(15).
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visions are adequate to accomplish -the objectives of an antidis-
crimination law. However, they differ in a number of respects
from the corresponding provisions of the Model Act.
A. By EMPLOYmS
1. Employers Covered
Subdivision 15 of section 363.01 of the State Act, which was
added by the 1967 amendments, defines the term "employer" to
mean "a person who has one or more employees." This defini-
tion does not change the law since the State Act previously con-
tained no definition of the term, and thus all employers were
subject to its provisions regardless of the number of employees.
Section 301 (1) of the Model Act leaves it to each State to decide
how many employees an employer must have to be covered by
the Act.9 By covering all employers, the Minnesota Legislature
has chosen to prefer the right of equal employment opportunity
to the right of freedom of association which other states may
seek to secure by exempting employers who have less than a
certain minimum number of employees. 10
(a) Government Agencies as Employers
The addition of the definition of the term "employer" to the
State Act removes any doubt which may have previously existed
that the state, its departments and agencies, and its political sub-
divisions are subject, as employers, to the provisions proscrib-
ing unfair employment practices. An employer is defined as "a
person who has one or more employees" and "a person" is defined
in section 363.01(7) of the State Act to include "the state and its
departments, agencies, and political subdivisions." Section 201
(5) of the Model Act accomplishes the same result by defining
"person" to include "the State, or any governmental entity or
agency.""
9. For definitions of the term "employer" in the Federal Civil
Rights Act of 1964 and various state statutes prohibiting discrimina-
tory employment practices, see Bonfield, The Substance of American
Fair Employment Practices Legislation I: Employers, 61 Nw. U.L.
REV. 907, 922-30 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Bonfield I]. It is not my
intention to go over the ground covered by Professor Bonfield in his
excellent and comprehensive articles on the substantive provisions of
the American statutes outlawing discrimination in employment.
10. See Bonfield I 922-24.
11. In all other respects, the term "person" is defined inclusively in
both the State Act and the Model Act. However, the Model Act, but
not the State Act, defines "person" to include a "joint apprenticeship
[Vol. 52:231
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Of course, the United States Constitution prohibits any
agency of state or local government from discriminating in its
employment practices, and the state and federal courts will en-
force this prohibition. But the State Act's coverage of "the
state and its departments, agencies, and political subdivisions"
subjects all state and local government agencies to the investiga-
tory, adjudicatory, and remedial provisions of the State Act.
This is proper, since the reasons for subjecting private employers
to these provisions also apply to the government as an
employer.1
2
(b) Public Contractors and Subcontractors
Unlike the Model Act, the State Act does not expressly in-
clude as an "employer" any person "who as contractor or sub-
contractor is furnishing material or performing work for the
State or a governmental entity or agency of the State." This pro-
vision is necessary in the Model Act to cover a public contractor
or subcontractor who may have less than the minimum number
of employees required for coverage of a private employer. The
Uniform Law Commissioners justify the coverage of all public
contractors and subcontractors because of "their special obliga-
tion to avoid discrimination."' 3  But such express coverage is
unnecessary in the State Act which applies to all employers,
regardless of the number of their employees. A public contractor
or subcontractor is obviously an "employer" as defined in section
363.01 (15) of the State Act.
(c) Agents
Unlike the Model Act, the State Act does not expressly in-
clude as an "employer" any "agent" of a person who is an em-
ployer. Nor does the State Act's definition of "person" do so.
Nevertheless, as Professor Bonfield suggests, the term "em-
ployer" should always be construed to include the agents of an
employer because "the agent within the scope of his employment
is just that-an agent or arm of the employer . . .whether or
not the agent acts with the express assent or knowledge of the
committee." Whether a joint apprenticeship committee is covered by
the State Act will be considered below.
12. Section 701(b) of the Federal Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42
U.S.C. § 2000 e(b) (1964), excludes "the United States, a corporation
wholly owned by the Government of the United States, an Indian
tribe, or a state or political subdivision thereof," from its definition
of "employer." See Bonfield I 921-22.
13. MODEL ANTI-DIscRIvINATION ACT 13.
1967]
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employer."'14 The purposes of the State Act will be furthered
if an employer's agents are personally subjected to its provisions.
In any case, the agents of an employer are subject to the
provisions of sections 363.03 (1) (5) and (6) of the State Act which
make it unlawful for any person "intentionally to aid, abet, incite,
compel or coerce another person to engage in any of the practices
forbidden by" the Act or "intentionally to attempt" to do so.
Sections 801(2) and 802 of the Model Act contain similar provi-
sions.
2. Prohibited Practices
Section 302 (a) (1) of the Model Act makes it unlawful for
an employer to "fail" as well as to "refuse" to hire "an individ-
ual" because of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. Sec-
tion 363.03 (1) (2) (a) of the State Act forbids an employer "to re-
fuse" to hire "an applicant" for employment because of race,
color, creed, religion, or national origin. Nothing of moment
would seem to turn on the absence in the State Act of the words
"to fail," though these words may have been added in the Model
Act to discourage quibbling. Furthermore, to effectuate the
purposes of the State Act, the term "applicant for employment"
can and should be read to include any individual against whom
the prohibited discrimination is directed.
Section 302 (a) (1) of the Model Act also forbids an employer
"otherwise to discriminate against an. individual with respect to
compensation or the terms, conditions, or privileges of employ-
ment," for the proscribed reasons. Section 302 (a) (2) of the
Model Act makes it a discriminator- practice for an employer
"to limit, segregate, or classify an employee in a way which
would deprive or tend to deprive an. individual of employment
opportunities or otherwise adversely affect the status of an em-
ployee" for the proscribed reasons. These provisions make the
policy against discrimination applicable to all aspects of the rela-
tionship between employers and employees. Thus, for example,
the Model Act would outlaw separate seniority rosters for white
and Negro workers.
The State Act is no less comprehensive. Section 363.03 (1) (2)
(c) makes it unlawful for an employer "to discriminate against
an employee with respect to his hire, tenure, compensation, terms,
upgrading, conditions, facilities, or privileges of employment,"
14. Bonfield I 920.
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while section 363.01(10) defines the term "discriminate" to in-
clude "segregate or separate."
B. By LABOR ORGANIZATIONS
1. Labor Organizations Covered
Although section 363.01(5) of the State Act and section
301(3) of the Model Act define the term "labor organization"
differently, both definitions are comprehensive. The Model Act
states the definition in greater detail then does the State Act,
covering "organizations having indirect as well as direct em-
ployee participation" and "agencies subordinate to such" organi-
zations.15 The State Act may easily be read to reach the same
result. The fact that its definition includes "any organization
that exists wholly or partly" for the purpose of mutual aid or
protection of employees-a provision not found in the Model
Act-reflects an intent to cover every organization reached by
the Model Act.
Unlike the Model Act, the State Act does not expressly in-
clude "an agent of a labor organization" as a "labor organiza-
tion." The considerations mentioned above in connection with
the definition of employer and with employers' agents are also
applicable here.
2. Prohibited Practices
The proctices prohibited by section 363.03 (1) (1) of the State
Act are generally those prohibited by section 304 of the Model
Act and vice versa, although the provisions in the two Acts are
not identically phrased. While section 304 of the Model Act
forbids a labor organization "to cause or attempt to cause an
employer to violate" the Act, section 363.03 (1) (1) of the State Act
contains no such provision. But section 363.03 (2) (4) achieves the
same end by making it unlawful for any person "(a) to engage
in any economic reprisal against any other person because that
person has opposed any practice forbidden under" the State Act;
or "(b) intentionally to aid, abet, incite, compel, or coerce any
other person to engage in any of the practices forbidden by" the
State Act; or "(c) to wilfully obstruct or prevent any person
from complying with the provisions of" the State Act "or any
order issued thereunder;" or "(d) to attempt directly or indi-
15. See Bonfield, The Substance of American Fair Employment
Practices Legislation II-Empoyment Agencies, Labor Organizations and
Others, 62 Nw. U.L. REV. 19, 29 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Bonfield II].
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rectly to commit any of the practices forbidden by" the State
Act.
Bonfield justly criticizes the Model Act because it pro-
hibits union discrimination only against a member or applicant
for membership and not against any person or individual. 10 His
criticism is well taken because the policy against discrimina-
tion for the proscribed reasons is just as strong when the victim
is not a union member or applicant for union membership but is,
for example, an employer, a person employed by an employer,
or an employment agency. While the provisions of section
363.03 (2) (4) of the State Act quoted above may prohibit some
forms of union discrimination against persons who are not
union members or applicants for union membership, the State
Act is also vulnerable to Bonfield's criticism.
C. By EMPLOYERS, LABOR ORGANIZATIONS, AND JOINT LABOR-
MANAGEAMNT COMMITTEES
Section 305 of the Model Act forbids "an employer, labor
organization, or joint labor-management committee controlling
apprenticeship, on-the-job, or other training or retraining pro-
gram, to discriminate against an individual" for the proscribed
reasons "in admission to, or employment in, a program estab-
lished to provide apprenticeship or other training." The State
Act contains no such express provision. However, the employer
practice prohibited by section 305 of the Model Act would un-
doubtedly be reached by section 363.03(1) (2) (c) of the State
Act forbidding an employer "to discriminate against an employee
with respect to his hire, tenure, compensation, terms, upgrading,
conditions, facilities, or privileges of employment." The context
of section 363.03(1) makes it clear that the State Act was in-
tended to protect prospective employees. But if the labor or-
ganization practice prohibited by section 305 of the Model Act
is to be reached by section 363.03(1) (1) of the State Act, the in-
dividual discriminated against must be a union member or an
applicant for union membership. The activities of joint labor-
management committees may thus be covered by the State Act
because the members of such committees ordinarily represent
unions and employers which are responsible for the acts of their
agents.
To resolve all doubts, the language of section 305 of the
Model Act should be incorporated into the State Act. There are
16. Id. at 32.
[Vol. 52:231
ANTI-DISCRIMINATION ACTS
currently about one hundred and forty-two joint labor-manage-
ment committees in Minnesota which control apprenticeship in
various trades.'7 Negroes still complain that they are victims of
a pattern of exclusion from apprenticeship in these trades.' s
The matter is further complicated by the fact that joint labor-
management committees often confine admission to apprentice-
ship programs to members of the family or friends of union
members or the employer. If this practice is intended to per-
petuate prior discrimination or mask present discrimination, for
any of the proscribed reasons, it would be outlawed both by the
State Act and by the Model Act. But if no such unlawful pur-
pose is shown, and the practice merely has the effect of excluding
minority group members from the apprenticed trades, it is
doubtful whether it is prohibited, for the discrimination in ques-
tion is not "because of" any of the proscribed reasons.
Bonfield has suggested that the Model Act be amended to
incorporate the provision now found in the New York law pro-
hibiting the selection of persons for apprenticeship programs "on
any basis other than their qualifications as determined by ob-
jective criteria which permit review."' 9 Bonfield adds that a
similar prohibition should be imposed upon the selection of per-
sons for union membership.2
0
In 1963 the Secretary of Labor issued rules and regulations
requiring apprenticeship and training programs registered with
the Labor Department's Bureau of Apprenticeship and Training
to select apprentices "on the basis of qualifications alone, in
accordance with objective standards which permit" questions of
discrimination to be fairly adjudicated.2 ' The appropriate field
representatives of the Labor Department were directed to en-
courage State Apprenticeship Council states to adopt and imple-
ment the equal opportunity standards laid down for BAT-
registered programs.22 However, it was not until 1965 that Min-
nesota promulgated a plan to adopt and implement these equal
17. The Minneapolis Star, Nov. 22, 1966, at 16B.
18. Id., Nov. 21, 1966, at IA; Nov. 23, 1966, at 26; and Nov. 24, 1966,
at 1D. "There are fewer than 50 Negroes listed among 20,000 journey-
men in 25 selected Twin Cities trade union- locals surveyed by the
Minneapolis Star .... Only 10 Negroes are listed among the 1,598 active
apprentices reported by these unions." Minneapolis Star, Nov. 21,
1966, at 1.
19. Bonfield II 34-35.
20. Id.
21. Part 30-Nondiscrimination in Apprenticeship and Training, 29
C.F.R. §§ 30.3(a), 30.4(2) (1963).
22. Id. § 30.16(a) (1).
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opportunity standards, 2 3 and by the end of 1966, only 10 of the
142 apprentice selection committees in the state had defined
their selection standards and procedures as required by the
Minnesota Plan.24
D. By EMPLOYMENT AGENcIEs
1. Employment Agencies Covered
The definitions of "employment agency" in section 363.01
(4) of the State Act and section 301(2) of the Model Act are al-
most identical and are equally comprehensive, except that the
Model Act expressly includes an agent of an employment agency
in the definition while the State Act does not. However, Bonfield
criticizes the Model Act for requiring that an employment agency,
to be covered, must "regularly" undertake to procure employees
or opportunities for employment. 25 He argues that "the limited
nature of the conduct in which employment agencies are barred
from engaging and the great harm caused by their discriminatory
actions" make it appropriate "to impose equal employment op-
portunity standards even on those persons who irregularly seek
employment for others or provide employees for employers. '26
The State Act is subject to the same just criticism.
On the federal level, section 701(c) of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964 covers only state and local employment services receiving
federal assistance,27 while the definitions of "employment agen-
cy," taken together with the definitions of "person" in the Model
and State Acts, result in the coverage of state and local govern-
ment employment agencies.
2. Prohibited Practices
Although the language of prohibition in section 363.03(1)
(3) of the State Act is very similar to that of section 303 of the
Model Act, the State Act may be broader in one respect. Section
363.03(1) (3) (b) contains a provision, not found in the Model
Act, prohibiting an employment agency from complying "with a
request from an employer for referral of applicants for employ-
23. Minnesota Plan For Adopting and Implementing Equal Oppor-
tunity Standards Under 29 CFR, Part 30-Nondiscrimination in Appren-
ticeship and Training, adopted by Minnesota Department of Labor and
Industry, Industrial Commission, June 7, 1965.
24. The Minneapolis Star, Nov. 23, 1966, at 26.
25. See Bonfield II 22-23.
26. Id.
27. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(c) (1964).
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ment if the request indicates directly or indirectly that the em-
ployer fails to comply with the provisions of" the State Act.
This provision helps to effectuate the purposes of an antidis-
crimination law by "cutting an employer off from any help in
hiring if he indicates in any way that he intends to do so in a
discriminatory manner."28 It is possible, however, that an em-
ployment agency under the Model Act may be forbidden to com-
ply with a request from such an employer by section 801(2)
which makes it unlawful to aid, abet, incite, or coerce a person
to engage in a discriminatory practice.20
Bonfield also criticizes the Model Act and the laws of most
jurisdictions because they do not specifically prohibit an employ-
ment agency from discriminating against any person with respect
to admission or employment in an apprenticeship or training
program.30 The State Act, too, does not contain such an express
prohibition. Apparently, Bonfield fears that the general provi-
sion in the State and Model Acts making it unlawful for an em-
ployment agency to refuse or fail to refer an individual for
employment may not cover referrals for admission to apprentice-
ship or training programs which are not related to employment
by a known employer. However, Bonfield here ignores the pro-
vision in both the State and Model Acts making it unlawful for
an employment agency "otherwise to discriminate against" an
individual. If this provision means that discrimination in ways
other than those specified is prohibited only in connection with a
specific employment situation, Bonfield's conclusion may still
be warranted. Such a catchall phrase, however, should not be
read so restrictively. It is reasonable to read it as prohibiting
other discriminatory practices engaged in by an employment
agency in the performance of functions relating to the opening
up of employment opportunities for individuals immediately or
in the long run. Discrimination in referring individuals for ad-
mission to a training program which is not related to employment
by a known employer would therefore be forbidden.
E. BY EMPLOYERS, EMPLOYMENT AGENCIES, AND LABOR
ORGANIZATIONS-OTHER PRoHMITED PRACTICES
1. Discriminatory Advertisements and Notices
Section 363.03(1) (8) (b) of the State Act makes it unlawful
for an employer, employment agency, or labor organization, be-
28. Bonfield I 28.
29. Id. at 42.
30. Id. at 26.
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fore an individual is employed by an employer or admitted to
membership in a labor organization, to "cause to be printed or
published a notice or advertisement that relates to employment
or membership and discloses a preference, limitation, specifica-
tion, or discrimination based on race, color, creed, religion or na-
tional origin." Although the comparable provision in section
306(a) of the Model Act is phrased in somewhat different lan-
guage, no difference in substance is discernible. These provisions
are intended to prohibit practices which are "calculated to dis-
courage qualified minority group members from even applying
for jobs."'31
But neither the Model Act nor the State Act makes it un-
lawful for the news media to carry discriminatory notices and
advertisements. It would, however, be reasonable to impose
upon the media the obligation not to carry such material in order
to prevent violation of the basic prohibition by the advertiser.
2. Discriminatory Inquiries
Section 363.03(1) (8) (a) of the State Act forbids an em-
ployer, employment agency, or labor organization, before an in-
dividual is employed by an employer or admitted to membership
in a labor organization, to "require the applicant to furnish in-
formation that pertains to the applicant's race, color, creed, re-
ligion or national origin ... ." An exception is made for the
purpose of national security where "information pertaining to
the national origin of the applicant is required by the United
States, this state or a political subdivision or agency of the United
States or this state." Section 306(b), the comparable provision
of the Model Act, is in some respects narrower and in others
broader.
While the State Act covers employers, employment agen-
cies, and labor organizations, the Model Act covers only employ-
ers and employment agencies. The Uniform Law Commissioners
do not explain why the Model Act excluded labor organizations
from the coverage of this provision. Furthermore, the omission
of labor organizations from the coverage of section 306(b) of the
Model Act makes it difficult to say that such inquiries are barred
by the general prohibitions of section 304 of that Act. Yet there
would seem to be no reason why labor organizations should be
permitted to make such inquiries in connection with applications
for admission to union membership. 32
31. Bonfield I 967.
32. The Uniform Law Commissioners point out that a labor union
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Section 306(b) of the Model Act also forbids employers and
employment agencies "to make or keep a record of that informa-
tion [i.e., the information obtained by making the inquiries of
applicants for employment prohibited by the section] or to dis-
close the information." The State Act contains no such provi-
sion. It would be desirable if it did because, as Bonfield states,
"an employer who intends to obey a state's fair employment act
has no legitimate need for this kind of information." 33  Labor
unions, too, should be forbidden to keep records of the race, color,
creed, religion, or national origin of applicants for membership.
Although the Model Act does not contain the State Act's
exception for cases in which the federal or state government may
require information pertaining to national origin "for the pur-
pose of national security," it expressly provides that practices
otherwise prohibited may be "permitted by regulations of the
Commission or by applicable federal law." The practice per-
mitted by the State Act could thus be authorized under the
Model Act.
3. Discriminatory Statements
Bonfield points out that the Model Act does not prohibit
statements by an employer to an applicant for employment in a
pre-employment interview (such as "This is a Protestant firm")
which indicate that individuals of a particular race, color, creed,
religion, or national origin are unwelcome, objectionable, or
unacceptable for employment.34 Likewise, the State Act does
not prohibit such statements. Although such a statement by an
employer may constitute evidence of a discriminatory practice
on his part and subject him to proceedings under the Act, it
would be advisable to prohibit specifically the making of such
statements because they, too, are intended to discourage qualified
minority group members from applying for jobs.
4. Advertisements by Individuals Seeking Employment
Section 307 of the Model Act prohibits an individual seeking
employment from publishing or causing to be published "in a
newspaper or magazine an advertisement that specifies or indi-
cates his race, color, religion, or national origin, or expresses a
"acting as an employment agency is covered." MODEL ANTI-DIscRIVIcNA-
TION AcT 15.
33. Bonfield I 969.
34. Id. at 970. The Iowa Act prohibits such statements. Iowa
Civil Rights Act of 1965, IowA CODE AN. § 105A.7(1) (C) (Supp. 1966).
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preference or limitation as to the race, color, religion, or national
origin of a prospective employer," unless (1) religion or national
origin is a bona fide occupational qualification for particular
employment, or (2) the advertisement is "for employment in
the domestic service of the employer." The Uniform Law Com-
missioners explain that this provision is designed to prohibit
individuals seeking employment from trying to induce discrimi-
nation in their favor or to obtain employment with an employer
of a particular race, color, religion, or national origin.35
The State Act contains no comparable provision. But again,
the same result may be reached under the State Act by applying
the general provisions in sections 363.03 (1) (5) and (6) which
make it unlawful for a person "intentionally to aid, abet, [or]
incite . . . another person to engage in any of the practices for-
bidden by" the Act or to attempt to do so.
Bonfield criticizes the Model Act for not going far enough
in this respect.36 Section 307(a) of the Model Act is limited to
material published in newspapers and magazines because the
Uniform Law Commissioners thought it undesirable to attempt
to interfere with private correspondence. 37 Bonfield maintains
that there "is no more reason to exerapt such private correspond-
ence or face to face discussion . . . from the strictures of the
law than there is to exempt them when they emanate from the
employer."38 Again, it should be noted that violations of the
general provisions of sections 363.03(1) (5) and (6) of the State
Act may occur in private correspondence or even in face to face
discussion. Here too, the Model and State Acts do not, but should,
impose an obligation upon the news media not to carry the pro-
hibited advertisements.
F. PRoscRIBED REASONS FOR DISCRImIvNATION
Section 363.03(1) (2) of the State Act prohibits employers
from discriminating "because of race, color, creed, religion, or
national origin." Section 302 of the Model Act eliminates "creed"
and adds "sex" as a prohibited ground of discrimination. The
same differences also apply with respect to the prohibitions im-
posed upon labor organizations (section 363.03(1) (1) of the
35. MODEL ANTi-DIscamIINATIoN ACT 16. Section 307 makes "no
reference to sex because of the difficulty of preventing revelation of
that fact." Id.
36. See Bonfield I 968.
37. MODEL ANTI-DIscRIMINATION ACT 16.
38. Bonfield I 968.
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State Act and section 304(1) of the Model Act) and employment
agencies (section 363.03(1)(3) of the State Act and section 303
of the Model Act).
1. Creed
The ambiguity of the term "creed" makes it difficult to say
whether it will be held to refer to anything other than religious
belief.39 In order more fully to protect freedom of speech and
conscience against unwarranted pressures from the private sec-
tor of our society, Bonfield urges that the term "creed" should
be interpreted broadly, in accordance with its dictionary mean-
ing, to include political or scientific beliefs as a prohibited ground
of discrimination.40
2. National Origin
The State Act and the Model Act define "national origin"
differently. Section 363.01 (6) of the State Act defines "national
origin" as "the place of birth of an individual or of any of his
lineal ancestors." Section 201(4) of the Model Act defines "na-
tional origin" to include "the national origin of an ancestor."
The State Act may be broader than the Model Act because it
would prohibit "discrimination by persons in one American state
against persons coming from or raised in another."41 Such dis-
crimination should be prohibited.
3. Sex
Unlike the Model Act, the State Act does not prohibit dis-
crimination on the basis of sex.42  The Uniform Law Commis-
sioners explain that this ground of discrimination was prohibited
because the Federal Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits it and it is
important to decentralize the enforcement of the prohibition.43
Although it may be agreed that discrimination on the basis of
sex raises problems of policy different from discrimination based
on race, color, creed, religion, or national origin,44 the considera-
39. See id. at 913-15.
40. See id.
41. Id. at 917.
42. Section 703 of the Federal Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits
discrimination on the basis of sex. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (a) (1) (1964).
So do almost a dozen states. Bonfield I 908. About two dozen states
prohibit discrimination on the basis of age, but neither the Federal
Act, the Model Act nor the State Act does so. Id.
43. MODEL ANTI-DIscpmmxATIoN ACT 12.
44. See Miller, Sex Discrimination and Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, 51 Mum-. L. REv. 877 (1967).
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tions that motivated the Uniform Law Commissioners are per-
suasive, and it is unfortunate that the State Act does not include
a prohibition of sex discrimination.
It is important to note that the prohibitions of the State and
Model Acts is not limited to discriminatory employment prac-
tices based on the race, color, religion, or national origin of the
discriminated against. It is unlawful under both Acts to dis-
criminate in employment against an individual because of the
race, color, religion, or national origin of other persons, such as
his wife, natural or adopted child, or circle of friends.
G. EXEMPTIONS AN] EXCEPTIONS
1. Bona Fide Occupational Qualifications
Employers, labor organizations and employment agencies
may engage in practices otherwise prohibited by section 363.03
(1) of the State Act when race, color, creed, religion, or national
origin is a "bona fide occupational qualification." Section 309
(1) of the Model Act makes similar exceptions for employers,
labor organizations, joint labor-management committees, and
employment agencies only when "religion, sex, or national origin
is a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to
the normal operation of the business or enterprise." Section 306
(a) of the Model Act does not apply "when religion, sex, or na-
tional origin is a bona fide occupational qualification for employ-
ment." Similarly, section 307(a) of the Model Act lifts its pro-
hibitions when "religion or national origin is a bona fide occupa-
tional qualification for particular employment."
Unlike the State Act, the Model Act precludes the possibil-
ity that race or color may constitute a bona fide occupational
qualification. Bonfield argues persuasively for the position taken
in the State Act on the ground that race may be a rational and
essential qualification for certain types of jobs.45
Furthermore, Bonfield does not think that the Model Act's
addition of the phrase "reasonably necessary to the normal oper-
ation of the business or enterprise" advances the cause of clari-
fication very much over the mass of state acts which do not in-
clude the explanatory phrase.40
2. Religious or Fraternal Association
Section 363.02(1) of the State Act makes the provisions of




section 363.03(1) inapplicable to a "religious or fraternal corpor-
ation, association, or society, with respect to qualifications based
on religion, when religion shall be a bona fide occupational quali-
fication for employment." Section 308 of the Model Act exempts
from all its provisions relating to discrimination in employment
any "religious corporation, association, or society with respect to
the employment of individuals of a particular religion to perform
work connected with the carrying on by the corporation, asso-
ciation, or society of its religious activities."
Section 308 of the Model Act may represent an effort to
give more specific meaning to the general phrase used in the
State Act: "when religion shall be a bona fide occupational qual-
ification for employment. '4' Bonfield doubts that any advantage
is gained by this substitution. 48 Furthermore, he criticizes both
the Model Act and the State Act for being too restrictive in per-
mitting discrimination in employment in this area solely on the
basis of the prospective employee's religion.49 Bonfield points
out that a particular religion may insist "on theological grounds,
that only persons of its religion and of a specified race may
occupy certain jobs of a sacred nature."50 To prohibit such dis-
crimination, he suggests, may be an unconstitutional interference
with the free exercise of religion.5'1
However, Bonfield recognizes that the general bona fide
occupational qualification exemption in the State Act, but not
the Model Act, may permit racial discrimination on religious
grounds in appropriate cases. 52  But he raises the question
whether "the effect of including . . . a provision dealing exclu-
sively with religious institutions" may not be "to nullify, as a
matter of construction, the applicability to such religious institu-
tions of the broader general bona fide occupational qualification
exemption."53 This is not likely because the purpose of including
a specific exemption for religious institutions in the State Act
is to give such institutions wider, not lesser, latitude in their
employment practices than is accorded all other employers.
Nevertheless, it is difficult to see what, if anything, the
exemption in section 363.02(1) of the State Act adds to the bona
fide occupational qualification exception in section 363.03(1).
47. Id. at 934.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 934-35.
50. Id. at 934.





There is no reason why it should add anything to the latter
exception. Although a "rational accommodation between free-
dom of religion and equal employment opportunity" may de-
mand no less, it requires no more than to permit religious insti-
tutions to discriminate on the prohibited grounds when such dis-
crimination is warranted by a bona fide occupational qualifi-
cation.54
3. Religious Educational Institutionss
Section 309(2) of the Model Act permits "a religious educa-
tional institution or an educational organization operated, super-
vised, or controlled by a religious institution or organization to
limit employment or give preference to members of the same
religion." This section gives religious educational institutions a
broader exemption than section 308 gives noneducational reli-
gious associations. The latter makes the prohibitions of the
Model Act inapplicable to a noneducational religious association
only with respect "to the employment of individuals of a particu-
lar religion to perform work connected with the carrying on by
the" association "of its religious activities." But section 309(2)
lifts the prohibitions of the Model Act with respect to the em-
ployment of individuals of a particular religion even when they
are hired to perform work having no connection with the reli-
gious activities or teachings of the educational institution in
question. It is difficult to justify amy such exemption which
goes beyond what is needed to satisfy the bona fide occupational
requirements of religious educational institutions. 5 The State
Act contains no provision comparable to section 309 (2).
4. Employment by Close Relatives
Section 363.02(1) (1) (a) of the State Act exempts from the
provisions of section 363.03(1) the employment of any individual
"by his parent, grandparent, spouse, child, or grandchild." Sec-
tion 302 (b) of the Model Act contains a comparable exemption
but does not extend it to grandparents and grandchildren. This
omission in the Model Act is not explained by the Uniform Law
Commissioners and there is no apparent justification for it. In-
deed, an exemption to permit familial preference is probably not
necessary at all because such preference does not discriminate
"because of" any of the proscribed reasons.50
54. Id.
55. See id. at 930-36.
56. See Bonfield II 34-35.
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It should also be noted that even though section 363.02(1)
(1) (a) of the State Act provides an exemption from all the pro-
visions of section 363.03(1), in effect it exempts only a parent,
grandparent, spouse, child, or grandchild as an employer of his
respective child, grandchild, spouse, parent, or grandparent.
5. Employment in Domestic Service
Section 363.02(1) (1) (b) of the State Act makes all the pro-
visions of section 363.03(1) inapplicable to the employment of
any individual "in the domestic service of any person." Section
302(b) of the Model Act merely makes the prohibitions upon
employers inapplicable to employment "in the domestic service of
the employer." Section 307(b) of the Model Act also makes the
prohibition against discriminatory advertisements by individuals
seeking employment inapplicable to "an advertisement for em-
ployment in the domestic service of the employer." Thus the
Model Act does not permit either employment agencies or labor
organizations to discriminate for the proscribed reasons simply
because employment in domestic service is involved. Since the
purpose of the exemption is to safeguard the prospective em-
ployer's or employee's freedom of association, even at the cost of
equal employment opportunity,57 there is no reason to extend
the exemption when claims to freedom of association are not at
issue.
Thus, for example, an employment agency should not be
permitted to violate section 363.03(1) (3) of the State Act by re-
fusing to refer individuals for employment in domestic service
because of race, color, creed, religion, or national origin or by
complying with a request from an employer for referral of an
individual on any of these bases for employment in his domestic
service. If an employer wishes so to discriminate, it is not un-
reasonable to require that he forego the help of an employment
agency.58 The provisions of the Model Act in this respect are
preferable to those of the State Act.
However, it is possible to read section 363.02(1) (1) (b) of
the State Act so as to reach the result achieved by section 302 (b)
of the Model Act. The "employment" of any individual may be
taken to imply employment "by an employer." However, the
57. It should be noted that the recently enacted St. Paul civil
rights ordinance makes a contrary choice of values and does not ex-
empt employment in domestic evidence. SAINT PAUL, MINN., LEGISLA-
TIVE CODE (1967).
58. See Bonfield II 25-26.
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fact that the section speaks of the domestic service "of any per-
son," and not of the "employer," may militate against the sug-
gested interpretation. On the other hand, in context with sec-
tion 363.02(1) (a), it is reasonable to read section 363.02(1) (b)
as also creating an exemption for employers only.
In one respect, even the Model Act does not limit the exemp-
tion sufficiently. An employer should not be permitted to ad-
vertise for a domestic servant nor a prospective domestic servant
for an employer of a particular race, color, creed, religion, or
national origin. Public media of information should not be put
to such use, nor should they be permitted to carry such adver-
tisements.
III. THE PROHIBITION OF DISCRIMINATION IN
REAL PROPERTY TRANSACTIONS
With one important exception, the 1967 amendments made
no substantive changes in the preexisting provisions of the State
Act prohibiting unfair discriminatory practices in real property
transactions. Prior to the 1967 amendments, section 363.02(2)
(1) (c) of the State Act exempted from the provisions of section
363.03(2) thereof "the rental, lease or' sale of a one-family dwel-
ling, owner occupied, not defined as a publicly assisted housing
accommodation." 59 It is estimated that this exemption excluded
from the coverage of the State Act approximately seventy per
cent of the single family homes in the Twin Cities metropolitan
area and probably a larger percentage of such homes in outstate
Minnesota. 60 The 1967 amendments eliminated this exemption-
a step urged by Governor Harold LeVander and proposed in the
1966 platforms of both the Democratic-Farmer-Labor and Re-
publican Parties.61
59. The State Act defined "a publicly assisted housing accommoda-
tion" as a
housing accommodation that is, or is located in a building: (a)
Situated on land owned or assembled into a parcel for housing
accommodations by a governmental body; (b) Upon which a
commitment by a governmental body to guarantee or insure an
acquisition loan is outstanding; or (c) Subject to an outstanding
secured or unsecured loan made, guaranteed, or insured by a
governmental body for the purpose of financing the acquisition,
construction, rehabilitation, repair, or maintenance of the build-
ing.
MINN. STAT. § 363.01(11) (1965).
60. These are estimates of the United States Federal Housing Agen-
cy released by SCAD.
61. Inaugural Address of Governor Harold LeVander, Sixty-fifth
Session of the Minnesota Legislature, Jan. 4, 1967, at 18-19; 1966
DEmocRATic-FARmER-LABoR PLATFORM FOR MINNESOTA 6, MINNESOTA
REPUBLICAN PLATFORM, PROGRAMS FOR PEOPLE 1966-67, at 7.
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A. By OwNERs Am REAL ESTATE BROKERS AND SALESMEN
1. Coverage
Though they accomplish the result in different ways, both
sections 363.03(2) (1) and (2) of the State Act and section 602 of
the Model Act cover the sale, rental, or lease (or offer for sale,
rental, or lease) of real property by (a) an owner, lessee, sub-
lessee, assignee, or managing agent thereof; (b) an agent of any
of the enumerated persons; (c) a real estate broker, real estate
saleman, or employee or an agent thereof; or (d) any other per-
son having the right to make the sale, rental, or lease (or offer
for sale, rental, or lease). Section 602 of the Model Act, read
together with the definition of "real estate transaction" in sec-
tion 601 thereof, expressly includes the "exchange" as well as
the sale, rental, or lease of real property. While explicitness in
definition is always preferable, it is clear that the language of
sections 363.03(2) (1) and (2) of the State Act also covers the
exchange of real property, even though the term "exchange" is
not used, because an exchange is either a reciprocal sale or a
reciprocal lease. In any case, to refuse to exchange real property
for the proscribed reasons would be to "deny to or withhold"
real property other than by refusing to sell, rent, or lease, within
the meaning of section 363.03 (2) (1) (a) of the State Act.
In addition, the real estate broker covered by section 363.01
(13) is defined as a person who otherwise satisfies the require-
ments of the definition and "lists, sells, purchases, exchanges,
rents, or leases any real estate, or the improvements thereon,
including options,"0 2 thereby removing all doubt about the Act's
applicability to real property exchanges. The State Act could
hardly have been intended to prohibit a real estate broker or
salesman, but not the owner or lessee for whom he is acting,
from engaging in discriminatory practices in the exchange of real
property.
The Uniform Law Commissioners state that the definition of
"real property" in section 601(1) of the Model Act was taken
"from the Minnesota and New Jersey statutes, with the addition
of cooperatives and condominiums." 63 Although it is not ex-
plicit, there is little doubt that section 363.01(12) of the State
Act, when read together with the substantive provisions of sec-
tion 363.03(2), covers the items specifically enumerated in the
62. Mu. STAT. § 82.01(4) (1965). This section is incorporated
by reference into MmN. STAT. § 363.01(13) (1965).
63. MODEL ANTr-Dscur..mNATIoN ACT 21.
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Model Act but not included in the State Act: "buildings, struc-
tures, . . .leaseholds, interests in real estate cooperatives, condo-
miniums... or any interest therein."
The definition of "real estate broker or salesman" in section
601 (4) of the Model Act was also adapted from the Minnesota
and New Jersey statutes. 64 In some ways, the definition in sec-
tion 82.01(4) of the Minnesota Statutes may be more explicit
than section 601(4) of the Model Act. For example, the State
Act, but not the Model Act, expressly includes as a "real estate
broker" the "business opportunity broker," defined in section
82.01(6) as "any person, who for another, and for a commission,
money or other thing of value, sells, exchanges, buys or rents or
offers or attempts to negotiate a sale, exchange, purchase or
rental of any business, its good will, inventory, fixtures or an
interest therein . .. ." The business opportunity broker, how-
ever, is subject to the prohibition of section 363.03(2)(2) only
in connection with transactions in "real property" as defined in
section 363.01(12) of the State Act. 'Undoubtedly, the Model Act
reaches the same result through its -more general definition of a
"real estate broker or salesman."
2. Prohibited Practices
(a) General Prohibitions
Section 363.03 (2) (1) of the State Act sets forth the practices
forbidden to owners, lessees, sublessees, assignees, or managing
agents, and section 363.03(2) (2) sets forth those forbidden to
real estate brokers and salesmen. The Uniform Law Com-
missioners comment that section 602 of the Model Act "is pat-
terned primarily after the Minnesota, New Jersey and New York
statutes, with the exception that it combines the prohibitions
directed against owners, lessees, sublessees, assignees, and man-
aging agents, on the one hand, and real estate brokers and real
estate salesmen on the other."65 They recognized that certain of
the practices prohibited by section 602 of the Model Act were
directed primarily toward only one of the two categories of per-
sons covered. Nevertheless, they combined the prohibitions di-
rected against the two categories in order "to make the prohibi-
tions as broad as possible in respect of both groups. 06
The wisdom of the Model Act's drafting technique is appar-
64. Id. at 22.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 23.
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ent if we compare the effects of the combination in the Model
Act with the separation in the State Act. Any owner, lessee,
sublessee, assignee, or managing agent, as well as any real estate
broker or salesman, is forbidden by the Model Act, for the pro-
scribed reasons, (a) "to refuse to receive or to fail to transmit a
bona fide offer to engage in a real estate transaction from a per-
son" (section 602(3)); (b) "to refuse to negotiate for a real
estate transaction with a person" (section 602(4)); (c) "to repre-
sent to a person that real property is not available. or to fail to
bring a property listing to his attention, or to refuse to permit
him to inspect real property" (section 602(5)); and (d) "to offer,
solicit, accept, use or retain a listing of real property with the
understanding that a person may be discriminated against in a
real estate transaction or in the furnishing of facilities or ser-
vices in connection therewith" (section 602 (7)).
Under section 363.03(2) (2) (a) of the State Act, these prac-
tices are expressly forbidden only to real estate brokers, real
estate salesmen, and their employees and agents. But owners,
lessees, sublessees, assignees, and managing agents may also en-
gage in certain of these practices. To prohibit them, the more
general language of section 363.03 (2) (1) (a) of the State Act will
have to be invoked. It can reasonably be held that any owner,
lessee, sublessee, assignee, or managing agent, who engages in
these practices expressly forbidden to real estate brokers and
salesmen is refusing "to sell, rent, or lease" or is "otherwise"
denying to or withholding real property from a person.
No other differences in the general practices prohibited by
the two Acts are discernible.
(b) Restrictive Covenants and Conditions
The Uniform Law Commissioners state that section 605 of
the Model Act is based "on several state laws, including Colorado,
Minnesota and Ohio" and is intended to void "restrictive cove-
nants of the kind held unenforceable in Shelley v. Kraemer,
334 U.S. 1 (1948), and Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953)."67
The counterpart provision in the Minnesota law is not found in
the State Act but in Minnesota Statutes 1965, section 507.18. In
a number of respects, section 605 of the Model Act is a broader
and more desirable provision.
Section 605(a) of the Model Act, unlike section 507.18(1)
of the Minnesota Statutes, voids the prohibited restrictions in
67. Id. at 24.
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oral agreements, as well as written instruments, relating to real
property. It also expressly forbids restricting the conveyance,
encumbrance, occupancy, or lease of real property. Section 507.18
(1) does not mention "occupancy," but covers the "conveying,
mortgaging, encumbering, or leasing" of real property. How-
ever, a liberal reading of the term "leasing" in section 507.18(1)
would include "occupancy."
While section 605(b) of the Model Act voids every "condi-
tion, restriction or prohibition, including a right of entry or pos-
sibility of reverter, which directly or indirectly limits the use
or occupancy of real property" for the proscribed reasons, sec-
tion 507.18(l) and (2) of the Minnesota Statutes do not contain
this language but accomplish the same purpose by voiding provi-
sions "of any kind or character disciminating against any class
of persons" for the proscribed reasons. The Model Act does not
contain the latter language.
More important, section 605(c) of the Model Act makes it a
discriminatory practice "to insert in a written instrument re-
lating to real property a provision that is void under this section
or to honor or attempt to honor such a provision in the chain of
title." Section 507.18(4) of the Minnesota Statutes merely sub-
jects persons who violate the section, or aid or incite others to do
so, to a civil action for damages not exceeding five hundred dol-
lars, at the instance of the aggrieved person. It would be de-
sirable if, in addition, it were made an unfair discriminatory
practice to violate section 507.18, and violators were thus sub-
jected to the administrative, adjudicatory, and remedial provi-
sions of the State Act.
Finally, in one respect, the iinnesota Statutes may be
broader than the Model Act. Section 605(b) of the Model Act
excepts from the provisions prohibiting the specified restrictions
on use (but not transfer) of real property "a limitation of use
on the basis of religion of real property held by a religious insti-
tution or organization or by a religious or charitable organization
operated ... and used for religious or charitable purposes." The
Uniform Law Commissioners refer l;o this excepted use limita-
tion as a "common form of limitation for the benefit of religious
institutions.168 The Minnesota Statutes do not make this excep-
tion.
The exception in the Model Act may be too broad. No one




condition that it shall be devoted to religious purposes such as
the erection of a church or monastery. But surely such a con-
dition would not be forbidden by the Minnesota Statutes. It
does not discriminate against any class of persons because of
their religious faith. If, however, a religious institution owns an
apartment building which is operated to make money and de-
votes the income therefrom to religious or charitable purposes,
it is difficult to justify a restriction limiting occupancy of the
building to individuals of a particular religion. It is also some-
what difficult to justify limiting the use of a charitable old-folks
home or hospital operated by a religious institution to individuals
of a particular religion, yet limitations of use to individuals of a
particular religion in all these cases may be permitted by the
exception in section 605 of the Model Act. Aside from this ex-
ception, the provisions of section 605, on the whole, are preferable
to those of section 507.18 of the Minnesota Statutes.
(c) Blockbusting
Section 606 of the Model Act, unlike the State Act, contains
a provision directed against blockbusting. Section 706(b)(9)
of the Model Act also provides injured parties with a remedy
against "blockbusters" who profit financially from their tactics.
Section 606 is explained by the Uniform Law Commissioners as
follows:
"Blockbusting" is carried on by operators who induce
whites to sell their property to them at low prices by playing
on the fear that the neighborhood is about to be opened to Ne-
groes. The property is then resold at high profit to Negroes
who are prepared to pay exorbitant prices for decent housing
.... Several cities, including Detroit, have enacted ordinances
to deal with the problem, and Ohio recently became the first
state to pass a statute on the subject.
The section is a scaled-down version of the typical ordi-
nance which usually contains additional provisions making it un-
lawful to place more than one "For Sale" or "Open" sign per
75 feet of frontage of each street upon which the property being
offered for sale shall abut; to place any sign advertising the sale
of real property on any city-owned property without authority;
and to place any sign on real property located in a residentially
zoned area for the purpose of indicating that the real property
has been sold.
Although this section imposes some restriction on speech,
including speech that may be true or innocently false, consti-
tutional problems are significantly lessened by the fact that
the restraint imposed is on commercial expression, where there
is a narrower reach to the first amendment. See Valentine v.
Christensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942) .... 69
69. UN moM LAw CommnssIoNEmS' UNmroRm ATi-DscRVIINATIoN
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Blockbusting is becoming a problem in Minnesota and the
State Act should contain a provision like section 606 of the Model
Act to discourage its use.70
B. By FnANCiAL INSTITUTIONs
1. Coverage
The coverage of both Acts is comprehensive. Section 604 of
the Model Act covers any "person to whom application is made
for financial assistance," and section 363.03(2) (3) of the State
Act covers any "person, bank, bankdng organization, mortgage
company, insurance company, or other financial institution or
lender to whom application is made for financial assistance."
Section 363.03(2) (3) of the State Act covers applications for
financial assistance in connection with the "purchase, lease, ac-
quisition, construction, rehabilitation, repair or maintenance" of
real property. When read together with section 601(2) of the
Model Act, section 604 thereof omits "acquisition" but adds "ex-
change," "rental," and "improvement" of real property. No dif-
ference in result, however, is discernible because of these differ-
ences in language.
2. Prohibited Practices
Section 604 of the Model Act closely follows the language of
section 363.03 (2) (3) of the State Act in defining the discrimina-
tory practices prohibited, except that section 363.03(2)(3)(a)
of the State Act is more specific than its counterpart, section
604(1) of the Model Act. The respective provisions, however,
are equally comprehensive in prohibiting discrimination by fi-
nancial institutions.
C. PROSCRIBED REASONS FOR DIscRHm mATIoN
Section 602 of the Model Act prohibits discrimination in real
property transactions "because of race, color, religion, or national
origin." Sex is not mentioned in this connection. Section 363.03
(2) (1) and (2) of the State Act prohibit discrimination because of
"race, color, creed, religion or national origin." The previous dis-
cussion of the significance of the omission of "creed" in the
ACT 35-36 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1966). The comment of the Uniform Law
Commissioners on § 606 of the approved final Act is not so full. See
MODEL ANTI-DIsCRMUNATION ACT 24-25.
70. The new Saint Paul civil rights ordinance does forbid block-
busting. SAINT PAUL, MINN., LEGISLATIVE CODE (1967).
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Model Act, which alone differentiates it from the State Act with
respect to the prohibited grounds of discrimination in this area,
is equally applicable here.
The Model Act prohibits discrimination "because of race,
color, religion, or national origin," but does not say that it must
be because of the race, color, religion, or national origin of the
person discriminated against. Thereby, the Uniform Law Com-
missioners explain, they "intended to cover discrimination
against an individual because of the race, color, religion or na-
tional origin of another individual, such as his wife."7' 1 This
was the result achieved by both the Model Act and the State
Act in connection with the prohibition of discrimination in em-
ployment. But there is grave doubt whether the State Act
achieves this result in connection with the prohibition of dis-
crimination in real property transactions.
Sections 363.03(2) (1) (a) and (2) (a) of the State Act prohibit
certain practices vis-a-vis a "person or group of persons" be-
cause of the race, color, creed, religion, or national origin "of
such person or group of persons." Section 363.03(2)(1)(b) of
the State Act also forbids certain acts of discrimination "against
any person or group of persons" because of the race, color, creed,
religion, or national origin "of such person or group of persons,"
while section 363.03(2) (2) (b) outlaws the specified acts of dis-
crimination "against any person because of his race, color, creed,
religion, or national origin." These provisions apparently refer
to the race, color, creed, religion, or national origin of the pro-
spective purchaser, renter, or lessee of real property-the person
discriminated against. They do not seem to prohibit discrimina-
tion against an individual because of the race, color, creed, reli-
gion, or national origin of other individuals, such as his wife,
child, or friends who frequently visit him, if such other individ-
ual is not also the prospective purchaser, renter, or lessee of the
real property. The term "group of persons," as used in section
363.03 (2), would seem to refer to a group of the same race, color,
creed, religion, or national origin.
However, in the case in which a prospective purchaser,
renter, or lessee is being discriminated against because of the
race, color, creed, religion, or national origin of his wife or child,
it may be argued that real property is being denied to or with-
held from the wife or child for a proscribed reason "otherwise"
than by the rejection of the prospective purchaser, renter, or
71. MODEL ANTI-DIScRIMINATION ACT 23.
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lessee because of his race, color, creed, religion, or national origin.
Even this strained interpretation of sections 363.03 (2) (1) (a) and
(2) (a) would not be possible under sections 363.03 (2) (1) (b) and
(2) (b) because they do not contain the "otherwise deny to or
withhold from" clause. Furthermore, it would not suffice to
prohibit the rejection of a prospective purchaser, renter, or lessee
because of the race, color, creed, religion, or national origin of
the friends who will visit but will not live with him.
It should also be noted that sections 363.03(2) (1) (c), (2)
(c), and (3) (b) proscribe the indication of "any limitation, speci-
fication, or discrimination as to race, color, creed, religion, or na-
tional origin" or of "any intent to make any such limitation,
specification, or discrimination." These provisions clearly pro-
hibit indications that an individual will be discriminated against
because of the race, color, creed, religion, or national origin of
other individuals, such as his wife, child, or friends.
Furthermore, unlike the situation in sections 363.03(2) (1)
and (2) of the State Act section 363.03 (2) (3) specifically forbids
discrimination "against any person or group of persons" not only
"because of the race, color, creed, religion, or national origin of
such person or group of persons," but also because of the race,
color, creed, religion, or national origin "of the prospective occu-
pants or tenants of such real property." There is no doubt what-
soever, therefore, that a financial institution may not discrimi-
nate against an individual because of the race, color, creed, reli-
gion, or national origin of his wife or child who will also occupy
the premises. But again, discrimination because of the race,
color, creed, religion, or national origin of his friends would
apparently be allowed.
It is difficult to see why financial institutions should be for-
bidden to engage in practices which are permitted to owners of
the real property or real estate brokers or salesmen. Therefore,
subdivision(2) (3), as well as subdivisions(2) (1) (c), (2) (2) (c)
and (3) (b), may reveal a legislative intent also to prohibit such
practices on the part of owners, real estate brokers, and salesmen.
But the absence in sections 363.03 (2) (1) (a) and (b) and (2) (a)
and (b) of the specific language used in section 363.03(2) (3) (a)
makes this result difficult to reach.
The policy against discrimination reflected in the State Act
is equally applicable when an individual is discriminated against,
not because of his own race, color, creed, religion, or national
origin, but because of that of his wife, child, or friends. The




Finally, it should be mentioned that section 507.18, relating
to restrictive covenants, voids restrictions aimed at individuals
of a specified religious faith, creed, race, or color but does not void
restrictions based on national origin. No reason is apparent for
the failure to include national origin. It clearly should be in-
cluded.
D. EXEMPTIONS Am EXCEPTIONS
Section 363.02(2) of the State Act makes the prohibitions
against discrimination in real property transactions inapplicable
to the "(a) ... rental of a portion of a dwelling containing ac-
commodations for two families, one of which is occupied by the
owner," and "(b) the rental by an owner of a one-family accom-
modation in which he resides of a room or rooms in such accom-
modation to another person or persons." The counterpart pro-
vision of section 603 of the Model Act is broader in some respects,
but narrower in one, than section 363.02 (2) of the State Act.
The Model Act extends the exemption to cases in which the
owner of the duplex or one-family accommodation does not re-
side therein, but a member of his family does. Since the purpose
of the exemption is to recognize the claim to freedom of associa-
tion, even at the expense of equal access to housing, it may be
argued that the narrower exemption in the State Act is justified
because the owner has no claim, or not as strong a claim, to free-
dom of association when he does not himself reside in the duplex
or one-family accommodation. But the member of his family
residing therein does have such such a claim and there is no
reason why this claim should be satisfied only when made by
the owner. In any case, families may circumvent the more re-
stricted scope of the State Act exemption by arranging to have
the member of the family residing in the housing accommoda-
tion take title to it. If this is not a desirable alternative for some
families, family harmony-another important social objective-
should not be strained by forcing them to make title arrange-
ments solely for the purpose of qualifying for this exemption.
On balance, then, if the claim to freedom of association is to be
satisfied in this connection, the broader exemption of the Model
Act would seem to be wiser.
Section 603 of the Model Act would also exempt the rental
of a room in an apartment in which the individual making the
rental, or a member of his family, lives. There is doubt whether
the State Act's reference to the "owner of a one-family accommo-
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dation" would cover the rental of a room by a lessee of an
apartment. Obviously, the same policy should apply in the two
cases, and the State Act should be amended to remove any doubt
on this score.
The exemption made by section 603 of the Model Act is only
from the provisions of section 602, which impose certain prohibi-
tions upon owners, lessees, sublessees, assignees, managing
agents, real estate brokers, and real estate salesmen, but not
from the provisions of section 604, which impose certain prohibi-
tions upon financial institutions. Section 363.02(2) of the State
Act, by contrast, is a complete exemption from all the provisions
of section 363.03 (2). Here too, the 'Model Act would seem to be
preferable. A financial institution, for example, should not be
allowed to discriminate against an applicant for financial assist-
ance to enable the applicant to purchase a two-family home be-
cause the applicant intends to rent one of the accommodations
to a person of a particular race, color, creed, religion, or national
origin not approved by the financial institution. Nor should a
real estate broker or salesman be permitted to discriminate
against a person of a particular race, color, creed, religion, or na-
tional origin who seeks to rent one of the accommodations in a
two-family home, if the owner thereof has no objection to such
a person. In this respect, the exemptions in both the Model Act
and the State Act may be too broad.
Section 607 of the Model Act permits "a religious institution
or organization or a charitable or educational organization oper-
ated, supervised or controlled by a religious institution or organi-
zation to give preference to members of the same religion in a
real property transaction." The State Act contains no such ex-
ception. The Uniform Law Commissioners do not undertake to
justify this exception in their comment on the Model Act. Since
the preference permitted may be in connection with a transac-
tion wholly unrelated to religious purposes, it would seem to be
indefensible.
Whether these exemptions in the Model and State Acts are
advisable is a question about which reasonable men may differ,
and the position taken with respect to one of the exemptions
may reasonably differ from that taken with respect to the
other. By granting the exemptions, the State Act did not pre-
clude other resolutions of the issue on a statewide basis. Any
locality may still adopt an open-housing ordinance deleting one
or both of the exemptions. Thus each locality is given the
opportunity to decide the question of policy for itself. In view
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of the strong differences of opinion on the question, this was the
wisest course for the 1967 Legislature to pursue.
The recently enacted St. Paul civil rights ordinance does
not contain either of the exemptions found in the State Act.
However, the new Minneapolis ordinance while eliminating the
exemption for owner-occupied duplexes, does except the
occupancy of a room or rooms by not more than one family,
or not more than two persons unrelated to each other, in a resi-
dential unit where such occupancy is by leave or license of an
owner or lessee of such residential unit who occupies the same
or a portion thereof as his principal place of abode.72
It would be an encouraging sign of improvement in human
relations if more localities saw fit to follow the leadership of
St. Paul in this respect.
IV. THE PROHIBITION OF DISCRIMINATION
IN PUBLIC ACCOMMODATIONS
Prior to the 1967 amendments, section 363.03(3) of the State
Act made it an unfair discriminatory practice "for any person to
engage in any act forbidden by" section 327.09 of the Minnesota
Statutes. Section 327.09 provided that
No person shall be excluded, on account of race, color, national
origin, or religion from full and equal enjoyment of any accom-
modation, advantage or privilege furnished by public convey-
ances, theaters, or other public places of amusement, or by ho-
tels, barber shops, saloons, restaurants, or other places of re-
freshments, entertainment or accommodation.
Subdivision 3 of section 363.03 was added to the Act in 1965.7 3
At the same time the provision of section 327.09 which provided
that "Every person who violates any provision of [section
327.09], or aids or incites another to do so, shall be guilty of a
gross misdemeanor, and, in addition to the penalty therefor [set
forth in section 609.03 of the Minnesota Statutes] shall be liable
in a civil action to the person aggrieved for damages not ex-
ceeding $500" was repealed.74
The 1967 amendments did not repeal section 327.09, but sec-
tion 363.03 (3) of the State Act was amended to make it an unfair
discriminatory practice "[t]o deny an individual or group of in-
dividuals the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services,
facilities, privileges, advantages, and accommodations of a place
72. INNEAPOLIS, MIN., CoDE OF ORDINANCES § 944.020(j) (1967).
For the Saint Paul Ordinance, see SAInT PAuL, MINN., LEGISLATIVE CODE
(1967).
73. [1965] Minn. Laws ch. 585, § 2.
74. [1965] Minn. Laws ch. 585, § 1.
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of public accommodation because of race, color, creed, religion,
or national origin." In addition, subdivision 18, defining a
"place of public accommodation," was added to section 363.01.
A. AccomamoDATIoNs COVERED
Section 363.01(18) of the State Act, defining "place of pub-
lic accommodation," is taken word for word from section 401(a)
of the Model Act and is broader than the definition in section
327.09 of the Minnesota Statutes. This definition, according to
the Uniform Law Commissioners, "is intended to be all-inclu-
sive."75 Nevertheless, section 401(b) of the Model Act goes on to
specify the types of accommodations not obviously included, but
intended to be included, in the general definition and states
that this specification is "[b]y way of example, but not of limita-
tion." The State Act contains no such enumeration.
The comment on the Tentative Fourth Draft of the Model
Act explained the objectives of section 401 as follows:
Two main techniques have been employed in existing leg-
islation, neither with complete satisfaction. Some states define
"place of public accommodation" in general terms .... The
problem there has been that courts have sometimes created a
patchwork that defies rational explanation. For example, Cali-
fornia courts held that shoe stores, race track club houses and
saloons were places of public accommodation, while dramatic
schools, dentists' offices and cemeteries were not.
The other technique .... has been to list all possible places
of public accommodation with a catchall phrase "and all other
places of public accommodation." The difficulty with this solu-
tion is that it is not possible to thizk of all places and those
that are missing can be excluded, despite the catchall, under
the maxim expressio unius or ejusdem generis.
The solution offered here combines the two techniques
.... Subsection (a) contains a general, all-inclusive state-
ment and subsection (b) an explicit list of public accommoda-
tions .... 76
Until the 1967 amendments, Minnesota relied primarily on
the second of the two techniques described above and once ran
into the difficulty pointed out. Minnesota's first statute to guar-
antee equal access to places of public accommodation provided
that all persons within the jurisdiction of the state of Minnesota
shall be entitled
to the full and equal enjoyment of the accommodations, ad-
vantages, facilities and privileges of inns, public conveyances
on land or water, theaters and places of public amusements,
75. MODEL ANTI-DIscRImINATION AC 18.
76. UNIORm LAw CoMmissioNERs' UNIORm ANTi-DIscRmNA-
TioN AcT 25 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1966).
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restaurants and barber shops, subject only to the conditions
and limitations established by law and applicable alike to all
citizens of every race or color, regardless of any previous condi-
tion of servitude.77
This statute was amended in 1897 to make it unlawful for any
person (1) to exclude any other person within the jurisdiction
of the State of Minnesota, on account of race, color, or previous
condition of servitude, from the full and equal enjoyment of any
-accommodation, advantage, facility, or privilege, furnished by
innkeepers, hotel keepers, managers or lessees, common carriers,
or by owners, managers, or lessees of theaters or other places of
amusement, or public conveyances on land or water, restaurants,
barber shops, eating houses, or other places of public resort, re-
freshment, accommodation, or entertainment, or (2) to deny,
aid, or incite another to deny, to any other person because of
race, creed, or color, or previous condition of servitude, the full
and equal enjoyment of any of the accommodations, advantages,
facilities, and privileges of any hotel, inn, tavern, restaurant,
eating house, soda water fountain, ice cream parlor, public con-
veyance on land or water, theater, barber shop, or other place
of public refreshment, amusement, instruction, accommodation,
or entertainment.78 Yet Rhone v. Loomis7 9 held that a saloon,
which was not specifically named in the 1897 amendments, did
not come within any of its catchall phrases. Here is a case, said
the Minnesota Supreme Court,
where the legislature has specifically enumerated, in a some-
what descending order according to rank or importance, every
kind of place of refreshment which was presently in mind to
which they intended the act to apply, but have omitted, ap-
parently purposely, to enumerate places where intoxicating li-
quors are sold as a beverage. Such places, conceding them to
be places of refreshment, are sui generis,-of a quality essen-
tially different from, and much more numerous than, any of
those specifically enumerated. We are of opinion that upon
these facts, it is not permissible, under any proper application
of the doctrine of ejusdem generis ... to extend the meaning of
the general words 'or other places of public refreshment,' so as
to include places where intoxicating drinks are sold.80
The Legislature responded quickly, adding saloonkeepers and
saloons to the list of specified places of public accommodation
in 1899.81
77. [1885] Minn. Laws ch. 224, § 1.
78. [1897] Minn. Laws ch. 349, amending AT=,. STAT. §§ 8002-03
(1894) which incorporated [1885] Minn. Laws ch. 224 verbatim.
79. 74 Minn. 200, 77 N.W. 31 (1898). Two Justices dissented.
80. Id. at 204, 77 N.W. at 34.
81. [1899] MVinn. Laws ch. 41.
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In 1905 the definition was simplified by providing that
No person shall be excluded, on account of race or color, from
full and equal enjoyment of any accommodation, advantage,
or privilege furnished by public conveyances, theaters, or other
public places of amusement, or by hotels, barber shops, saloons,
restaurants, or other places of refreshment, entertainment, or
accommodation.8 2
The prohibitions against exclusion on account of national origin
or religion were added in 1943.83 The definition thus amended
was included in section 327.09 of the Minnesota Statutes 1965.
It is unclear why the 1967 Legislature took the "general all-
inclusive statement" of section 401(a), but not the "explicit
list of public accommodations" in section 401(b), of the Model
Act. But it would not effectuate the policy declared in section
363.12 of the State Act nor be consistent with the injunction in
section 363.11 to construe the State Act "liberally for the accom-
plishment of the purposes thereof" if the Legislature's failure to
set forth the explicit list were interpreted as indicating either
doubt that some of the accommodations listed were within the
general definition or an intent to leave it to the courts to decide
whether the listed accommodations came within the general def-
inition. It would best accomplish the purposes of the State Act
for the Legislature's action to be interpreted as reflecting its
concern that the explicit list, despite the statement in section
401(b) of the Model Act that the listing is by way of example
and not of limitation, might be used by the courts to narrow the
coverage of the general definition. Accordingly, section 363.01
(18) of the State Act should be construed to include, without
question, the accommodations speciftcally listed in section 401 (a)
of the Model Act.
B. PROHIBITED PRACTICES
Section 363.03(3) of the State Act and section 402(1) of the
Model Act are virtually identical in language, forbidding any
person to deny an individual (the State Act, but not the Model
Act, adds "or group of individuals") "the full and equal enjoy-
ment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, and
accommodations of a place of public accommodation" for the
proscribed reasons.
However, unlike the State Act, section 402(2) of the Model
Act also forbids any person
to print, circulate, post, or mail, or otherwise cause to be pub-
82. mINN. RE. LAws ch. 55, § 2812 (1905).
83. [1943] Minn. Laws ch. 579, § I.
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lished a statement, advertisement, or sign which indicates that
the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities,
privileges, advantages, and accommodations of a place of public
accommodation will be refused, withheld from, or denied an
individual... or that an individual's patronage of or presence
at a place of public accommodation is objectionable, unwelcome,
unacceptable, or undesirable,
for the proscribed reasons. It is unfortunate that the State Act
does not contain both this provision and a provision prohibiting
the news media from carrying such discriminatory advertise-
ments.
Of course, evidence of the practices prohibited by this Model
Act provision may be used to support a charge of actual discrimi-
nation in violation of section 363.03 (3) of the State Act. But un-
less prohibited, these practices may discourage individuals of a
particular race, color, creed, religion, or national origin from
seeking access to the place of public accommodation in question.
This is of moment if equal access to the resorts of Minnesota is
to be assured. It should be recalled that section 363.03 (1) (8) (b)
of the State Act, relating to employment, and sections 363.03
(2) (1) (c), (2) (c) and (3) (b), relating to real property trans-
actions, contain provisions similar to the anti-publication provi-
sion in question here. This kind of practice should also be pro-
hibited in connection with public accommodations.
C. PROSCRIBED REASONS FOR DISCRIIvNATION
The Model Act, once again, prohibits discrimination because
of race, color, religion, or national origin. The State Act adds
creed, but section 327.09 specifies only "race, color, national
origin, or religion" and not creed.
It should also be noted that it is a discriminatory practice
under section 363.03(3) of the State Act to deny an individual
access to a place of public accommodation not only because of
his race, color, creed, religion, or national origin, but also because
of that of another individual, such as his wife, child, or friend
who accompanies him.
D. EXEMiPTIONS AND EXCEPTIONS
Unlike the State Act, section 403 of the Model Act exempts
private clubs and other establishments not in fact open to the
public "except to the extent that the goods, services, facilities,
privileges, advantages, or accommodations of the establishment
are made available to the customers or patrons of another estab-
lishment that is a place of public accommodation." While this
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express provision is useful, its laudable objectives should be
achievable by proper interpretation of the general definition of
a "place of public accommodation" in section 363.01(18) of the
State Act. Any establishment that is not in fact open to the
public is not a place of public accommodation within the mean-
ing of section 363.01(18). However, to the extent that a private
club makes its accommodations available to the customers or
patrons of a place of public accommodation, it, too, is a place
of public accommodation within the meaning of the State Act.
V. THE PROHIBITION OF DISCRIMINATION
IN PUBLIC SERVICES
The 1967 amendments added subdivision 4 forbidding dis-
crimination against any person "in the access to, admission to,
full utilization of or benefit from arty public service because of
race, color, creed, religion, or national origin" to section 363.03
of the State Act. Subdivision 19 was added to section 363.01 to
define "public service" broadly so as to include "any public
facility, department, agency, board or commission, owned, oper-
ated or managed by or on behalf of the state of Minnesota, or
any subdivision thereof, including any county, city, borough,
town, township, or independent district in the state." There are
no corresponding provisions in the Model Act and it is very
doubtful that the Model Act's definition of "place of public ac-
commodation" would cover public services as defined in the
State Act. The Uniform Law Commissioners make no mention
of public services in their comment, yet the inclusion of public
services is desirable.
Of course, it is a violation of the fourteenth amendment for
a state or subdivision thereof to engage in any of the practices
now declared to be unfairly discriminatory by section 363.03(4)
of the State Act. But in the absence of section 363.03(4), the
only remedy available to the person discriminated against is a
lawsuit which such person would have to initiate himself. Such
discriminatory practices are now subject to the administrative,
adjudicatory, and remedial provisions of the State Act. This fur-
nishes an additional, and needed, weapon in the battle against
discrimination in the furnishing of public services. It also helps
to augment the authority and responsibility of the Commissioner
of Human Rights for antidiscrimination policy within the State
Administration.
It should also be noted that, under section 363.03 (4), dis-
crimination against an individual is forbidden not only because
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of his race, color, creed, religion, or national origin, but also
because of that of another individual, such as his wife or child.
VI. THE PROHIBITION OF DISCRIMINATION IN
EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS
Following the Model Act, the 1967 amendments added a new
subdivision 5 to section 363.03 of the State Act prohibiting educa-
tional institutions from engaging in certain discriminatory prac-
tices.
A. EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS COVERED
Section 363.01(20) of the State Act, which defines the educa-
tional institutions covered by section 363.03(5), is taken word
for word-with one exception-from section 501 of the Model
Act. The definition includes all public and private institutions;
but in setting forth the illustrative list of institutions covered,
the State Act, unlike the Model Act, fails to specify a "uni-
versity." It does, however, specify a "college." No reason
for the failure to specify a university is apparent, and it can
only be charged to inadvertence. Certainly the definition is
comprehensive enough to include universities. Thus the 1967
amendments, for the first time, subject public and private edu-
cational institutions to the administrative, adjudicatory, and
remedial provisions of the State Act.
B. PRoHmBiTE PRACTIcEs
Section 363.03(5) (2) of the State Act follows section 502 (1)
of the Model Act in forbidding an educational institution, for the
proscribed reasons, to "exclude, expel, limit, or otherwise dis-
criminate against an individual seeking admission as a student,
or an individual enrolled as a student." While the State Act
stops there, the Model Act adds that the prohibition is against
discrimination "in the terms, conditions, and privileges of the in-
stitution." Section 363.03(5) (1) of the State Act, however, ac-
complishes the same purpose by forbidding an educational insti-
tution to "discriminate in any manner in the full utilization of
or benefit from any educational institution, or the services ren-
dered thereby ......
Section 363.03 (5) (3) of the State Act is taken word for word
from section 502(2) of the Model Act. These sections are de-
signed to outlaw practices seeking to elicit information about the
proscribed factors from applicants for admission. However, they
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are not intended to prohibit personal interviews.8 4 The Uniform
Law Commissioners also emphasize that the prohibition in sec-
tion 502 (2) applies "exclusively to practices with respect to appli-
cants and not to students finally admitted, because the informa-
tion involved can serve proper educational purposes as to en-
rolled students."8 15 Because, even as to applicants, "there may
be occasions when legitimate purposes will be served by inquiries
as to" the proscribed factors,8 6 both the Model Act and the State
Act authorize the administrative agency to permit such inquiries
under appropriate regulations.
It is not entirely clear that it is wise policy to permit educa-
tional institutions to elicit information and keep records of the
race, color, religion, or national origin of enrolled students. The
need to have such records for legitimate research purposes and,
indeed, for effective enforcement of the antidiscrimination law,
must be acknowledged. Yet these records may also make possible
subtle and covert discrimination which will be very difficult to
detect. At this stage in the development of Minnesota's anti-
discrimination policy, it would have been preferable if the ad-
ministrative agency had also been authorized to permit or re-
fuse to permit and, if permitted, to regulate the practices in
question involving enrolled students.
Section 502(3) of the Model Act, but not the State Act, also
forbids an educational institution "to print or publish or cause
to be printed or published a catalogue or other notice or adver-
tisement indicating a preference, limitation, specification, or dis-
crimination based on the race, color, religion, or national origin
of an applicant for admission." As we saw above, this type of
prohibition is included in the provisions of the State Act relating
to discrimination in employment and in real property transac-
tions, but not in those relating to discrimination in public ac-
commodations. Such a provision is most desirable. Its absence
from section 363.03(5) of the State Act may discourage individ-
uals of a particular race, color, creed, religion, or national origin
from seeking admission to the educational institution that en-
gages in the practice in question. Again, the news media should
also be forbidden to carry the prohibited advertisements.
An argument may be made that the practices forbidden by
section 502(3) of the Model Act are prohibited by the more gen-
eral provision of section 363.03(5) (1) of the State Act, but this





argument is not very sound. It is sounder to maintain that an
educational institution which engages in a practice expressly
prohibited by section 502(3) of the Model Act is attempting in-
directly to commit a practice forbidden by section 363.03(5) of
the State Act and is therefore violating section 363.03 (2) (4) of the
State Act. The same argument may also be advanced if such a
practice is committed in connection with a public accommodation.
Its weakness is that the Legislature expressly forbade the prac-
tice in some cases but not in others. Therefore, it may be argued
that the Legislature did not intend to impose the prohibition be-
cause it did not impose it expressly. However, it is not known
whether the omission of the prohibition in connection with public
accommodations and educational institutions was intentional or
inadvertent. Certainly no good reasons can be advanced for this
omission. Thus, the general prohibition in section 363.03 (2)
(4) of the State Act should not be limited by presumptions of
legislative intent which contradict the policy and purpose of the
State Act as a whole.
Section 502(4) of the Model Act forbids an educational insti-
tution "to announce or follow a policy of denial or limitation
through a quota or otherwise of educational opportunities of a
group or its members because of" the proscribed reasons. The
Uniform Law Commissioners explain that this subsection "is
designed to prohibit discrimination against groups through,
for example, the kind of quotas that have been widely used by
certain educational institutions. 8s7 Although the State Act does
not contain this language, the following of a quota policy is pro-
hibited by section 363.03 (5) (1) and (2) of the State Act. Whether
the announcement of a quota policy is prohibited by the State
Act, however, depends upon the considerations advanced above
in discussing section 502 (3) of the Model Act and section 363.03 (2)
(4) of the State Act.
It should also be mentioned that section 504 of the Model
Act authorizes certain voluntary "imbalance plans" which may
preclude the possibility that quotas used to cure imbalance will
be invalidated under section 502 (4) of the Model Act.88
C. PROscRmED REASONS FOR DIscaumNATIoN
As in previous sections, the Model Act here, too, prohibits
discrimination because of "race, color, religion, or national ori-
87. Id.
88. Id. at 21.
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gin." The State Act adds "creed" as a proscribed factor. Sections
363.03(5) (1) and (2) of the State Act, like section 502(1) of the
Model Act, forbid discrimination against an individual not only
because of his race, color, religion, or national origin but also
because of that of any other individual, such as one or both of
his parents. This may not be the case in section 363.03 (5) (3) of
the State Act, or in its counterpart section 502(3) of the Model
Act, which prohibits only inquiries concerning the race, color,
religion, or national origin "of an applicant for admission."
However, it may be reasonably argued that an inquiry concern-
ing the race or religion of the parents of an applicant for admis-
sion is forbidden because it "attempts to elicit information" about
the applicant's race or religion. This same argument, however,
could not be made under the Model Act because section 502(3)
thereof does not contain this language of the State Act. Both
the Model and State Acts should have been drafted so as to re-
move any doubt that the practice in question was banned.
D. ExEMPTIoNS Am EXCEPTIONS
Section 363.02(3) of the State Act and its counterpart section
503(1) of the Model Act authorize religious institutions "to limit
admission or give preference to applicants of the same religion."
The exception in the Model Act extends to any "religious educa-
tional institution or ... educational institution operated, super-
vised, or controlled by a religious institution or organization."
The exception in the State Act is broader because section 363.01
(21) thereof extends it to (1) any educational institution which
is "sustained primarily," even if not "operated, supervised, con-
trolled," by a religious or denominational organization; and (2)
any educational institution which is "stated by the parent church
body to be and is, in fact, officially related to that church by
being represented on the board of the institution, and by provid-
ing substantial financial assistance and which has certified, in
writing, to the board that it is a religious or denominational
educational institution."
Finally, section 503 (2) of the Model Act, which is optional,
authorizes an educational institution "to accept and administer
an inter vivos or testamentary gift upon the terms and condi-
tions prescribed by the donor." The Uniform Law Commis-
sioners explain that this exemption is bracketed "because it is
not common in state laws and could be used to defeat the pol-
icy of the" Act.89 The exemption is not only indefensible as a
89. Id. at 20.
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matter of policy, but is clearly unconstitutional if a public educa-
tional institution is involved. The State Act wisely omits it.
VII. THE PROHIBITION OF OTHER DISCRIMINATORY
PRACTICES
Section 801 of the Model Act forbids a person, or two or
more persons, to conspire (1) "to retaliate or discriminate
against a person because he has opposed a discriminatory prac-
tice, or because he has made a charge, filed a complaint, testified,
assisted, or participated in an investigation, proceeding, or
hearing under" the Act; (2) "to aid, abet, incite, or coerce a per-
son to engage in a discriminatory practice;" (3) "willfully to
interfere with the performance of a duty or the exercise of a
power by the Commission or one of its members or representa-
tives;" or (4) "willfully to obstruct or prevent a person from
complying with the provisions of this Act or an order issued
thereunder." Section 802 bans attempts "to commit, directly or
indirectly, a discriminatory practice," and section 804 makes it a
misdemeanor, subject to a fine or imprisonment or both, for a
person willfully to resist, prevent, impede, or interfere with the
performance of a duty or the exercise of a power by the Com-
mission or one of its members or representatives.
The State Act has no counterpart to section 804, but contains
provisions comparable to sections 801 and 802 of the Model Act.
Thus sections 363.03 (1) (4)- (7) of the State Act bar employers,
labor organizations, and employment agencies-and in some in-
stances any person-from engaging in the practices prohibited
by the Model Act, and section 363.03(2) (4) forbids any person
to engage in such practices. The language of section 363.03 (2) (4)
is broader than that of sections 363.03 (1) (4)- (7). The overlap-
ping, however, does no harm.
Though section 363.03 (3) (public accommodations), section
363.03(4) (public services), and section 363.03(5) (educational
institutions) contain no such prohibitions, it is clear that sec-
tion 363.03(2) (4) would prohibit any person from engaging in
such practices with regard to public accommodations, public ser-
vices, or educational institutions.
Bonfield argues that section 801 of the Model Act may be too
broad in forbidding any person "to retaliate or discriminate
against a person" for the reasons specified. This provision seems
to him to prohibit "retaliation in respect to rights or relation-
ships other than those protected against discrimination on the
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basis of race, religion or ethnic background."90  For example,
says Bonfield, literally read, section 801 would forbid an individ-
ual to "exclude another from his card party because that other
person filed a charge with a commission or opposes practices
forbidden by the act." 91
This criticism may also be directed against section 363.03(1)
(4) of the State Act which makes it unlawful for an employer,
labor organization, or employment agency "to discharge, expel,
or otherwise discriminate against a person" for the reasons spec-
ified. It would not be wholly applicable to section 363.03(2) (4)
which forbids only "economic reprisal" against any person for
the specified reasons. Bonfield suggests the substitution of a
provision, like that in the Iowa Act, which bans discrimination
against any person, for the reasons specified, "in any of the rights
protected against discrimination" on the proscribed grounds.0 2
But the Iowa provision may be too narrow in one respect. It
would not prohibit, as does section 363.03(2)(4)(a) of the
State Act, economic reprisal divorced from situations involving
employment, real property transactions, public accommodations,
public services, or educational institutions. For example, it
would not prohibit a wholesaler from refusing to sell to a retailer
who has taken a strong public position against discriminatory
practices prohibited by law. The Iowa provision plus section
363.03(2) (4) (a) may be the ideal solution. This combination
would still be narrower than section 363.03(1) (4) of the State
Act, apart from the fact that the latter provision does not cover




Section 310 of the Model Act declares that it is not a dis-
criminatory practice for a person subject thereto
to adopt and carry out a plan to fill vacancies or hire new em-
ployees so as to eliminate or reduce imbalance with respect to
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin if the plan has been
filed with the Commission under regulations of the Commission
and the Commission has not disapproved the plan.
Similarly, section 504 of the Model Act authorizes educational
institutions, and section 608 authorizes any person subject to the
90. Bonfield II 39.
91. Id. at 39-40.
92. Id. at 40 (emphasis added). The Iowa provision in question is
IOWA CoDE ANN. § 105A.8(2) (Supp. 1966).
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prohibitions against discrimination in real property transactions,
"to adopt and carry out a plan to eliminate or reduce imbalance
with respect to race, color, religion, or national origin if the
plan has been filed with the Commission under regulations of the
Commission and the Commission has not disapproved the plan."
The State Act contains no similar provision. The new St.
Paul Civil Rights ordinance, however, sanctions plans
to reduce or eliminate imbalance with respect to race, color,
creed, national origin, or ancestry, even though such plan may
mean selectivity with respect to employment, housing, or edu-
cation, provided such plan is filed with the Department [of Hu-
man Rights] and is not disapproved by the Director [of Human
Rights] or [Human Rights] Commission on grounds it is not
a bona fide plan to reduce imbalance. 93
It should be stressed that the imbalance plan provisions of
the Model Act do not require the adoption of plans to reduce or
eliminate imbalance, nor does the Model Act express itself in
favor of the voluntary adoption of such plans. It merely assures
that nothing in the Model Act will stand in the way of the vol-
untary adoption of such plans, except the authority given to the
administrative agency to disapprove them. The Legislature in
passing the Model Act would thus leave it to others, most likely
to those subject to the Act's prohibitions and the agency admin-
istering the Act, to decide whether to put such plans into
effect. If a particular legislature has previously enacted a stat-
ute permitting or requiring the elimination of imbalance, the
Model Act also assures that its passage will not effect a repeal
by implication of the prior legislation.
The failure of the State Act to incorporate the imbalance
plan provisions of the Model Act raises serious questions about
the legality of plans to eliminate or reduce racial imbalance in
Minnesota. In examining these questions, it is also necessary
to consider the wisdom, and indeed the constitutionality, of the
Model Act provisions. Should all plans to eliminate or reduce
imbalance be outlawed? In answering this question it must be
acknowledged frankly that it is primarily the questions of racial
imbalance and preferential treatment for the Negro that are at
issue. It is not likely, for example, that voluntary plans will
be offered to eliminate or reduce imbalance with respect to re-
ligion, or that the Commission on Human Rights created by the
Model Act would approve them if they were offered.
To evaluate the imbalance plan provisions, it must be real-
ized that antidiscrimination laws are insufficient in themselves
93. SAINT PAUL, MIN., LEGISLATIVE CODE (1967).
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to make equal opportunity for the Negro a social and economic
reality. Yet achievement of this goal, as President Johnson
pledged to the graduates of Howard University in June 1965,
"is the next and the more profound stage of the battle for civil
rights."94  The President thus described the requirements of
this next and more profound stage:
You do not take a person who, for years, has been hobbled
by chains and liberate him, bring him up to the starting line of
a race and then say, "you are free to compete with all the
others," and still justly believe that you have been completely
fair.
Thus it is not enough just to open the gates of opportunity.
All our citizens must have the ability to walk through these
gates.
... We seek not freedom but opportunity. We seek notjust legal equity but human ability-not just equality as a right
and a theory, but equality as a fact and equality as a result....
To this end equal opportunity is essential, but not enough
.. .95
Antidiscrimination laws, at their best, may benefit Negroes
in the middle and working classes. They may benefit the Negro
who has the necessary qualifications for the job but is discrimi-
nated against. They may benefit the Negro doctor, lawyer,
teacher, or skilled worker who can afford to move to the sub-
urbs but is barred from entering. But they will not benefit the
unemployed or marginally-employed Negro, the Negro who
lacks skills that are currently marketable. They are not designed
to overcome the handicap of race combined with the handicaps
of poverty and lack of education.
If the Negro is to achieve "equality as a fact and equality
as a result," programs in employment, housing, and education
will be required that demand affirmative action to integrate the
Negro into the American society. To achieve the color-blind
society which must be our aim, the power-wielding institutions
of our society, private as well as public, must become color-
conscious.
Yet when official agencies of government act with color-
consciousness, questions of constitutionality inevitably arise and
Justice Harlan's dissenting cry that "Our Constitution is color-
blind"96 is brought to mind. But, of course, Justice Harlan
94. Address of President Lyndon B. Johnson at Commencement
Exercises, Howard University, Washington, D.C., June 4, 1965, at 2 (Re-
printed by Housing and Home Finance Agency, Office of the Adminis-
trator, Washington, D.C., June 1965).
95. Id.




was protesting against the separate-but-equal doctrine. We must
never forget, as Chief Justice Hughes taught us, that behind
"the words of the constitutional provisions are postulates which
limit and control."97 The postulate, indeed the "one pervading
purpose," underlying the Civil War Amendments is to insure
"the freedom of the slave race, the security and firm establish-
ment of that freedom, and the protection of the newly-made
freeman and citizen from the oppressions of those who had
formerly exercised unlimited dominion over him."98s The con-
temporary goal of our democratic society reflecting this "one
pervading purpose" must be the full integration of the Negro
into the American society.
To what extent and under what circumstances preferential
treatment for the Negro is necessary and wise in order to achieve
this goal is a complex and thorny question of policy. But the
equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment should
not stand in the way of a decision that it is necessary and wise to
accord such treatment or otherwise to act in a color-conscious
manner. The legal and policy questions involved must be separ-
ately considered with respect to employment, housing, and
education.
B. PREFERENCE IN EMPLOYMENT
The affirmative program that will benefit the Negro most is
one that will expand his job opportunities. The National Com-
mission on Technology, Automation, and Economic Progress
pointed out that with "the best of fiscal and monetary policies,
there will always be those handicapped in the competition for
jobs by lack of education, skill, or experience or because of dis-
crimination."99  Yet the Employment Act of 1946 commits the
federal government to create and maintain "conditions under
which there will be afforded useful employment opportunities
* . . for those able, willing, and seeking to work .... ,,100 To
honor this commitment, the National Commission recommended
"A program of public service employment, providing in effect,
that the Government be an employer of last resort, providing
work for the 'hard-core unemployed' in useful community enter-
97. Principality of Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 322 (1934).
98. Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 71 (1873).
99. REPORT OF THE NATIONAL CommIssIoN ON TECHNOLOGY, Au-
TOMATION, mAm ECONOMIC PROGRESS, TECHNOLOGY AND THE AmERICAN
EcoNoMY 110 (1966).
100. 60 Stat. 23, as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1021-24 (1964).
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prises."'u 0 Recently, as a crucial component of an overall pro-
gram to still unrest in the ghettos of our great cities, the Urban
Coalition, a voluntary group of leaders from all walks of Ameri-
can life, called for an emergency work program that would
create 1,000,000 new jobs to utilize the existing levels of skill of
the unemployed and underemployed in public service em-
ployment.10 2
It should be emphasized that, although such a program to
provide jobs may be a color-conscious program, in the sense that
it is intended to help alleviate racial strife and may benefit the
Negro as a group proportionately more than it benefits any
other group, it does not prefer the Negro in any way because,
obviously, whites will also benefit since they constitute the larg-
est percentage of the unemployed. This is also true of the Na-
tional Commission's recommendation that "economic security be
guaranteed by a floor under family income" which "should in-
clude both improvements in wage-related benefits and a broader
system of income maintenance for those families unable to pro-
vide for themselves.' 0 3 It is also true of programs to provide
vocational training in schools and on-.the-job and to lower mini-
mum standards of employment for certain jobs with unneces-
sarily high requirements.
Other color-conscious programs to increase job opportuni-
ties for the Negro will also raise no question of legality under
the State Act or the Constitution. For example, employers may
broadcast "their employment wanted ads to the Negro com-
munity as well as the white one."'0 4 They may use the employ-
ment services of the National Urban League.105
101. TECHNOLOGY AND THE AMERIcAN EcoNoMy, supra note 99, at
110.
102. N.Y. Times, August 25, 1967, at 1, col. 1. The Urban Coalition
suggested that the emergency work program should concentrate on "the
huge backlog of employment needs in parks, streets, slums, countryside,
schools, colleges, libraries, and hospitals." Id.
103. Note 99 supra.
104. Kaplan, Equal Justice in an Unequal World: Equality for the
Negro-The Problem of Special Treatment, 61 Nw. U.L. REV. 363, 386
(1966).
105. The Minneapolis Urban League, for example, operates a Skills
Bank, a registry of over 1000 skilled non-whites known to be unem-
ployed or marginally-employed, which is drawn on when job orders
are received or referrals are made. MNEAPOLIS LEAGUE OF WOMEN
VOTERS, MiNNEAPOLIs WoRKs FOR EQuAL OPPORTUNITY 41 (1964).
Mr. Robert Williams, former director of the Minneapolis Urban
League, reports that "more than forty companies now use the Urban
League employment service to recruit prospective employees." Among
these companies are Pillsbury Company, Northern States Power Con-
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On the other hand, there may be color-conscious programs
which do not involve preferential treatment of the Negro, yet
which' raise questions of legality under the State Act. For ex-
ample, a study by four psychologists has revealed that uniform
tests for job applicants do not accurately predict job perform-
ances of all ethnic groups. "[T]wo ethnic groups may perform
at the same average level on the job, yet one may show poorer
test scores, or one group may be superior in average perform-
ance, but not superior in average test performance."'1 6 If so,
it is apparent that a uniform test, because it does not take into
account a job applicant's cultural deprivation and impoverished
background, in fact discriminates against him. Such a uniform
test perfectly illustrates Aristotle's dictum that injustice arises
not only "when equals are treated unequally" but "also when
unequals are treated equally."
To give job applicants different tests, based upon their
different socioeconomic or ethnic backgrounds and therefore
designed better to predict the job performance of each applicant,
would not discriminate against or prefer anyone. But it would
be impossible for an employer to try to achieve equality and
justice in this manner unless he knew the socioeconomic and
ethnic backgrounds of the applicants, yet the State Act pro-
hibits the employer from finding out. Section 363.03(1) (8) (a)
forbids an employer or employment agency, before an individual
is employed, to "require the applicant to furnish information
that pertains to the applicant's race, color, creed, religion or na-
tional origin." The Model Act avoids this difficulty by author-
izing the administrative agency to allow employers and employ-
ment agencies to elicit such information (section 306(b)) and
by permitting the elicitation of such information as part of an
imbalance plan (section 310). Such an exception from the pro-
hibition otherwise applicable under an antidiscrimination law
would hardly violate the constitutional guarantee of equal pro-
tection. In fact, it would eliminate a source of unfair discrimina-
tion.
pany, Honeywell Inc., Northwestern Bell Telephone Co., Archer Daniels
Midland Company, Univac Corporation, and the Great Northern Rail-
way. Minneapolis Star, Nov. 26, 1966, at 16.
106. J. KRKPATRICK, R. EWEN, R. BARmR & R. KATZELL, DIF-
FERENTIAL SELECTION AMONG APPLICANTS FROM DIFFERENT SOCIOECO-
NOMIC OR ETHNIc BACKGROUNDS (1967). The results of this study, which
the writer has not read, are reported by M. S. Handler in the N.Y.
Times, Aug. 27, 1967, § 1, at 69, col. 1. The above quotations from the
study are set forth by Mr. Handler.
1967]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
Obviously, the affirmative programs outlined above would
do more for the Negro than any preferential treatment. But the
question remains whether such treatment is also necessary and
wise, particularly when the most essential of these affirmative
programs do not yet exist.
Fear that it may be unconstitutional for an antidiscrimina-
tion law to countenance preferential treatment may lead to the
view that it is unnecessary. 10 7 Yet the National Commission
on Technology, Automation, and Economic Progress did not think
so; it advocated "a positive program by employers and unions to
provide compensatory opportunities to the victims of past dis-
crimination . "...":108 Differences of opinion may still prevail,
however, depending upon the nature of the compensatory pro-
gram. Unfortunately, opinion may be swayed by the inapt lan-
guage of section 310 of the Model Act which implies that there
is such a thing in areas of employment as "balance" or "imbal-
ance" with respect to race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
This language immediately brings quota systems to mind. 0 9
Obviously quotas, whether minimum or maximum, which are
geared to race, color, religion, sex, or national origin would be
pernicious. Employment qualifications are not so distributed.
It is interesting that the two cases always cited against the
legality of preferential treatment for the Negro job applicant
involved such quotas. In Hughes v. Superior Court, o0 the Su-
preme Court of the United States held that a California state
court did not infringe upon the freedom of speech guaranteed
by the first amendment when it punished for contempt the vio-
lation of an injunction against picketing an employer. The pick-
eting was being carried on in support of a demand that the em-
ployer hire Negroes at one of its grocery stores, as white clerks
quit or were transferred, until the proportion of Negro clerks
to white clerks approximated the proportion of Negro to white
customers, which was then about fifty per cent. The Supreme
Court of California had held that the purpose of the picketing
was unlawful.
In assessing the claim of the picketers to freedom of speech,
in the context of the state policy that the purpose of the picket-
ing was unlawful, Mr. Justice Frankfurter, speaking for the
107. See Kaplan, supra note 104, at 386; Bonfield 1 961.
108. 1 TECN GoToY AND THE AmimcAx ECONOMY, supra note 99, at
112.
109. See Bonfield I 961.
110. 339 U.S. 460 (1950).
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Court, stressed California's antidiscrimination policy and the con-
viction of its courts that "it would encourage discriminatory hir-
ing to give constitutional protection to [the picketers'] efforts
to subject the opportunity of getting a job to a quota system."11 '
To deny to California the right to ban picketing in the cir-
cumstances of this case would mean that there could be no pro-
hibition of the pressure of picketing to secure proportional
employment on ancestral grounds of Hungarians in Cleveland,
of Poles in Buffalo, of Germans in Milwaukee, or Portuguese
in New Bedford, of Mexicans in San Antonio, of the numerous
minority groups in New York, and so on through the whole
gamut of racial and religious concentrations in various cities
.... The differences in cultural traditions instead of adding
flavor and variety to our common citizenry might well be hard-
ened into hostilities by leave of law. The Constitution does not
demand that the element of communication in picketing prevail
over the mischief furthered by its use in these situations.11"2
Section 310 of the Model Act would authorize an employer
to file a plan embodying the quota system involved in Hughes v.
Superior Court and to put it into effect unless and until the Com-
mission on Human Rights created by the Act disapproved it.
One would hope that the administrative agency would not hesi-
tate to disapprove it, but its failure to disapprove such an im-
balance plan should not be held unconstitutional. Nor is there
anything in Hughes v. Superior Court to indicate that the Su-
preme Court would hold such administrative action to be uncon-
stitutional. On the contrary, Mr. Justice Frankfurter said:
If because of the compulsive features inherent in picketing
* . . a state chooses to enjoin picketing to secure submission to
a demand for employment proportional to the racial origin of
the then customers of a business, it need not forbid the employer
to adopt such a quota system of his own free will .... 113
It is true that Mr. Justice Frankfurter was not directing his at-
tention to a provision like section 310 of the Model Act which in-
volves the state's administrative agency in the employer's volun-
tary action. However, he was speaking in the context of a case
coming up from a state which had an antidiscrimination law.
Nevertheless, it is not apparent whether he was aware that the
employer could not voluntarily adopt such a quota system in
the absence of an exception from the antidiscrimination law.
Arguably, it may be inferred, but with no certainty, that he
would not have held such an exception to be unconstitutional.
In dicta in Centennial Laundry v. West Side Organization,"14
111. Id. at 463.
112. Id. at 464.
113. Id. at 468.
114. 34 I. 2d 257, 215 N.E.2d 443 (1966).
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the Illinois Supreme Court expressed the opinion that a demand
that a laundry discharge eight white driver-salesmen and replace
them with eight Negroes called for action by the employer that
would violate the Illinois Fair Employment Practices Act and
the Federal Civil Rights Act of 1964.1r It would also violate
the Model Act and the State Act. Section 310 of the Model Act
does not authorize an imbalance plan calling for such action be-
cause it excepts from the Model Act's prohibitions only plans
"to fill vacancies or hire new employees," not to discharge white
employees on the job, in order to eliminate or reduce imbalance.
We may grant the pernicious character of any plan to pro-
portion jobs according to race or religion. Still, that does not
gainsay the need for the "systematic injection of Negroes into
all channels of professional and economic advancement."" 6
Professor Eli Ginzburg has suggested that every large and me-
dium-sized employer should be required to "absorb a limited
number of disadvantaged workers;" and that the federal govern-
ment should provide subsidies for such employers to underwrite
the indoctrination and training costs involved in upgrading the
qualifications of the handicapped workers hired and should ex-
pand the program of sheltered workships "to meet the needs of
those who cannot be employed, initially or ever, in the competi-
tive market. 1" 7
Again, it is important to note ;hat while Professor Ginz-
burg's program is race-conscious, it would treat Negro and white
persons who are handicapped for employment on an equal basis.
May it not be maintained, then, that in most cases preferential
treatment of a Negro job applicant, with qualifications lower
than those possessed by white applicants, is not because of his
race or color but because he is as handicapped or disadvantaged
as a physically disabled person? Even if this argument is not
accepted, such preference, divorced from any quota system,
should be tolerated by an antidiscrimination law, even if it goes
beyond the kinds of programs envisaged by Ginzburg." s
115. Id. at 261, 264, 215 N.E.2d at 447, 450.
116. Dunbar, The Arts of Peacemaking, 21 NEw SouTH 2, 6 (1966).
117. Ginzburg, Advice to the Urban Coalition, THE REPORTER, Sept.
7, 1967, at 19.
118. For an effective and perceptive presentation of the position
that such preferential treatment is unnecessary, undesirable, and un-
constitutional, except, possibly, by the government as an employer,
see.Kaplan, supra note 104, at 369-84.
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C. BENIGN QUOTAS IN HousING
The affirmative programs that will benefit the Negro most
in this area are those that will expand the supply of decent
housing within reach of his income, particularly in suburban
areas. Race-conscious programs but not programs which prefer
the Negro in any way, are required.
The ingredients of the needed affirmative programs are not
difficult to state in general terms. The federal government
should use its immense power and influence in this area to in-
crease the supply of standard low-income housing and locate
and market it in such a way as to make residential desegrega-
tion possible. 119
Thus, for example, large, concentrated public housing pro-
jects should be avoided. Greater use should be made of leasing
arrangements under which local housing authorities contract
for units in private apartment houses and operate them as scat-
tered-site public housing, with the tenant paying the rent he
would pay for conventional public housing.120 The rent supple-
ment program authorized by the Housing and Urban Develop-
ment Act of 1965 should also be expanded. Under this program,
"nonprofit and limited-dividend sponsors will enter into forty-
year contracts with [the Department of Housing and Urban De-
velopment] for the construction of rental projects for occu-
pancy by low-income tenants-in some cases mixed with or adja-
cent to middle-income housing." "No tenant will be required to
pay rent higher than twenty-five percent of annual family in-
come, the difference between that amount and fair market rent
being made up by rent supplement funds."'12  Urban renewal
projects should not be approved unless the relocation of the dis-
possessed residents is planned so as to reduce residential racial
concentration and eliminate racial isolation in the schools.
22
To help open up suburban areas to low-and-moderate-in-
come Negroes, the federal government should condition its vari-
ous subsidies to the suburbs under, for example, the open space
land program, the college housing program, the public works
planning program, the public facilities loan program, and the
119. See Notre Dame Conference on Federal Civil Rights Legislation
and Administration: A Report, 41 NoTRE DAME LAW. 906, 910 (1966).
120. Id. at 913. Such leasing arrangements are authorized by Hous-
ing and Urban Development Act of 1965, 79 Stat. 451 (codified in
scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
121. Id. at 9.
122. See RACIAL ISOLATION IN THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS: A REPORT OF
THE UNITED STATES ComnWIssIox ON CIVIL RIGHTS 211-12 (1967).
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water and sewers program, upon the adoption of metropolitan
area-wide plans to distribute desegregated, low-income housing
throughout the suburbs.123  Obviously such plans would also
have to provide for the necessary job opportunities and the edu-
cational facilities which the new, added population would re-
quire.
The effectuation of such a program would call for a high
degree of overall metropolitan area planning and is not a task
that the federal government can accomplish without close, local
cooperation. Minnesota has pioneered in the creation of a Met-
ropolitan Council for the Twin Cities metropolitan area.12 4 No
more worthy task for the Council can be proposed than to plan
for and promote residential desegregation throughout this metro-
politan area.
If the affirmative programs suggested above were carried
out on a sufficient scale, the problem of the "benign quota" in
housing would not arise, but most of these programs operate
on a most inadequate scale or do not yet even exist. Scattered-
site public housing is the exception, not the rule. The ghetto is
still a stark reality.
The "benign" housing quota is intended to preserve residen-
tial integration where it exists "by limiting the number of
Negroes allowed into the integrated area to a percentage below
the tipping point."'12 5 "There is a theoretical maximum minority-
group proportion which whites will tolerate in any area. Once
this proportion is exceeded, the whites will flee. The point be-
yond which one more minority group member will cause mass
white exodus is the ... tipping point .... -126
The legal questions raised by the benign quota, then, are
clear. May an individual landlord or group of home-owners
enforce such a quota to the point of 6.enying housing to a Negro
because of his race? May a state or the federal government en-
force such a quota in public housing? Is section 608 of the Model
Act, which authorizes benign housing quotas, constitutional?
In considering these questions, it should be recognized that
the benign housing quota, unlike the racial quota in employ-
ment discussed above, is not benevolent toward the individual
Negro looking for housing. At the least, it may deprive him of
123. Id. at 6-7.
124. See [1967] Minn. Laws 1112.
125. Kaplan, supra note 104, at 391.




his freedom to choose in which of several public housing pro-
jects he wishes to live. At the most, it may deprive him, be-
cause of his race, of the opportunity he would otherwise have to
live in a public housing project or in a particular neighborhood.
The quota is benign only because of its laudable purpose to
preserve integration.
The courts have not yet passed upon the constitutionality of
the benign housing quota. They have had occasion to outlaw
malevolent quotas designed to maintain patterns of segregation
or to limit the total percentage of public housing accommoda-
tions made available to the Negro to the percentage of the total
population eligible for such accommodations accounted for by
the Negro eligible population.1 27 The commentators disagree on
the question of constitutionality.1 28  Professor Kaplan, who
doubts the wisdom or constitutionality of the benign housing
quota, nevertheless concedes that it "provides the strongest justi-
fication for allowing a departure from color-blindness."' 2 9
The benign housing quota presents such a difficult question
because it opposes individual claims to group claims so sharply.
If it is agreed that the Constitution "speaks of the individual,
not of the racial or other group to which he may belong" and,
therefore, "prohibits a state from arbitrarily discriminating
against 'any person'," 30 the benign housing quota is clearly
unconstitutional. But Judge John Minor Wisdom has argued
eloquently that the claims of Negroes as a class cannot be ignored
in interpreting the Civil War Amendments. 3 1
Judge Wisdom points out that the Supreme Court itself, in
the second Brown decision, "subordinated the 'present' right
in the individual plaintiffs to the right of Negroes as a class to a
127. Favors v. Randall, 40 F. Supp. 743 (E.D. Pa. 1941); Banks v.
Housing Authority of San Francisco, 120 Cal. App. 2d 1, 260 P.2d 668(1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 974 (1954); Taylor v. Leonard, 30 N.J.
Super. 116, 103 A.2d 632 (1954).
128. See Bittker, The Case of the Checker-Board Ordinance: An
Experiment in Race Relations, 71 YALE L.J. 1387 (1962); Hellerstein, The
Benign Quota, Equal Protection and The Rule in Shelley's Case, 17 RuT-
GERS L. REV. 531 (1963); Horowitz, Discrimination in Housing, in DIs-
cRMINATIoN AND THE LAW 123-24 (Countryman ed. 1965); Kaplan, supra
note 104 at 389-98; Navasky, supra note 126, at 67-68.
129. Kaplan, supra note 104, at 396-97.
130. Banks v. Housing Authority of San Francisco, 120 Cal. App. 2d
1, 8, 260 P.2d 668, 674 (1953).
131. See generally Bessemer Bd. of Educ. v. United States, 372 F.2d
836 (5th Cir. 1966), aff'd en banc, 380 F.2d 385 (5th Cir. 1967), cert de-
nied, 36 U.S.L.W. 1383 (U.S. Oct. 10, 1967).
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unitary nonracial system-some time in the future."'132 The be-
nign housing quota subordinates the present claim of an indi-
vidual Negro family to the present opportunity of Negroes as a
class-and of some particular Negro families-to live in an inte-
grated housing project or area. It is not easy to say that this
subordination is wise and should be held to be constitutional.
But, on balance, the Supreme Court should not foreclose the pol-
icy choice, which may be made differently in different locali-
ties, by declaring the subordination of individual claims to be
unconstitutional under any and all circumstances. Nor should
the State Act foreclose such a choice by not embodying section
608 of the Model Act.
D. DE FACTO OR ADVENTITIOUS SEGREGATION IN EDUCATION
To implement the affirmative programs suggested above in
the areas of employment and housing would do more to eliminate
racial isolation in the public schools than any action school
administrators themselves might take. To make adequate edu-
cational opportunity available to all would further require, ac-
cording to the National Commission on Technology, Automation,
and Economic Progress,
compensatory education for those from disadvantaged environ-
ments, improvements in the general quality of education, uni-
versal high school education and opportunity for 14 years of
free public education, elimination of financial obstacles to higher
education, lifetime opportunities for education, training, and
retraining, and special attention to the handicaps of adults with
deficient basic education.' 33
But again these programs, which may be race-conscious but
do not in any way involve preferential treatment for the Negro,
are either nonexistent or inadequate. The facts are that "Amer-
ican public education remains largely unequal in most regions
of the country, including all those where Negroes form any sig-
nificant proportion of the population" and that "the great major-
ity of American children attend schools that are largely segre-
132. Id. at 867. In the Jefferson County case itself, however,
Judge Wisdom was holding that it was insufficient merely to satisfy the
claims of individual Negroes advanced under "freedom-of-choice" plans
for school desegregation. The school authorities were obliged to go
further and take affirmative steps to integrate the separate Negro school
and the separate white school existing in the same attendance area.
No question of sacrificing the rights of individual Negroes was involved
in the case.




gated-that is, almost all of their fellow students are of the
same racial background as they are."'134
In the Nation's metropolitan areas, where two-thirds of both
the Negro and white population now live, [racial isolation is
most severe]. Seventy-five percent of the Negro elementary
students in the Nation's cities are in schools with enrollments
that are nearly all-Negro (90 percent or more Negro), while 83
percent of the white students are in nearly all-white schools.
Nearly nine out of every 10 Negro elementary students in the
cities attend majority-Negro schools.1 3 5
And the trend is toward a further increase in the extent of racial
isolation in the public schools. 36
Racial isolation in the schools is caused only in part by pur-
poseful school segregation which the Supreme Court of the
United States has held to violate the Constitution. It is also
caused by the application of otherwise reasonable neighborhood
school plans in residential areas which are segregated as a result
of complex social, economic, and political factors described by
the United States Civil Rights Commission. 37 The Commission
recommended that new federal legislation be enacted to remove
"present racial imbalances from our public schools" and thereby
"eliminate the dire effects of racial isolation" described in its
Report.138 To this end, it suggested that Congress define as
"racially imbalanced, schools in which Negro pupils constitute
more than 50 percent of the total enrollment." 39
1. The Situation in Minnesota
By the criterion proposed by the United States Civil Rights
Commission, 14 schools in Minnesota were racially imbalanced
during the 1966-1967 school year.140 Nine of the 14 were Indian
schools in unconsolidated school districts-Vineland (elementary
school), White Earth (elementary school), Naytauwausch (ele-
mentary school), Ponsford (elementary school), Bishop Whipple
School in Redwood County near Morton, Minnesota (elementary
school), and the Red Lake Reservation schools (3 elementary
schools and 1 high school). The other four schools were located
134. COLEMAN, EQUALITY OF EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY 3 (U.S. Of-
fice of Education, National Center for Educational Statistics, 1966).
135. RACIAL IsoLATION IN THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS, supra note 122, at
199.
136. Id. at 11-12.
137. Id. at 17-71, 200-02.
138. Id. at 209.
139. Id.




in the Twin Cities: Hay elementary school in Minneapolis
(64.84% Negro and 65% Negro and Indian); Grant elementary
school in Minneapolis (53.12% Negro and 57.44% Negro and
Indian); Maxfield elementary school in St. Paul (94.82% Negro
and 96.07% non-white); and McKirney elementary school in St.
Paul (78.10% Negro and 83.85% non-white). In addition, Field
elementary school in Minneapolis (48.97% Negro) is nearly
"racially imbalanced." However, if we take Judge J. Skelly
Wright's position that a school is racially imbalanced if the per-
centage of Negro students in it exceeds the percentage of Negro
students in the entire school system,'1 4 1 dozens of schools in the
Twin Cities are racially imbalanced.
The Minneapolis Board of Education has rejected both these
definitions of racial imbalance. It "sees racial imbalance exist-
ing where one race predominates significantly beyond the ratio
of the population per racial group."'142 If the non-white student
population of Minneapolis were spread out evenly throughout the
city, the ratios in each school would be approximately ninety-
one percent white and nine per cen; non-white.143  So the Min-
neapolis School Board classified as racially imbalanced any
school in which minority group (non-white) enrollment ex-
ceeds twenty per cent in elementary schools and ten per cent
in secondary schools. 4 4 According to these criteria eleven
elementary schools (Adams, Bancroft, Blaine, Clinton, Field,
Grant, Hall, Harrison, Hay, Mann, and Willard) and four sec-
ondary schools (Central, Bryant, Thcanklin, and Lincoln) were
racially imbalanced. 45
141. Wright, Public School Desegregation: Legal Remedies for De
Facto Segregation, 40 N.Y.U.L. REV. 285, 303 (1965).
142. MINNEAPOLis BOARD OF EDUCATION, GUIDELINES-HUmAN RELA-
TIONS, MINNEAPOLIS Pu3LIC ScHooLs (Undated Work Copy issued to
the media of public information).
143. Id. It is a fact, however, that Negro students account for dif-
fering percentages of all elementary school students, all junior high
students, and all senior high students.
144. Negroes in the 1966-1967 school year comprised 7.69% of all
elementary school students, and 4.15% of all secondary school students,
in the Minneapolis public schools. Data supplied by Minnesota De-
partment of Education.
145. It would not take much of a stretch to include as racially im-
balanced three other elementary schools-Agassiz (17.75% non-white),
Lyndale (19.82% non-white), and Madison (19.05% non-white)--and
one other secondary school-Phillips (15.98% non-white). Data sup-
plied by Minnesota Department of Education.
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2. Programs To Reduce Racial Imbalance in Minnesota
On January 9, 1967, the Minnesota Department of Education
issued a statement declaring it to be its policy "to encourage and
assist each school board in the State of Minnesota toward achieve-
ment of racial balance in each school building of the district
wherein it has been determined that racial imbalance exists."' 4 6
By merely stating that racial imbalance "exists in a school build-
ing when the number of non-white pupils enrolled is substan-
tial,"' 47 the State Board of Education left it to each local school
board to define racial imbalance for itself.
The Minneapolis School Board pledged itself "to make every
reasonable effort to arrest, reduce and eliminate de facto segre-
gation in the schools toward maintaining racial balance in the
school system," including "planning of new schools in such a way
as to disperse non-white pupils, the use of re-districting of
school attendance areas, open enrollments, and other techniques,
when consistent with sound educational and planning practices,
in order to achieve reasonable balance."'148 However, while
the long-range goal of racial balance is being achieved, the
Board will seek to upgrade existing school buildings and cur-
riculum on the premise that better education can be achieved
in all neighborhoods irrespective of economic circumstances
and/or racial composition of pupils.149
For the 1967-1968 school year, the Minneapolis School Board
is placing principal reliance upon an open enrollment policy
to reduce racial imbalance in the Minneapolis public schools.
This policy has many variants but, essentially, it "permits a stu-
dent to attend an underutilized school outside of the attendance
zone in which his residence is located."' 59 To carry out the
School Board's policy, the Minneapolis Superintendent of Schools
authorized the "special transfer of individual students upon re-
quest by the parents or guardian when such transfers will
improve racial balance in both the home and the receiving
school."' 5l
146. POLICY ON RACIAL IVBALANcE AN DIscRImvNATIoN IN PUBLIC
SCHOOLS, MINNESOTA DEPARTMENT oF EDUCATION CODE IX-B-445 (1967).
147. The statement of the State Department of Education is quoted
in GUIDELINEs-HUmAN RELATIONS, MINNEAPOLIS PUBLIC SCHOOLS, su-
pra note 142, at 2.
148. Id. at 1.
149. Id. at 2.
150. RACIAL ISOLATION IN THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS, supra note 122, at
147.
151. Superintendent's Office, Statement on Special Transfers, Min-
neapolis Public Schools, Aug. 3, 1967, at 1. The outline of the transfer
policy that follows is taken from this document.
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Non-white students will be permitted to transfer out of an
elementary school if its non-white student population is at least
twenty per cent of the total student body; and out of a sec-
ondary school if its non-white student population is at least
ten per cent of the total student body. Conversely, white stu-
dents will be permitted to transfer out of an elementary school
if its white student population is eighty per cent or more of the
student body; and out of a secondary school if its white student
population is ninety per cent or more of the total student body.
Even if these conditions are met, the transfer will not be
permitted unless it will also improve the racial balance, and
will not result in overcrowding, in the receiving school. A stu-
dent who wishes to transfer must secure an application from
the principal of the school he would otherwise attend. The ap-
plication must indicate that the pupil's parents "desire a transfer
of their children on a permanent basis to improve the racial
balance in the school their children presently attend and in
the school to which they are transferring." The principal must
recommend the transfer. The recommendation and application
will then be forwarded for review by a special advisory commit-
tee working with the Director of Urban Affairs of the Minneap-
olis Public Schools.
The advisory committee will make a recommendation to the
Assistant Superintendent of Elementary Education or the As-
sistant Superintendent of Secondary Education, who will in
turn notify the principal in the home school as to whether or
not the request for transfer to improve racial imbalance is ap-
proved.152
The parents or guardian of the student permitted to transfer
will then have to bear the transportation costs involved. The
School Board, however, has indicated that school district trans-
portation "may be furnished when a group of 20 or more students
from a given school district are involved in special transfers."'1 3
The United States Civil Rights Commission has exposed the
weaknesses of any open enrollment plan as a means of reducing
racial imbalance in the schools. The "requirement that trans-
152. The advisory committee consists of one elementary principal
appointed by the Assistant Superintendent in charge of Elementary
Education, one junior high and one senior high principal appointed by
the Assistant Superintendent in charge of Secondary Education, the
Consultant in School Social Work or one other member of the Human
Relations Committee, and the Director or Assistant Director of Urban
Affairs. Id.
153. GuIDELINEs-HumAN RELATIONS, MINNEAPOLIS PUBLIC SCHOOLS,
supra note 142, at 5.
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portation expenses be paid by the family imposes obvious limita-
tions on achieving significant desegregation."'' 54 The number of
transfers is limited by available space in the receiving schools.155
Many Negro families, like many white families, prefer to have
their children attend a school close to home .... Negro parents
who gladly might participate in a desegregation plan affecting
the entire community may be reluctant to require their children
to assume the role of pioneers in an almost all-white school and
they may resent being forced to assume the entire burden of
desegregation themselves. 5 6
In short, "[r] elying on open enrollment places the responsibility
for school integration on the uncoordinated actions of thousands
of parents, rather than on the planned actions of the schools
themselves."' 5 7  Finally, "open enrollment may drain from ma-
jority-Negro schools the students who have the highest aspira-
tions."'r 8
While these weaknesses of the open enrollment policy may
not be so glaring in Minneapolis, because of the relatively few
majority-Negro schools in the city, they give warning that failure
threatens the School Board's transfer policy. Experience to date
gives no cause for optimism. For the Fall of 1967, only 73 appli-
cations to transfer were received; 69 were granted and 4 were
rejected because of overcrowded facilities in the schools to which
transfer was requested. 59 On September 26, 1967, the School
Board voted to provide its first and only free bus service for 22
non-white pupils transferring from Willard Elementary School
to Shingle Creek Elementary School. 60 The transfers will not
eliminate racial imbalance in any school in which it existed prior
thereto. Yet under the transfer policy, there were about nine
154. RACIAL ISOLATION IN THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS, supra note 122, at
147.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 148.
157. ADVISORY CosInI ON RACIAL IMBALANCE AND EDUCATION,
MASSACHUSETTS STATE BOARD OF EDUCATION, BECAUSE IT Is RIGHT-
EDUCATIONALLY 4 (1965), quoted id. at 148.
158. RACIAL ISOLATION IN THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS, supra note 122, at
149.
159. This information was supplied by the Urban Affairs Office of
the Minneapolis Superintendent of Schools. There were 43 transfers
from elementary schools (17 from South Minneapolis and 26 from
North Minneapolis); 21 from junior high schools (10 from South Min-
neapolis and 11 from North Minneapolis) and 5 from senior high schools
(4 from South Minneapolis and I from North Minneapolis).
160. Minneapolis Tribune, Sept. 27, 1967, at 21, col. 8. The bus
service is estimated to cost $6000 for the school year. The Board also
urged the formation of a city-wide citizens group to coordinate fund-




hundred openings in the elementary schools, seven hundred
openings in the junior high schools and twelve hundred open-
ings in the senior high schools, for non-white students.1' 1
St. Paul has had a more far-reaching and effective program
to eliminate racial imbalance in its schools. Its open enrollment
policy' 62 has been more successful primarily because a volun-
teer citizens' group, Parents for Integrated Education (PIE), has
encouraged transfers and raised money to pay for the transporta-
tion costs involved.16 3 The St. Paul School Board has now guar-
anteed that it will provide buses in the future for pupils assisted
by PIE who wish to continue attending white elementary
schools. 64
The St. Paul School Board has also ordered the closing of the
McKinley elementary school (83.85% non-white) and will bus
its 430 former pupils, together with 93 volunteer pupils from the
Maxfield elementary school (96.07% non-white) to 9 schools
serving predominantly white neighborhoods 6 5 It also plans to
close the Maxfield elementary school next year and bus its 483
pupils into white neighborhood schools. 6 It should be men-
tioned here that in 1965, the Minneapolis School Board closed the
Warrington elementary school, which had been three-fourths
Negro, and distributed its pupils to other schools.
The fact that non-white school children in the Twin Cities
account for a relatively small percentage of the total school
population, compared to the ratios it most major urban centers,
makes it feasible to eliminate racial imbalance in the schools of
these cities. This opportunity must not be lost. The possibility
of using suburban schools as receiving schools for non-white
children, or building educational parks 67 which children from
the suburbs as well as the cities might attend, should also receive
the urgent attention of the newly-formed Metropolitan Council.
3. Legality of Programs To Reduce Racial Imbalance
Many of the programs to reduce racial imbalance in the
schools, while obviously the product of color-consciousness, raise
161. Id., Sept. 3, 1967, at 6B, col. 4.
162. See UPGRADING EDUCATION IN THE SELBY-DALE AREA OF ST. PAUL
123 (Domian ed. 1965).




167. An "educational park" is a new facility "consolidating a range
of grade levels on a single campus or site." RACIAL ISOLATION IN THE
PUBLIC SCHOOLS, supra note 122, at 167-68.
[Vol. 52:231
ANTI-DISCRIMINATION ACTS
no question of legality under the State Act. This is true of such
desegregation programs as merging the attendance areas of two
or more schools serving the same grades ("pairing"); making
one school building become a central facility for several grades
servicing the entire school district ("central schools"); closing a
particular school and dispersing its students among the remain-
ing schools; strategically selecting school sites, involving the
establishment of new attendance areas and concomitant changes
in old attendance areas; changing attendance area boundaries;
creating supplementary centers and magnet schools to offer
specialized programs, either in existing schools or new facilities,
to students from all or many parts of the city; establishing edu-
cational complexes which would group existing schools and con-
solidate their attendance zones; and building new educational
parks.168
However, the transfer policy of the Minneapolis School
Board does raise questions of legality under the State Act which
the imbalance plan provisions of section 504 of the Model Act
would obviate. It should be recalled that section 363.03(5) (2)
of the State Act forbids any educational institution to "exclude,
expel, limit, or otherwise discriminate against an individual seek-
ing admission as a student ... because of race, color, creed, re-
ligion, or national origin." Under the Minneapolis transfer plan,
for example, a non-white student may not be permitted to
transfer to a school of his choice if the non-white student popu-
lation in the school he is attending is less than twenty per cent
(elementary school) or ten per cent (secondary school) of the
total student body. Even if this condition is satisfied, he will
not be permitted to transfer to a school of his choice unless his
transfer will improve the racial balance in that school. Analo-
gous conditions, as we saw, restrict the transfer of white pupils.
Is the white or non-white student who is not permitted to trans-
fer to a school of his choice, because he cannot satisfy the re-
quirements of the transfer policy, excluded or limited because of
his race in violation of section 363.03(5) (2) of the State Act?
Read literally, this provision calls for an affirmative answer.
Read in context, the forbidden exclusion or limitation of in-
dividuals seeking admission as students must amount to discrim-
ination. It may be argued that there is no discrimination in the
Minneapolis transfer policy because, in its absence, no student
168. For descriptions and illustrations of these desegregation tech-




would have a right to transfer to a school outside his attendance
area. The fact remains, however, that the transfer policy confers
a privilege or benefit upon some students, and denies it to others,
because of their race or color. It is unfortunate, therefore, that
doubts about the legality of transfer plans like those adopted in
the Twin Cities were not removed by the enactment of the imbal-
ance plan provisions of section 504 of the Model Act.
It should also be pointed out that the Minneapolis transfer
plan undoubtedly violates section 3,33.03 (5) (3) of the State Act
which forbids an educational institution to "make or use a ...
form of application for admission that elicits or attempts to elicit
information . . . concerning the race, color, creed, religion, or
national origin of an applicant for admission, except as per-
mitted by regulations of the department." The Minneapolis
transfer plan has not yet been authorized by regulations of the
Department of Human Rights. The school authorities do not
seem to be aware that such authorization is required or that this
requirement puts the fate of all plans to reduce or eliminate
racial imbalance in the public schools of Minnesota in the hands
of the Commissioner of Human Rights.
Finally, plans to reduce racial imbalance in Minnesota public
schools also raise questions under section 127.08 of Minnesota
Statutes which provides: "No district shall classify its pupils
with reference to race, color, social position, or nationality,
nor separate its pupils into different schools or departments upon
any of such grounds." It is apparent, however, that this provi-
sion is aimed at classification with. the purpose of separation,
not integration. To use this statute to outlaw plans to reduce
racial imbalance would effectuate the separation of the races it
was intended to prevent. It may be sounder to argue that a
school district which follows a neighborhood school policy which
it knows will perpetuate racial isolation is violating this statute.
The legality of the transfer policies adopted in the Twin
Cities also depends upon the constitutional status of efforts to
eliminate or reduce racial imbalance in the public schools. Al-
though the Supreme Court of the United States has not decided
the question, strong arguments have been advanced by commen-
tators that a state has an affirmative obligation under the equal
protection clause of the fourteenth amendment to eliminate ra-
cial isolation in the public schools.169 The arguments are multi-
169. See generally RACIAL ISOLATION IN THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS, supra
note 122, Legal Appendix, Racial Isolation: The Role of Law, at 219-
263. For representative views of such commentators, see Carter, De
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pronged- (a) there is state action because the state operates
the public schools and compels attendance; 170 (b) government
housing programs have contributed significantly to the creation
and maintenance of segregated residential areas; 17 ' (c) govern-
ment is responsible for the racial isolation in the public schools
because of "its deliberate choice to assign children to schools on
the basis of geographic criteria when it knows that, given the
ghettoized residential patterns, the implementation of this choice
will yield racially imbalanced schools;"'1 72 and (d) the children
assigned to imbalanced schools are deprived of the equal protec-
tion of the laws because "the educational opportunity afforded
Negro children required to attend such schools is unequal to that
afforded children attending the other public schools of the com-
munity."'73  This latter, crucial argument is buttressed by the
findings of the United States Civil Rights Commission which
describe the relationship "between the racial composition of
schools and the achievement and attitudes of most Negro stu-
dents ... when all other factors are taken into account."' 74
To date, no federal court of appeals has held that the Con-
stitution imposes an affirmative obligation upon the states to
eliminate segregation in the public schools resulting from adher-
ence to a neighborhood school policy. There are intimations
throughout the opinion of Judge Wisdom for the Fifth Circuit in
United States v. Jefferson County Board of Education.75 from
which it may be argued that the Fifth Circuit would impose such
a constitutional obligation. But Judge Wisdom also emphasized
that the Fifth Circuit "has not had to deal with nonracially
motivated de facto segregation, that is, racial imbalance resulting
Facto School Segregation: An Examination of the Legal and Constitu-
tional Questions Presented, 16 W. RES. L. REv. 502 (1965); Fiss, Ra-
cial Imbalance in the Public Schools: The Constitutional Concepts,
78 HARV. L. REV. 564 (1965); Sedler, School Segregation in the North
& West: Legal Aspects, 7 ST. Louis L.J. 228 (1962); Wright, Public
School Desegregation: Legal Remedies for De Facto Segregation, 40
N.Y.U.L. REV. 285 (1965).
For contrary views, see Block, Does the Fourteenth Amendment
Forbid De Facto Segregation?, 16 W. RES. L. REv. 532 (1965); Kaplan,
Segregation Litigation and the Schools-Part I1: The General Northern
Problem, 58 Nw. U.L. REV. 157, 182 (1963).
170. Sedler, supra note 169, at 229.
171. Carter, supra note 169, at 514.
172. Fiss, supra note 169, at 584.
173. Id. at 588.
174. RACIAL ISOLATION IN THE PUBLIc ScHooLs, supra note 122, at
204. See also id. at 73-114, 202-04.
175. 372 F.2d 836 (5th Cir. 1966), aff'd en banc, 380 F.2d 385 (5th
Cir. 1967), cert. denied 36 U.S.L.W. 3138 (U.S. Oct. 10, 1967).
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fortuitously in a school system based on a single neighborhood
school serving all white and Negro children in a certain attend-
ance area or neighborhood.' 76 It was still grappling with school
systems in which an attendance area or neighborhood was bi-
racially populated but in which separate schools for Negro and
white children nevertheless continued to exist, in fact, as a
result of ineffectual "freedom-of-choice" plans. 7 7
Sitting as a district court, Judge J. Skelly Wright of the
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held un-
constitutional racial isolation in the public schools of the District
resulting from a neighborhood school policy on the ground that
it deprived the District's "Negro and poor public school children
of their right to equal educational opportunity with the District's
white and more affluent public school children."' 7 8 Judge
Wright reiterated the basic finding, of the United States Civil
Rights Commission:
Racially and socially homogenous schools damage the minds
and spirit of all children who attend them-the Negro, the
white, the poor and the affluent-and block the attainment of
the broader goals of democratic education, whether the segrega-
tion occurs by law or by fact. 179
Judge Wright based his holding of unconstitutionality on three
principal grounds: (a) the equal protection clause was violated
because the predominantly Negro schools, in fact, were not equal
176. Id. at 852.
177. Id. at 867-88. See also Kelly v. Altheimer, Arkansas Pub.
School Dist. No. 22, 378 F.2d 483 (8th Cir. 1967); Evans v. Ennis, 281
F.2d 385 (3d Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 802 (1961).
178. Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 4101 (D.D.C. 1967).
179. Id. at 406. Judge Wright also found that (1) the District
School Board relaxes its neighborhood school policy only through the
use of optional zones which permit white children in a Negro school
district to transfer to a white or more nearly white school; (2) facul-
ties are segregated; (3) median annual per pupil expenditure in pre-
dominately Negro elementary schools has been $100 below the median
annual per pupil expenditure in predominately white schools; (4)
white schools are underpopulated while Negro schools are overcrowded;
and (5) the "track system" within the schools operates to discriminate
against Negroes and deny them "equal opportunity to obtain the white
collar education available to the white and more affluent children."
Id. at 406-07.
Judge Wright issued a decree ordering (1) the abolition of the op-
tional zone system which permitted white pupils to transfer out of
Negro schools; (2) the abolition of the "track system;" (3) faculty
integration; (4) transportation for volunteering children in the over-
crowded schools east of Rock Creek Park to the underpopulated
schools west of the Park; and (5) the submission to the court by Oct. 2,
1967 of a plan for pupil assignment which would eliminate the racial
and economic discrimination found to exist in the operation of the
District's school system. Id. at 407-08.
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in material respects to the predominantly white schools;8 0 (b)
de facto or adventitious school segregation in the District also
violated the equal protection clause because it deprived Negro
children of equal educational opportunity and was without justi-
fication;'"' and (c) "the doctrine of equal educational oppor-
tunity-the equal protection clause in its application to public
school education-is in its full sweep a component of due process
binding on the District under the due process clause of the Fifth
Amendment."'8 2
A federal district court in Massachusetts has also held de
facto or adventitious segregation to be unconstitutional because
it failed to provide equal educational opportunities for all chil-
dren, saying:
It is neither just nor sensible to proscribe segregation hav-
ing its basis in affirmative state action while at the same time
failing to provide a remedy for segregation which grows out of
discrimination in housing, or other economic or social factors.
Education is tax supported and compulsory, and public school
educators, therefore, must deal with inadequacies within the
educational system as they arise, and it matters not that the
inadequacies are not of their making. This is not to imply
that the neighborhood school policy per se is unconstitutional,
but that it must be abandoned or modified when it results in
segregation in fact.' 8 3
The First Circuit, however, vacated the district court's order
requiring the school authorities to present a plan "to eliminate to
the fullest extent possible racial concentration in its elementary
and junior high schools within the frame work of effective edu-
cational procedures" and ordered the district court to dismiss
the complaint without prejudice because the school officials were
voluntarily taking the action required by the district court's
order. 8 4 The First Circuit read the district court's order as
giving Negro students merely a "right to insist that the [school
authorities] consider their special problems along with all other
relevant factors when making administrative decisions," but not
an absolute right to have "what the court found to be 'tanta-
180. 269 F. Supp. at 495-99.
181. Id. at 503-11.
182. Id. at 493.
183. Barksdale v. Springfield School Comm., 237 F. Supp. 543 (D.
Mass. 1965). Two other district courts are in accord. Blocker v. Board
of Educ., 226 F. Supp. 208 (E.D.N.Y. 1964) (Manhasset); Branche
v. Board of Educ. 204 F. Supp. 150 (E.D.N.Y. 1962) (Hempstead).
See also Jackson v. Pasadena City School Dist., 31 Cal. Rptr. 606, 609,
610, 382 P.2d 878, 881, 882 (1963).




mount to segregation' removed at all. costs."' 85 "We can," it con-
cluded, "accept no such constitutional. right."'
86
The Fourth, Sixth, Seventh, and Tenth Circuits have held
that the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment
does not impose an affirmative obligation upon states to elimi-
nate de facto or adventitious segregation in the public schools.
8 7
A few courts, indeed, have gone so far as to hold that state efforts
to eliminate or reduce racial isolation in the public schools are
themselves unconstitutional. The Illinois Supreme Court has
invalidated the Armstrong Act which required school officials
to eliminate racial imbalance in the public schools of Illinois on
the ground that "programs to create equal educational opportun-
ities must be administered without regard to race."'u 8 A federal
district court in Virginia outlawed a desegregation plan based
on a transfer policy essentially similar to that adopted in Min-
neapolis. 8 9 Most federal and state courts, however, have upheld
the constitutionality of state programs to eliminate or reduce
racial imbalance in the public schools. 90
185. Id. at 264.
186. Id.
187. Swann v. Charlotte - Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 369 F.2d 29 (4th
Cir. 1966); Deal v. Cincinnatti Bd. of Educ., 369 F.2d 55 (6th Cir. 1966),
cert. denied, 36 U.S.L.W. 3138 (U.S. Oct. 10, 1967); Gilliam v. School Bd.,
345 F.2d 325 (4th Cir.), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 382
U.S. 103 (1965) (Hopewell); Downs v. Bcard of Educ., 336 F.2d 988 (10th
Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 914 (1965) (Kansas City); Bell v. School
City of Gary, 324 F.2d 209 (7th Cir. 1E,63), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 924
(1964); Accord, In re Skipwith, 14 Misc. 2d 325, 180 N.Y.S.2d 852 (1958).
188. Tometz v. Board of Educ., 36 U.S.L.W. 2011 (Ill. Sup. Ct.
June 22, 1967).
189. Beckett v. School Bd. (Norfolk), 269 F. Supp. 118 (E.D. Va.
1967). Under a desegregation plan proposed for the 1967-1968 school
year, Norfolk was divided into five senior high school attendance areas.
Students living in four of the areas were required to attend the high
school in the area. The remaining area was served by an all-Negro
high school. The Negro pupils attending this high school were given
the opportunity to transfer to the high school in any one of three other
areas but not the fourth because the Negro student population in the
high school in the fourth area was already increasing. The equal pro-
tection clause, said the court, "commands that if a choice within a
given area is given to child No. 1, an equivalent choice must be given to
child No. 2, irrespective of race." "[A]ny freedom of choice plan re-
quires that an equal choice must be given to all. This means that
students living within any of the five areas may elect to attend a school
outside the areas of their residence." 269 F. Supp. at 128 (original
italics).
190. Offerman v. Nitkowski, 378 F.2d 22 (2d Cir. 1967) (the Second
Circuit thought that the allegation of unconstitutionality with respect
to Buffalo's program to reduce racial imbalance was so insubstantial
that a three-judge district court did not have to be convened); Dowell
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Thus the Second Circuit has held that if race is considered
"to insure against, rather than to promote deprivation of equal
educational opportunity, we cannot conceive that our courts
would find that the state denied equal protection to either race
by requiring its school boards to act with awareness of the prob-
lem." 91 Clearly, any decision by the school authorities, even
if color-blind, will have an effect on the racial composition of
the schools. It is inconceivable, as the Second Circuit stated,
that the equal protection clause forbids school authorities to be-
come alive to this effect and consciously seek an effect that will
reduce rather than increase racial isolation in the public schools.
Whether the Minnesota courts will interpret section 363.03
(5) (2) of the State Act as outlawing plans to reduce racial im-
balance, such as those adopted in the Twin Cities, may well de-
pend on their views about the constitutional questions raised by
the existence of de facto or adventitious school segregation.
It should be mentioned, too, that imbalance plans under
section 504 of the Model Act may go so far as to authorize educa-
tional institutions to admit, on a preferred basis, a certain num-
ber of Negro students. 1 2  This is the present practice of many
educational institutions and is probably warranted. The State
Act, however, casts grave doubt on its legality.
v. School Bd., 244 F. Supp. 971 (W.D. Okla. 1965); Fuller v. Volk, 230
F. Supp. 25 (D.N.J. 1964), vacated on other grounds, 351 F.2d 323
(3d Cir. 1965), af-'d on rehearing, 250 F. Supp. 81 (D.N.J. 1966). See
also Springfield School Comm. v. Barksdale, 348 F.2d 261, 266 (1st Cir.
1966).
The following state court decisions are in accord: Connecticut -
Guida v. Board of Educ., 26 Conn. Supp. 121, 213 A.2d 843 (1965) (New
Haven); Massachusetts - School Comm. of Boston v. Board of Educ., 35
U.S.L.W. 2743 (Mass. Sup. Jud. Ct., June 9, 1967); New Jersey - Morean
v. Board of Educ., 42 N.J. 237, 200 A.2d 97 (1964); Schults v. Board
of Educ., 86 N.J. Super. 29, 205 A.2d 762 (1965); New York - Balaban v.
Rubin, 20 App. Div. 2d 438, 248 N.Y.S.2d 574, affd, 14 N.Y.2d 193, 250
N.Y.S. 2d 281, cert. denied, 379 U.S. 881 (1964) (New York City); Ad-
dabbo v. Donovan, 43 Misc. 2d 621, 251 N.Y.S.2d 856 (1964), aff'd,
22 App. Div. 2d 383, 256 N.Y.S.2d 178, affd, 16 N.Y.2d 619, 261 N.Y.S.
2d 63 (1965) (New York City); Schnepp v. Donovan, 43 Misc. 2d
917, 252 N.Y.S.2d 543 (1964) (New York City); Strippoli v. Bickal, 21
App. Div. 2d 365, 367, 250 N.Y.S.2d 969, 972 (Rochester) rev'g 42 Misc.
2d 475, 248 N.Y.S.2d 588 (1964); Di Sano v. Storandt, 22 App. Div. 2d 6,
253 N.Y.S.2d 411 (1964), rev'g 43 Misc. 2d 272, 250 N.Y.S.2d 701 (1964);
Katalinic v. City of Syracuse, 49 Misc. 2d 734, 254 N.Y.S.2d 960 (1964);
Etter v. Littwitz, 47 Misc. 2d 473, 262 N.Y.S.2d 924 (1965) (Rochester);
Vetere v. Allen, 15 N.Y.2d 259, 258 N.Y.S.2d 77 (1965) (Malverne)..
191. Offerman v. Nitkowski, 378 F.2d at 24.
192. MODEL ANTI-DIscRvINATION ACT 21. Of course, once such
Negro students are admitted, they should be required to satisfy the




On the whole, it seems apparent that in rejecting the various
provisions of the Model Act authorizing imbalance plans, the
1967 Legislature did not give adequate consideration to the im-
portant and complex problems raised by affirmative plans to
build an integrated American society. Wisdom should have dic-
tated following the Model Act because this expedient would have
preserved the legal status quo. It would have left it to local em-
ployers, employment agencies, labor organizations, home owners,
real estate brokers and salesmen, financial institutions, and
school and political authorities, under the leadership of the Com-
missioner of Human Rights, to decide whether to act affirma-
tively to bring the Negro into all walks of American life. Even-
tually, of course, the Supreme Court of the United States will
speak authoritatively on the subject. In the field of education,
indeed, the Legislature might have gone further and imposed
affirmative obligations upon the State Commissioner of Educa-
tion to require and assist local school authorities to eliminate
racial imbalance in the Minnesota public schools.
IX. ADMINISTRATIVE ORGANIZATION
A. THE NEW DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RIGHTS
Prior to the 1967 amendments, the State Act was adminis-
tered by a State Commission Against Discrimination (SCAD),
consisting of nine members, with at least one from each of the
eight congressional districts of Minnesota. SCAD succeeded the
Minnesota Fair Employment Practices Commission in 1961. Its
members were appointed for five-year, staggered terms by the
Governor with the advice and consent of the Senate. The Gov-
ernor was empowered to remove a member only "upon a finding
of inefficiency, neglect of duty, misconduct or malfeasance in
office" and after notice and hearing. But the chairman was
named by the Governor and served at his pleasure. The mem-
bers of SCAD were not paid to perform their official duties but
received "reimbursement for necessary traveling expenses in-
curred on official business" in the manner provided by law for
state employees. A full-time, salaried Executive Director was
appointed by SCAD and served at its pleasure.
Essentially, this is the pattern of administrative organization
embodied in section 701 of the Model Act. As the Uniform Law
Commissioners state, the Model Act follows "the prevailing pat-
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tern of an independent administrative body.' 193 To create "one
centralized effective and efficient agency" in the "whole area
of human relations," Governor Harold LeVander, in his In-
augural Address, urged the establishment of a State Department
of Human Relations. 194 The Governor proposed to entrust the
new Department with the functions performed by SCAD, the
Governor's Commission on Human Rights, the Governor's Com-
mission on the Status of Women, and the State Commission on
Indian Affairs.195 The Governor pledged that his budget mes-
sage would reflect his concern that the new Department have
adequate staff and funds.' 96 A proposal to create a Department
of Human Rights, as it came to be called, was embodied in the
platforms of both political parties for the 1966 elections. 97 Bills
to effectuate the proposal were introduced in the House and
Senate with bipartisan support 9 8 and the proposal became law.
1. The Commissioner of Human Rights
Section 363.04(1) of the State Act establishes a new Depart-
ment of Human Rights, headed by a Commissioner of Human
Rights. The Commissioner is to be appointed by the Governor,
with the advice and consent of the Senate. He is to "serve at the
pleasure of the governor for a four-year term, which shall coin-
cide with the term of the governor." The Commissioner is to be
a full-time officer of the State, receiving compensation "at the
rate prescribed by law."
193. MODEL AxTI-DiscRnINATIIoN ACT 26.
194. Inaugural Address of Governor Harold LeVander, Sixty-fifth
Session of the Minnesota Legislature, January 4, 1967, at 18.
195. In addition to SCAD, only the Indian Affairs Commission has
statutory status. See NMnN. STAT. § 3.922 (1965). The primary duty
of the Indian Affairs Commission is "to acquire information" and make
reports and recommendations so that "adequate legislation may be en-
acted when it is required" and "[pjlans and programs ... worked
out with Indian people who need assistance in finding employment,
acquiring education, improving housing, getting medical care, developing
natural resources and generally in becoming self-sufficient." MINN.
STAT. §§ 3.922(6) (a) and (b) (1965).
196. Inaugural Address of Governor LeVander, supra note 194, at 18.
197. See 1966 DEMOCRATIc-FARMER-LABOR PLATFORM FOR MINNESOTA
6, which, however, envisaged that the Department would be directed
by a board appointed by the Governor; and MINNEsOTA REPuBLIcAN
PLATFORM, PROGRESS FOR PEOPLE 1966-67, at 6.
198. See S.F. 1287 which was authorized by Senators Keith Hughes,
Jack Davies, and Wayne Popham; and H.F. 1549, authored by Represen-
tatives Gary Flakne, William Frenzel, Paul Overgaard, Alpha Smaby,
and Fred Norton. H.F. No. 1545 eventually became the bill which in-
corporated all the 1967 amendments that became law.
19671
MINNESOTA LAgW REVIEW
The new Department displaces SCAD and the Governor's
Commissions on Human Rights and -the Status of Women, but it
does not supersede the Indian Affairs Commission, which retains
its statutory status. Opposition by representatives of the In-
dian tribes blocked the abolition of the Indian Affairs Commis-
sion and the transfer of its functions to the new Department.
Of course, Indians remain entitled to the protection of the State
Act, and the Commissioner of Human Rights is given affirmative
responsibilities to promote the welfare of Indians.
2. The State Board of Human Rights
SCAD will not be entirely without vestige in the new De-
partment. Section 363.04(4) of the State Act also establishes
within the Department a State Board of Human Rights.
(a) Composition
The Board is to consist of fifteen members appointed by the
Governor with the advice and consent of the Senate for stag-
gered, three-year terms. Board members are to be appointed
"with due regard to their fitness for the efficient dispatch of the
functions, powers and duties vested in and imposed upon the
Board" and may be removed by the Governor only "for ineffi-
ciency, neglect of duty or malfeasance in office." At least three
of the Board members must be lawyers admitted to practice law
in Minnesota. The Governor is to designate one of the Board
members as chairman and the chairnan will serve at the Gover-
nor's pleasure.
(b) Powers and Duties
The functions of the State Board of Human Rights are two-
fold: (a) to serve in an advisory capacity to the Commissioner;
and (b) to exercise the functions, powers, and duties of the ap-
peal board provided for in the State Act. The reference to the
State Board as an appeal board is inadvertent. It was a correct
appellation in earlier drafts of the bill containing the 1967
amendments, in which formal complaints of unfair discrimina-
tory practices, issued by the Commissioner, were to be heard by
hearing examiners, subject to appeal to the State Board. But
as enacted, section 363.071 (1) authorizes the Commissioner to ap-
point a hearing examiner or a three-man hearing panel of the
State Board, at least one member of which must be a lawyer, to
hear a complaint. In performing this function, the hearing
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panels of the State Board will act as adjudicatory bodies in the
first instance and not as appeal boards.
3. The Division of Women's Affairs and Advisory Committee
on Women's Affairs
The Commission on the Status of Women did not disappear
entirely. Section 363.04(7) of the State Act forms a Division of
Women's Affairs in the new Department to assist women in
the areas of (1) employment policies and practices; (2) educa-
tion and training; (3) health and welfare; (4) civil and political
rights; and (5) home, community, and family life. Subdivision
8 of section 363.04 adds an Advisory Committee on Women's
Affairs to advise and assist and Commissioner of Human Rights.
This Committee is to consist of fifteen persons to be appointed
by the Commissioner for staggered, two-year terms and of the
following ex-officio, nonvoting members: a member of the
State Senate, a member of the House of Representatives, the
Commissioner of Education, the Commissioner of Public Welfare,
and the Executive Secretary of the State Board of Health. The
Committee is to select its own chairman. Its members will not
be paid salaries but will be reimbursed for necessary expenses
incurred in the performance of their duties "in the same amount
and in the same manner as provided by law for state officers and
employees."
Furthermore, section 363.05(1) (19) authorizes and directs
the Commissioner to "conduct research and study discriminatory
practices based upon race, color, creed, religion, national origin,
or other factors and develop accurate data on the nature and ex-
tent of discrimination and other matters as they may affect
housing, employment, public accommodations, schools, and other
areas of public life." Under this mandate, the Commissioner is
required to study the extent of discrimination based upon sex
and, pursuant to section 363.05(1) (1), to make recommendations
thereon to the Governor and Legislature.
4. Statewide and Local Advisory Committees
Though the 1967 amendments did not, themselves, create any
counterpart to the Governor's Commission on Human Rights
within the new Department, the functions of the Governor's
Commission have been entrusted to the Commissioner of Hu-
man Rights. In addition, section 363.05 (1) (17) requires the Com-
missioner to "create such local and statewide advisory commit-
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tees as will in his judgment aid in effectuating the purposes of
the department of human rights." These committees will be able
to assist the Commissioner in discharging the fact-finding and
educational functions formerly performed by the Governor's
Commission.
B. EXEcUTIVE DEPARTMENT VERSUS INDEPENDENT COMMISSION
So far as can be ascertained, Minnesota now stands alone in
having a separate, whole executive department to administer the
state's antidiscrimination laws. 99 Creation of such a new De-
partment is, however, an important step toward realization of
the objectives of these laws.
Unfortunately there are no empirical studies on which to
base conclusions about the extent to which the effectiveness or
ineffectiveness of civil rights agencies may be attributed to the
ways in which these agencies are organized and structured, and,
since the alternative chosen by Minnesota is unique, there is no
experience elsewhere by which to evaluate it. Yet there is
good reason to try new ways because the old ways have not
been marked by great success.
The commentary accompanying the Fourth Tentative Draft
of the Uniform Anti-Discrimination Act offered two reasons for
proposing an independent commission. First, to the contention
that "an executive department with a single head would be more
efficient than a body of commissioners," it was replied that while
"a department structure might be preferable if the body were
concerned merely with enforcement of anti-discrimination legis-
lation, the traditional commission pattern seems desirable if it
is to be responsible for judicial functions as well. ' 20 0 This ar-
gument reveals the hazards of generalization in this area. As
the 1967 amendments prove, it is possible to devise a depart-
mental structure which will not give the department head ad-
judicatory responsibilities, yet which will provide a system of
administrative adjudication resembling that employed by the in-
dependent commission.
199. Bonfield, who is engaged in a general study of the administra-
tive structure of civil rights agencies, informs me that the civil rights
agency is part of an existing executive department in California, Hawaii,
New Jersey, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Utah, and Wisconsin.
200. UImFORm LAW CoMMissIoNERs' 1jITRoRm ANTi-DiscRIMINATION
ACT 37 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1966). The Uniform Law Commissionersjustify an independent administrative agency solely on the ground that




When called upon, the "hearing examiner"-also misnamed
in the State Act-will function like an administrative court.
His duties will be exclusively judicial. The State Board of Hu-
man Rights, too, will perform adjudicatory functions, but it will
also serve in an advisory capacity to the Commissioner.
Second, the commentary accompanying the Fourth Tenta-
tive Draft states that there seems to be a "definite preference"
for an independent commission because it "will be less subject
to political pressures." 20 1 It is true that an agency like SCAD
may be less subject to "political pressures" than the Commis-
sioner of Human Rights. The members of SCAD were "inde-
pendent;" they did not devote their full time to the work of
SCAD; each "represented" a different congressional district;
they were appointed for five-year terms, thus overlapping the
Governor's term of office; and they could be removed only upon
a finding, after hearing, of inefficiency, neglect of duty, miscon-
duct, or malfeasance in office. 20 2 By contrast, the Commissioner
is a full-time, salaried state official; he is appointed by the
Governor and may be removed by the Governor at any time;
and his four-year term of office must coincide with the Gover-
nor's.
Without question, the Commissioner has no independence;
he is completely the Governor's man. Yet there is reason to
assume that the struggle for civil rights in Minnesota will not
suffer thereby. By focusing upon the Governor all political re-
sponsibility for the implementation of the anti discrimination
laws, the task may be better done. It would be hard to imagine
a more effective way than SCAD to disperse responsibility and
make it impossible to hold anyone in particular accountable
for success or failure in the administration of the State Act.
Moreover, the restrictions that the State Act imposed on
the Governor's power of appointment made it difficult for him
to assure that the best qualified individuals in the State would
be appointed to SCAD. Now the Governor has every incentive
to appoint the most qualified person he can find to head the
Department of Civil Rights.
However, the Legislature has not been very helpful to the
201. UNmFo~m LAw COUMnSSIONERS' UNwoFmW ANTI-DiscraIMATION
AcT, at 37 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1966).
202. To accentuate the nonpartisanship of the Commission it creates
and obtains "a broad spectrum of opinion" on it, § 701(a) of the Model
Act provides that only a bare majority of the Commissioners may be of
the same political party. See MODEL ANTI-DiscRanmNATIox ACT 26.
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Governor in this respect. It fixed the Commissioner's salary
at $12,500 per year-the lowest for a department head in the
state-and failed to provide any appropriation for a Deputy
Commissioner, though the latter office is authorized by section
363.04(2) of the State Act.2 0 3 This crsgraceful, initial treatment
of the heads of the new Department should be remedied at the
next session of the Legislature.
Nevertheless, it is not realistic to suppose that the Legisla-
ture would have replaced SCAD with a full-time, adequately
paid, independent commission of 5 to 7 members. For SCAD, the
Legislature appropriated $81,326 for 1965 and $79,364 for 1966; and
for the Governor's Commission on Human Rights, it appropriated
approximately $24,000 for each year of the 1965-1967 biennium. 20 4
In addition to its Executive Director, SCAD was able to employ
6 professional and 4 nonprofessional employees and the Gover-
nor's Commission, 2 professional and 1 nonprofessional em-
ployee. Thus, it is encouraging that the Legislature has demon-
strated some willingness to finance the new Department of Hu-
man Rights on a more adequate, though still insufficient, scale.
For the 1967 biennium, the Department received an appropria-
tion of $338,594.205 Including the Commissioner and Deputy
Commissioner, it now employs 12 professional and 6 nonprofes-
sional employees. 20
6
203. See [1967] Minn. Extra Sess. Laws §§ 70(6)-(8). The salaries
of department heads range up to $22,000 a year.
Because the former Executive Director of SCAD was in the state's
classified civil service, she was given the position to which she was
thereby entitled and then appointed Deputy Commissioner of Human
Rights.
204. These figures and the data that follow were supplied by
SCAD's Executive Director, now the Deputy Commissioner of Human
Rights. For the first two years of its life, 1961-1963, SCAD's budget was
$67,203. The Legislature appropriated $51,332 for 1963-1964 and $52,529
for 1964-1965.
205. [1967] Minn. Extra Sess. Laws {§ 45. Governor LeVander re-
quested $599,054, of which $150,000 was to be for grants to local civil
rights agencies. See Governor's Biennial Budget for 1967 Biennium for
Department of Human Relations. The Indian Affairs Commission re-
ceived $45,000 for the 1967 biennium, compared with $30,000 for the
1965 biennium. [1967] Minn. Extra Sess. Laws § 2(7).
Of the $338,594 appropriated for the biennium, only $125,000 was
made available for 1967-1968. In a forthcoming study, Professor Bon-
field points out that under the current budget, Minnesota will spend
more for civil rights administration and enforcement, per non-white
resident, than any other state. In 1960, the non-white population of
Minnesota was 42,261. But at the same time, Minnesota ranked among
the 10 states which spent least per complaint filed.




More important still, the question of the most appropriate
administrative structure for the enforcement of civil rights must
be considered in light of the expectations generated by the pas-
sage of federal and state civil rights laws which are still far
short of fulfillment.20 7 "Persistence of this wide gap between
law and achievement presents a serious danger of disillusionment
as to the effectiveness-and worse, the good faith-of" govern-
ment.20 8  To bridge this gap, which is an imperative for our
society, the administrators of the civil rights laws must not only
make good the legal guarantees against discrimination, they
must also, as was stressed above in the discussion of imbalance
plans, assume leadership in formulating affirmative programs to
make equal opportunity a social and economic reality and in
seeing to it that these programs are carried out. An unpaid,
part-time, multi-member, geographically-dispersed commission
like SCAD cannot be expected to provide this kind of leadership.
It is more likely to regard itself as a judicial tribunal that waits
for complaints. This attitude may well frustrate staff efforts
along affirmative lines.
The Commissioner of Human Rights is expected to initiate
positive action. Section 363.05(1) directs him to formulate poli-
cies to effectuate the purposes of the State Act and to exercise
leadership, under the Governor's direction, in developing human
rights policies and programs. Subdivision (23) of section 363.05
requires him to "develop educational programs, community or-
ganization programs, leadership development programs, motiva-
tional programs, and business development programs for the
benefit of those persons theretofore and hereafter subject to prej-
udice and discrimination."
The Commissioner is also given affirmative responsibilities
for the welfare of women and Indians. Section 363.05(1) calls
upon him to cooperate and consult with the Commissioners of
Education, Labor and Industry, Public Welfare, Business Devel-
opment, and Conservation and with the Secretary of the State
Board of Health in developing plans and programs to serve most
effectively the needs of Indians and to assist women in the areas
designated in section 363.04(7). Subdivision 1 (24) of section
363.05 requires him to "provide information for and direction to
a program designed to assist Indian citizens to assume all the
rights, privileges, and duties of citizenship; and to coordinate
207. See Notre Dame Conference on Federal Civil Rights Legislation




and cooperate with local, state and national and private agencies
providing services to the Indian people."
Although Indians and women are named as beneficiaries of
such cooperative and consultative activity on the part of the
Commissioner, clearly the members of all minority groups in-
tended to be protected by the State Act will also be the benefi-
ciaries of similar activity on their behalf. Section 363.05(1) (7)
empowers the Commissioner to "obtain upon request and utilize
the services of all state governmental departments and agencies"
in effectuating the purposes of the State Act. The Commis-
sioner is in a position to make every executive department and
agency of state government aware oil its obligations and oppor-
tunities to achieve these purposes.
None of these provisions of the State Act looking to this
type of affirmative activity by the Commissioner has a counter-
part in the Model Act.
An independent commission should still be preferred if it
could be shown that it is more likely to withstand the pressures
of politically important segments of opinion opposed to the
objectives of the antidiscrimination laws than the head of an
executive department, or the Governor. But there is little evi-
dence or reason to suppose that this is the case. While the re-
quirement that each congressional district in the State be rep-
resented on SCAD was intended, laudably, to assure that the
civil rights program would have at least one notable spokesman
in every such district, each member was also thereby made a
spokesman for his district on SCAD, reflecting its attitudes and
opinions about the program. By contrast, it is not likely that a
Governor will appoint a Commissioner who is not sympathetic
to the cause of civil rights, and the Commissioner will be staking
his career on the successful performance of his job.
Of course, the civil rights program needs prominent and
vocal supporters in every area of the State. At its best, a multi-
member independent commission can perform the necessary
function of defending the compliance and enforcement activities
of the staff. But this function can be performed under the new
organization by the State Board of Human Rights, the Advisory
Committee on Women's Affairs, and such other local and state-
wide advisory committees as the Commissioner may choose to
set up under section 363.05 (1) (17).
No data exist on which to make reliable estimates as to how
effective SCAD and the Governor's Commission on Human
Rights were in this essentially educational work. A recent re-
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port, confined to Minneapolis, stated that only 39.6 per cent of
the whites and 61.4 per cent of the Negroes, when questioned,
replied that they knew there was a state law against discrimina-
tion in housing. Fourteen and one-tenth per cent of the whites
and 29.1 per cent of the Negroes replied that there was no such
law and the remainder stated that they did not know whether
there was such a law.209 When asked to whom they should report
an incident of housing discrimination, 98.9 per cent of the whites
and 89.4 per cent of the Negroes gave incorrect answers. 210 These
figures are discouraging, particularly since the whites questioned
all lived next door to Negroes and the Negroes questioned all lived
next door to whites.21 1 The Commissioner of Human Rights, of
course, will be more visible to the public than SCAD or the Gov-
ernor's Commission on Human Rights, and it will be interesting
to see whether the public will, in fact, come to know more about
his work.
C. THE ADJUDICATORY STRUCTURE
The Commissioner of Human Rights will not have formal
adjudicatory responsibilities. However, he will decide whether
to issue a formal complaint and whether the complaint will be
heard and judged, in the first instance, by a "hearing examiner"
-a misnomer because his decision is not subject to administra-
tive review-or a panel of the State Board of Human Rights.
The decision of the hearing examiner or panel is subject to re-
view in the courts. This adjudicatory structure is subject to
grave criticism.
Members of SCAD were not picked for their qualifications
to perform adjudicatory functions. Sections 363.04(4) and
363.071(1) of the State Act seek to assure such qualifications by
requiring that at least three members of the State Board of Hu-
man Rights must be lawyers and that one member of every three-
man adjudicatory panel of the Board must be a lawyer. The
hearing examiner, under section 363.01(17), must be a person
admitted to practice law. It may, of course, be doubted that the
presence of one lawyer on a panel of three makes the panel
particularly qualified to act as judges, but the principal diffi-
culty with these arrangements is that different panels and hear-
209. G. MILES, FINAL REPORT ON SOME FACTORS IN MINORITY Hous-






ing examiners may be appointed to hear different cases. It may
be impossible, therefore, for any parlicular person-hearing ex-
aminer or panel member-to have a continuing experience in
the hearing and adjudication of complaints of unfair discrimina-
tory practices. Yet the only justification for not relying upon
the ordinary courts to hear and adjudicate such complaints in the
first instance is the need to specialize the adjudicatory process in
this area so that it may become more informed and more sophis-
ticated about the difficult problems of proving discrimination 212
and more sympathetic to the aims of the antidiscrimination laws.
The Commissioner might try to encourage specialization by
selecting the same examiner or same Board panel to hear and
adjudicate cases. In fact, the Legislature appropriated money for
a hearing examiner and did not require that his task be rotated.
The Department of Human Rights could thus have added a hear-
ing examiner to its staff, but the Connissioner decided not to. It
would be preferable to confine the State Board of Human Rights
to advisory duties and to entrust administrative adjudication to
a full-time official within the Department of Human Rights who
would, however, be kept aloof from the process of investigation,
conciliation, and issuance of formal complaints.
To this end, an Assistant Commissioner, in addition to the
Deputy Commissioner, should be provided to perform the adjudi-
catory function free of supervision or direction by the Commis-
sioner. There is precedent for this type of arrangement. The
functions of the proposed Assistant Commissioner, for example,
would be similar to those of the Judicial Officer of the Post
Office Department,2 13 with some important exceptions. He
would hear as well as adjudicate cases, at least until the volume
of work became so heavy that hearing examiners would have
to be used. The Post Office's Judicial Officer primarily hears
appeals from the initial decisions of hearing examiners. 21 4 Un-
212. See Note, An American Legal Dilemma -Proof of Discrimina-
tion, 17 U. Cm. L. REv. 107 (1949).
213. The Postmaster General is authorized to appoint a Judicial
Officer to "perform such quasi-judicial duties as" he may designate.
To the extent that such duties are delegated to him by the Postmaster
General, the Judicial Officer is the "agency for purposes of the require-
ments of the Administrative Procedure Act." 39 U.S.C. § 308a (1964).
The Postmaster General has delegated to the Judicial Officer, described
as an "independent" officer, authority to make in his own name the
final decision and order in certain specified proceedings. 39 C.F.R.
§ 821.7 (1966). See, e.g., U.S. Health Club, Inc. v. Major, 292 F.2d 665
(3d Cir. 1961).
214. See 39 C.F.R. § 821.7(b) (2). The Judicial Officer may pre-
side at the reception of evidence if expedited hearings are requested by
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like the Judicial Officer,215 the Assistant Commissioner would
not be authorized to refer any proceeding to the head of the De-
partment for final decision. Finally, unlike the Judicial Officer,
the Assistant Commissioner could also be asked to assist the
Commissioner with the formulation of general policies and pro-
cedures. In this way, the Commissioner would have the benefit
of a more effective feedback from the adjudicatory process
than he will now have. Some feedback, however, will now come
from the State Board of Human Rights, which will act in an ad-
visory, as well as judicial, capacity.
An Assistant Commissioner, carrying out the duties sug-
gested above, will be more effective in making the Commis-
sioner see the impact of general policy on individual cases and
enabling him to shape general policy in the light of the decided
cases. On the basis of his continuing adjudicatory experience,
the Assistant would be able to help the Commissioner to change
or modify his policies speedily in response to freshly perceived
needs and to pinpoint the areas for the exercise of the rule-
making power granted to the Commissioner by section 363.05 (8).
Having an Assistant Commissioner to perform the adjudicatory
function and the other duties mentioned above may also quickly
win the Commissioner's confidence in the adjudicatory ma-
chinery and encourage him to pursue his enforcement activi-
ties vigorously and effectively. Hesitation to bring to prompt
hearing those charges of discriminatory practices which cannot
be conciliated will destroy the confidence of minority groups in
the Act.
It is acknowledged that the suggested administrative struc-
ture for adjudication will not have the advantages of group de-
cision making. As has been pointed out by a Task Force of the
Second Hoover Commission, the decision of a multi-member com-
mission, at its best, "provides a barrier to arbitrary or capricious
action" because it "reflects the combined judgment of the group
after critical analysis of the relevant facts and divergent
views."2 10 But the 1967 amendments to the State Act do not
assure these advantages because decisions thereunder may be
made by single hearing examiners, rather than three-member
panels of the State Board of Human Rights.
a party or are called for by the Post Office's Rules of Practice. 39
C.F.R. § 821.7(a) (1) (iii) (1966).
215. 39 C.F.R. § 821.7(a) (2) (1966).
216. TASK FORCE REPORT ON REGULATORY COMMISSIONS [Appendix
N] 21 (The [Hoover] Commission on Organization of the Executive
Branch of the Government, 1949).
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Furthermore, the Task Force saw "definite advantages" in
group decisions "where the problems are complex, where the
relative weight of various factors af.fecting policy is not clear,
and where the range of choice is wide. 2 1 .7 It is doubtful whether
these conditions are met by the ldnd of adjudication arising
under the State Act. Thus, there is little need to make such
adjudication a group process.
D. LEGAL REPRESENTATION OF THE CoIn\msSIoNEm
While section 363.05(1) (5) of the State Act follows section
702 (3) of the Model Act in authorizing the Commissioner to em-
ploy such attorneys as he may deem necessary and to prescribe
their duties, section 363.12(1) of the State Act also provides
that the "Attorney General shall be the attorney for the depart-
ment." This contradiction sharpens an issue of policy.
The Model Act is intended to empower attorneys appointed
under section 702(3) to appear for and represent the agency in
any court, except in those states "whose constitutions or laws
will not enable an independent commission . . . to appear in
court through attorneys other than those in the office of the
Attorney General. '2 18 Minnesota law may not impose such a
disability upon independent commissions or department heads in
all cases,219 but there is little doubt that section 363.12 (1) re-
flects the intent of the 1967 Legislature more accurately than
section 363.05 (1) (5).
The two sections might be reconciled by reading them to
enable the Commissioner of Human Rights to employ attorneys
to represent him before hearing examiners or State Board panels,
but not in the courts. However, it would have been preferable
for the Legislature, as it did in connection with the Departments
of Taxation and Public Welfare,220 to authorize and require the
Attorney General to appoint an additional Assistant Attorney
General for exclusive assignment to the Department of Human
Rights. While such an Assistant would be supervised by the
Attorney General who could remove him at any time, he would
217. Id.
218. MODEL ANTi-DiscRmImiATiON ACT 27.
219. Mnm. STAT. § 8.01 (1965) requires the Attorney General to
appear for the state only "in all causes in the Supreme and Federal
Courts wherein the state is directly interested." The section requires
him to appear for the state "in all civil causes of like nature in the
district courts" only if "in his opinion, the interests of the state require
it."
220. MnN. STAT. §§ 8.023, 8.024 (1965).
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be able to devote full time to the work of the Department and to
appear "in any court of this state, as the attorney general himself
might do."'221 The new Department badly needs a lawyer of the
stature of an Assistant Attorney General to become thoroughly
familiar with its operations, its procedures, its problems, and its
possibilities.
The best alternative would be to authorize the Commissioner
to appoint attorneys who would be entirely independent of the
Attorney General and able to represent the Department of Hu-
man Rights in the courts. It should be recalled that the 1967
amendments, for the first time, cover unfair discriminatory prac-
tices in public services and public educational institutions. The
alternative suggested would avoid the possibility that the Attor-
ney General may find himself representing both the state agency
charged with discriminatory practices and the state agency mak-
ing the charges.
In any event, it is hoped that the Attorney General will
exercise the discretion he now has 222 to see to it that an Assist-
ant Attorney General becomes specialized in the work of the
Department of Human Rights.
E. ExEcUTIm DEPARTMEmTS ON LOCAL LEVEL
The discussion of the new state organization for civil rights
administration should not be ended without mentioning the im-
pact it has already had on the localities. The new St. Paul civil
rights ordinance also creates a Department of Human Rights
headed by a Director of Human Rights, appointed by the Mayor
with the consent of the City Council from a list of three nominees
presented by the Human Rights Commission.223 The Director
performs his duties "subject to policies established by the May-
or"2 24 and may be removed at any time by the Mayor, if two-
thirds of the Commission concur. The Human Rights Commis-
sion is the adjudicatory tribunal, but it will also advise the
Mayor.225
The recently enacted Minneapolis ordinance establishes a
more complicated structure. It, too, creates a Department of
Civil Rights headed by a Director who is responsible to and acts
221. MINN. STAT. § 8.02 (1965).
222. See id.





under the direction of the Mayor,22 6 but the Director's function
is only to "coordinate the activities and provide all administra-
tive services and functions for" the Minneapolis Commission on
Human Relations.227 The Commission succeeds to the powers
and duties formerly exercised by the Minneapolis Fair Employ-
ment Practices Commission and the Mayor's Commission on
Human Relations.228 It will investigate charges, issue, hear, and
adjudicate complaints and issue cease and desist orders.
The two ordinances obviously reflect the different relations
between the Mayor and the City Council in the two cities. While
the St. Paul ordinance approximates the structure created by
the State Act, the Minneapolis ordinance is a compromise of
dubious value. But in time, we shall have an excellent oppor-
tunity to learn which structure, in fact, turns out to be best
suited to effectuate the purposes of the antidiscrimination laws
and the extent to which the considerations discussed above in
connection with the State Act are also applicable on the local
level.
F. DuTEs OF COM1ISSIONER
With one exception, subdivisions (1) (3)-(15) of section
363.05 of the State Act, after the 1967 amendments, reflect only
such changes in the preexisting law as were required by the crea-
tion of the new Department and the new adjudicatory struc-
ture.229 The exception is the new section 363.05(1) (10). When
226. M INNEAPOLIS, MINN., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 944.080 (1967).
227. Id.
228. Id. § 944.060.
229. The following changes were made in § 363.05 (1). The old para-
graph (3) was deleted. Paragraph (5) adds authority to employ hear-
ing examiners. The authority in the old paragraph (4) to fix the com-
pensation of employees was deleted because the Commissioner derives
this authority from § 363.04(9) and MINN. STAT. § 15.06 (1965). Para-
graph (9) empowers the Commissioner to "determine whether or not
probable cause exists for hearing" as well as to "issue complaints, re-
ceive and investigate charges alleging unfair discriminatory practices."
The prior provision in paragraph (8) enabled SCAD to "issue, receive,
and investigate complaints alleging discrimination because of race, color,
creed, religion, or national origin." Paragraph (10) omits the refer-
ences in the prior paragraph (9) to the commission. Paragraph (11) is
broader than the old paragraph (10), adding, as objectives, the elimina-
tion of unfair discriminatory practices in public accommodations, public
services, and educational institutions, as well as in employment and
housing. Paragraph (12) eliminates the phrase "based on race, color,
creed, religion, or national origin" in the old paragraph (11). The
prior paragraph (12) has been expanded in the new paragraphs (13)
and (19), as has been indicated above. The distribution, as well as
publication, of the results of research and study is made the duty of
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compared with the old section 363.05(1) (9), the elimination of
the phrase "relating to the case before the Commission" makes it
clear that the powers granted by paragraph (10) to obtain neces-
sary evidence may be exercised before, as well as after, a com-
plaint is issued.
Moreover, the provisions of sections 363.05(1) (1), (2) and
(16)-(24) inclusive, all added by the 1967 amendments, impose
affirmative responsibilities upon the Commissioner of Human
Rights which were not entrusted to SCAD. On the whole, the
Commissioner has been given wide powers which seem sufficient
for the tasks at hand.
Except for the affirmative duties, which, as has been stated,
have no counterparts in the Model Act, the powers and duties of
the Commissioner under section 363.05(1) of the State Act par-
allel those granted to the Commission on Human Rights by
section 702 of the Model Act. In some cases, the Model Act is
more explicit. Section 363.05(1) (8) of the State Act authorizes
the Commissioner to "adopt suitable rules and regulations for
effectuating the purposes of" the Act. Section 702(12) of the
Model Act adds a provision that the regulations of the Commis-
sion may include "regulations requiring the posting or inclusion
in advertising material of notices prepared or approved by the
Commission." Undoubtedly, the Commissioner may also promul-
gate such regulations if they are necessary to effectuate the
Act's purposes.
Section 363.05(1) (9) of the State Act authorizes the Com-
missioner to "issue" complaints whereas section 702(b) of the
Model Act authorizes the Commission to "initiate" complaints, but
undoubtedly the power to issue complaints would include the
power to issue complaints on the Commissioner's own motion.
In fact, the Uniform Law Commissioners' comment that in grant-
ing the essential power to initiate complaints, section 702 (b) "fol-
lows . . .such states as Massachusetts, Minnesota, and Wash-
ington.2 3 0
Both section 363.05(1) (17) of the State Act and section 702
(11) of the Model Act authorize the creation of local and state-
wide advisory committees, but the Model Act specifies that these
the Commissioner. The responsibilities set forth in the old paragraph(13) have also been expanded in the new paragraphs (1), (14),
(19), (20), (22) and (23).
Subdivision 2 of § 363.05, relating to the duties of SCAD's Execu-
tive Director, was repealed by the 1967 amendments.
230. MODEL ANTi-DiscRnvrNATIox ACT 28.
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committees may be empowered (1) to study and report on prob-
lems of discrimination; (2) to foster good will among the groups
and elements of the population of the state, through community
effort or otherwise; and (3) to recorrnend policies and practices
that will help to carry out the Act's purposes. Such specification
is helpful in giving the administrators some ideas as to how ad-
visory committees might be used. But clearly, advisory com-
mittees may also be used for such purposes under section 363.05
(1) (17) of the State Act.
Some other differences between the two Acts are worth
noting. Section 702 (7) of the Model Act authorizes the Commis-
sion to delegate its powers "to require answers to interroga-
tories, compel the attendance of witnesses, examine witnesses
under oath or affirmation, and require the production of docu-
ments" to "any member or individual designated to exercise
these powers in the performance of official duties." Section
363.05(1) (10) of the State Act grant; these powers to the Com-
missioner but adds only that hearing examiners are also author-
ized to exercise these powers. However, this provision of the
State Act must be read together with section 363.04(2) thereof
providing a deputy commissioner authorized to "perform such
functions, powers and duties as the commissioner shall pre-
scribe from time to time." It must also be read together with
Minnesota Statutes section 15.06(2), which states that, except
as otherwise expressly provided by law, the head of any state
department shall have the power to "delegate to any of his
subordinate officers or employees the exercise of such of his
powers or duties as he may deem advisable, subject to his con-
trol."
In light of the injunction in section 363.11 of the State Act
that it "shall be construed liberally for the accomplishment of"
its purposes, it would not be unreasonable to construe the ex-
press authorization of delegation to hearing examiners in sec-
tion 363.05(1)(10) as not precluding delegation of the powers
granted by that section to the Deputy Commissioner or any
other subordinate officer or employee. The hearing examiner
may have been mentioned specifically because of doubt that he
would be regarded as a subordinate officer or employee of the
Department for this purpose.
The only remaining difficulty concerns the adjudicatory
panels of the State Board of Human 'Rights. Obviously, there is
as much reason for them as for the hearing examiners to exer-
cise the powers granted by section 363.05(1) (10). When the
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State Board was converted from an appellate tribunal to a tri-
bunal of first instance, the need to include it under section
363.05(1) (10) was apparently overlooked. It seems difficult to
say that the members of an adjudicatory panel of the State
Board are subordinate officers or employees of the Department,
because they will not be exercising their powers subject to the
Commissioner's supervision or control. Nevertheless, it may be
held, with reason, that under these circumstances the State
Board panels are "hearing examiners" for the purposes of sec-
tion 363.05 (1) (10).
Finally, the State Act does not contain the specific provision
in section 702(4) of the Model Act empowering the Commission
"to promote the creation of local commissions on human rights,
and to cooperate or contract with individuals and state, local
and other agencies, both public and private, including agencies
of the federal government and of other states." But, in effect,
the Commissioner of Human Rights is given this power by sec-
tion 363.05(22) of the State Act, which authorizes him to "make
grants in aid to the extent that appropriations are made available
for such purpose in aid of carrying out his duties and responsibil-
ities." Before making a grant in aid, however, the Commissioner
is required to obtain the "advice and consent" of the State
Board of Human Rights. Governor LeVander requested the 1967
Legislature to appropriate $150,000 to implement this provision
of the State Act, but the Legislature refused to make the appro-
priation.231
X. ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE AND ADJUDICATION
A. COMPLAINT PROCEDURE
The amended section 363.06, unlike its predecessor, distin-
guishes between a "charge" and a "complaint" of an unfair dis-
criminatory practice. A "charge" is filed by a person who claims
to be "aggrieved" by a violation of the Act; a "complaint" is
issued by the Commissioner if he determines, after investigation,
that "probable cause exists to credit" the charge.
Aside from the changes in language required by this dis-
tinction between a "charge" and a "complaint" and some addi-
tional minor modifications,23 2 two differences between the
231. Governor's Biennial Budget for 1967, Biennium for Depart-
ment of Human Rights.
232. The amended § 363.06(1) provides for the filing of a "verified
charge"; its predecessor required a "signed complaint." The amended
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amended section 363.06(1) and its predecessor are worth noting.
The amended provision requires the Commissioner to serve a
copy of the charge upon the respondent within five days of its
filing. The prior provision made no such requirement, but
merely required that if "after inquiry the commission determines
that an unfair discriminatory practice exists, the commission
* * . shall issue and serve . .. a copy of the complaint" upon the
respondent. The amended section 363.06(4) (2) also requires
the Commissioner to serve a copy of any complaint he issues
upon the respondent.
Second, the amended section 363.06 (1) omits the prior pro-
vision that any "employer whose employees, or some of them,
or any labor union whose members, or some of them, refuse or
threaten to refuse to cooperate with the provisions of" the Act
"may file with the commission a signed complaint asking for as-
sistance by conciliation or other remedial action." There seems
to have been no good reason for deleting this provision. In some
cases, the prohibitions of section 363.03 (2) (4) may cover actions
by employees or union members to prevent their employers
or unions from complying with the requirements of the State
Act. And in any event, an employer or labor union may still
ask the Commissioner to extend his good offices to ameliorate
such a situation, or the Commissioner himself may offer to do so
on his own initiative, even though the provision referred to has
been deleted.
Subdivisions 2 and 3 of the old section 363.06 of the State
Act remain unchanged. Prior to the amendments, subdivision 4
of section 363.06 required SCAD to dismiss the complaint if, after
inquiry, it determined that "there is no probable cause for believ-
ing that an unfair discriminatory practice exists." Subdivision
4(1) now states that if, after investigation, the Commissioner
determines that "no probable cause exists to credit the allega-
tions of the unfair discriminatory practice, the commissioner
shall, within ten days of such determination, serve upon the
complainant and respondent written notice of such determin-
tion." It is then added: "This shall be a final decision of the
department." It does not seem that the standard of probable
cause has been changed by the slight changes in language pointed
out.
Subdivision (2) of section 363.06(4) requires the respondent
provision permits filing by any "person"; the prior provision allowed
any person to file "by himself, or his agent, or attorney." It is assumed
that this may continue to be done.
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to answer the allegations of a complaint issued by the Commis-
sioner "at a hearing before a hearing examiner at a time and
place specified in the notice, not less than ten days after service
of said complaint." The preexisting provision required the Com-
mission in such case to "set a time and place for hearing the com-
plaint" and required the respondent, within fifteen days after
receiving a copy of the complaint and notice of the time and
place of hearing, to serve a verified answer to the complaint
upon the Commission.
It would seem that the requirement of a verified answer
has been eliminated. The time to prepare the answer has also
been reduced from fifteen to ten days, but this change must be
evaluated in light of the fact that the respondent will also now
receive a copy of the original, verified charge, which he was not
entitled to under the preexisting provision.
Subdivision 4(2) of section 363.06 was apparently drafted to
fit the earlier bill making the State Board of Human Rights a
tribunal to hear appeals from decisions of hearing examiners.
The reference, therefore, to "a hearing before a hearing exam-
iner" must be read together with section 363.071 (1) which au-
thorizes the Commissioner of Human Rights to appoint either a
three-man panel of the State Board or a hearing examiner to
hear the complaint; with subdivisions 2 and 3 which speak of the
determination of discriminatory practices by the panel or exam-
iner; and with section 363.072(1), which provides for judicial
review of "a final decision of the board." It is also apparent that
this judicial review provision also contemplated that the State
Board would review decisions of hearing examiners, yet a hear-
ing examiner's decision may be the final decision of the Depart-
ment under section 363.071(3). To make a consistent and sensi-
ble whole of all these provisions, the term "hearing examiner"
in section 363.06(4) (2) must be read as including a State Board
panel and the term "board" in section 363.072 as including a
hearing examiner.
Subdivision 4(2) of section 363.06 requires a copy of the
written notice of hearing on a complaint issued by the Commis-
sioner to be served not only on the respondent but also on "the
charging party, the attorney general, and members of the board."
There is no particular reason why the Commissioner should be
required to furnish copies of such notices to the Attorney
General and to members of the State Board of Human Rights.
Presumably the Attorney General, the attorney for the Depart-
ment, will know about it, and the State Board is not concerned
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unless its panel is presiding at the hearing, in which case the
panel will obviously be informed about the proceeding. How-
ever, since the members of the State Board may be called upon
to adjudicate complaints of discriminatory practices, from time
to time, it may add to their experience to be kept informed
about the complaints heard by hearing examiners as well.
The most significant addition to section 363.06 of the State
Act is subdivision 4(3) authorizing the district courts to grant
temporary relief to persons who have filed charges of discrimi-
natory practices once the Commissioner has found probable cause
to believe them. This provision is based upon section 703(f) of
the Model Act and will be discussed when the amended section
363.06 is compared with its counterpart section 703 of the Model
Act.
Subdivision 5 of section 363.06, as amended, combines the
preexisting subdivision 5 and the sentence in the preexisting
subdivision 4 that, prior to hearing, "the commission [Commis-
sioner] shall endeavor to eliminate the unfair discriminatory
practice through education, conference, conciliation and persua-
sion." Subdivision 6 of section 363.06 remains unchanged.
The amendments to section 363.06 of the State Act were in-
fluenced in a number of respects by section 703 of the Model Act.
However, like the old section 363.06 of the State Act, the Model
Act does not distinguish between a "'charge" and a "complaint."
This is not a matter of great moment, but there are other
more important substantive differences between section 703 of
the Model Act and section 363.06 of the State Act.
1. Who Is Entitled To Charge an U~nair Discriminatory
Practice?
Section 363.06(1) of the State Act permits any "person ag-
grieved" to file a "verified charge." Section 703 (a) of the Model
Act authorizes any "person claiming to be aggrieved ... his
agent, a member of the Commission, [or] the Attorney General
[, or a non-profit organization chartered to combat discrimina-
tion]" to file a "written complaint." As pointed out above, it is
reasonable to construe section 363.06(1) of the State Act to
allow an agent or attorney of a "person aggrieved" to file on his
behalf. The Commissioner of Human Rights, of course, is au-
thorized to issue complaints on his own motion by section 363.06
(2) of the State Act.
Unlike the Model Act, however, the State Act does not au-
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thorize the Attorney General to file charges. The Uniform Law
Commissioners justify this provision of section 703(a) on the
ground that it follows "the law of several states, including Cali-
fornia, Colorado, and New York" and although "this authority
is used sparingly in practice, it seems desirable to allow the
state's highest legal authority to act if he so wishes.123 3 But it
is doubtful that this is necessary or proper under the State Act.
The Attorney General may always use his position as attorney
for the Department to persuade the Commissioner to issue a com-
plaint on his own motion in a particular case. To allow the
Attorney General to file a verified charge in his own name may
put him in the anomalous position of later having to advise the
Commissioner whether or not there is probable cause to credit
his own allegations of unfair discriminatory practices. If the
proposals made above to give the Commissioner his own attor-
ney, free of control by the Attorney General, were adopted, it
would then be advisable to give the Attorney General the right
to file a verified charge in his own name.
Finally, the Uniform Law Commissioners explain that the
bracketed clause in section 703 (a) of the Model Act "is an op-
tional provision based on several state and local acts that permit
private civil rights organizations to lodge complaints."234 This,
too, would seem to be a desirable provision which has no counter-
part in the State Act. Giving civil rights organizations the right
to file formal charges will encourage them to aid in enforcing the
State Act. Their assistance is needed for effective enforcement.
In addition, it is also a desirable objective, in itself, to accustom
such organizations to seek to implement their goals by using the
provisions and procedures of the antidiscrimination laws.
2. Contents of Charge
The requirements of section 363.06(1) of the State Act are
more stringent regarding the contents of a charge than those
of section 703 (a) of the Model Act. The State Act requires the
"verified charge" to give "the name and address of the person
alleged to have committed an unfair discriminatory practice, set-
ting out the details of the practice complained of and any other
information required by the commissioner ... ." The Model
Act merely requires the "written complaint" to state "the facts
upon which the complaint is based, and . . .facts sufficient to




enable the Commission to identify the person charged." The
provisions of the Model Act are preferable. The aggrieved per-
son may not be able to set forth "details" or know the name of
the person he thinks committed the discriminatory practice, yet
the charge may contain enough information to justify further
action by the Commissioner. No purpose is served by dismis-
sing the charge in such case because it fails to meet the State
Act's requirements as to specificity. Even if such a charge is dis-
missed, the Commissioner should proceed to investigate the mat-
ter on his own motion, pursuant to the responsibility imposed
upon him by section 363.06(2). Acceptance of such a charge as
proper would assure the procedural rights of the aggrieved per-
son which are not spelled out when he is not the charging party.
Finally, while the Model Act requires that the respondent be
furnished a copy of the complaint (charge) "immediately" after
the complaint has been filed, the State Act requires that a copy
of the charge be served upon the respondent within five days
after it has been filed.
3. Statute of Limitations
Under section 703(a) of the Model Act, a complaint must
be filed within one year after the alleged discriminatory practice
occurs. Section 363.06 (3) of the State Act imposes a six-month
limitation. There is no particular reason why the State Act
should not be as liberal as the Model Act in this respect, but
data are not available to show that a six-month limitation will
impose any hardship upon victims of discrimination.
4. The Probable Cause Standard
Section 363.06(4) of the State Act provides that the Com-
missioner shall investigate the charge filed and if, after investi-
gation, he determines that "no probable cause exists to credit the
allegations of" the charge, he shall serve written notice of his
determination upon the person filing the charge and the person
charged. If, however, the Commissioner determines that there
is such probable cause, he must issue a complaint and set it
down for hearing before either a State Board panel or a hearing
examiner.
For the "probable cause" standard in the State Act, section
703(b) of the Model Act substitutes "reasonable cause to believe
that the respondent has engaged in. a discriminatory practice."
The Uniform Law Commissioners explain that, in making this
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substitution, they followed section 706(a) of the Federal Civil
Rights Act of 1964,235 "rather than the mere [sic] common state
formulation. " 236 No reasonable cause, they state, "means that the
complaint [charge] lacks sufficient merit to warrant the case
going forward to the conciliation and hearing stage."237
As a matter of language, the difference between "probable
cause" and "reasonable cause" does not seem to be material.
The State Act, in fact, uses the terms interchangeably. Thus
section 363.06(2) of the State Act authorizes the Commissioner
to issue a complaint whenever he "has reason to believe that a
person is engaging in an unfair discriminatory practice." Even
if this provision is taken to refer only to the issuance of com-
plaints on the Commissioner's own motion, it would still be sen-
sible to assume that the Legislature did not intend the standard
governing such complaints to be different from the standard
governing the issuance of complaints after verified charges are
filed.
The comment of the Uniform Law Commissioners implies
that a finding of reasonable cause must be made before the
Commission may enter upon the conciliation stage.238  Section
703 of the Model Act, however, does not make this an explicit
prerequisite. Section 703 (d) thereof authorizes "a member of the
Commission designated by the Chairman or the staff" to "en-
deavor to eliminate the alleged discriminatory practice by con-
ference, conciliation, and persuasion" unless "the Commission has
issued an order dismissing the complaint." This would seem to
authorize conciliation efforts even before reasonable cause has
been found. While section 703 (b) directs the Commission to
dismiss the complaint if it finds "no reasonable cause," nothing
in the Model Act forbids the Commission to withhold such a
finding until it has attempted conciliation.
The State Act clearly allows the Commissioner of Human
Rights the greatest latitude in this respect. Section 363.06(5)
provides that "in complying with subdivision 4," the Commis-
sioner "shall endeavor to eliminate the unfair discriminatory
practice through education, conference, conciliation and persua-
sion." Since subdivision 4 includes the investigatory stage, it
is clear that the Commissioner may attempt to conciliate the mat-
ter even before determining probable cause.
235. 42 U.S.C. § 2000 e-5(a) (1964).





In this respect, the State Act :is to be preferred over the
Model Act as interpreted by the Uniform Law Commissioners.
It is understandable that a finding of reasonable cause should
be required before the agency proceeds to the public hearing
stage, but not that it should be required before the agency pro-
ceeds to the conciliation stage. As a practical matter, it is diffi-
cult for agency investigators to keep from educating, conciliating,
and persuading while they are investigating. Even if the in-
vestigation fails to turn up sufficient facts to warrant going
forward to hearing, the Commissioner and his staff may be con-
vinced that "something is wrong." Why, then, should they be
precluded from engaging in "education, conference, conciliation
and persuasion"' in order to achieve some satisfactory settlement?
Admittedly, reasonable objections may also be raised to the
requirement that a finding of probable or reasonable cause must
precede the hearing stage. Much litigation is instituted by pri-
vate parties and government agencies without an official finding
that there is reasonable or probable cause to institute it. How-
ever, this state of affairs is not necessarily desirable and pro-
cedural devices-the motion to dismiss, the motion for summary
judgment, and pre-trial conferences-are available to terminate
such litigation as quickly as possible. The administrative process
does not have to subject anyone to a public hearing on a charge
of violating the law unless there is reasonable or probable cause
to believe that such a violation has occurred. Therefore, it is
not unreasonable to impose the probable cause requirement on
the administrative agency.
There is a danger that the Commissioner, in determining
probable cause, may come to think of himself as a judge of the
ultimate guilt or innocence of the charged party. This attitude
would damage the possibility of securing maximum compliance
with the State Act. But this danger is minimized under the State
Act-although not under the Model. Act-by the fact that the
Commissioner is given only investigatory, compliance, and en-
forcement duties-not adjudicatory :Functions. The requirement
that probable cause must be found before proceeding to hearing
may temper prosecutory zeal, but it will not make the Commis-
sioner forget his essential role.
5. Administrative and Judicial Review of a Finding of
No Probable Cause
Section 363.06(4) (1) of the State Act makes the Commis-
sioner's determination of no probable cause the "final decision
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of the department." On the other hand, section 703(c) of the
Model Act permits the complainant to file with the Commission
an application for reconsideration of an order dismissing a com-
plaint after a determination of no reasonable cause. In such
case, the Model Act requires the Commission, or a designated
member of the Commission other than the one who made the
original determination, to make a new determination of reason-
able cause. If the new determination eventuates in another
order dismissing the complaint, section 707 (a) of the Model Act
enables the complainant to obtain judicial review of the order.
In providing judicial review, the Uniform Law Commissioners
say they are "following a rule that has been judicially applied
in many states but not codified. '239 However, in all likelihood,
a determination of no probable cause under the State Act would
not be subject to judicial review.
The mere fact that section 363.06 (4) (1) makes the Commis-
sioner's determination of no probable cause the "final decision
239. Id. at 41. In reaching this conclusion, the Commissioners cite
Bamberger & Lewin, The Right to Equal Treatment: Administrative
Enforcement of Anti-Discrimination Legislation, 74 HI-v. L. REV. 526,
572 (1961). The latter describe the legal situation as follows:
Even absent statutory authority, commission action may be
reviewable by the procedures applicable to any administrative
action. ... In Jeanpierre v. Arbury [4 N.Y.2d 238, 149 N.E.2d
882, 173 N.Y.S.2d 597 (1958) (per curiam); ... ] the New
York Court of Appeals held that a dismissal of a complaint by
the investigating commissioner was reviewable under a New
York procedure analogous to the common law writ of certiorari,
[N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act §§ 1283-1306] in spite of the fact that a
dismissal is not an "order" within the meaning of the judicial-
review provisions of the Law Against Discrimination. [N.Y.
Executive Law § 298]. That decision also articulated the prin-
ciple that in such review proceedings a commission decision
would not be reversed unless it was found to be arbitrary or
capricious ....
Several statutes specificallyprovide that a dismissal of a
complaint shall be reviewable. [E.g., Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 80-
24-8 (Supp. 1957)]. In California, a finding of no probable
cause may be reviewed by a writ of mandamus, [Interview
With Counsel, California Fair Employment Practice Commis-
sion, in San Francisco, Cal., Aug. 15, 1960] and a court has also
reviewed a decision of the Philadelphia Commission on Human
Relations not to proceed to a public hearing. [Fetterolf v.
Josephs, No. 7290, Pa. C.P. No. 6, March Term, 1960]. Massa-
chusetts permits review of a finding of no probable cause to
determine whether it is arbitrary or capricious, [See Richard-
son v. Boston Housing Auth., No. 71016 Eq., Mass. Super. Ct.,
Suffolk County, Oct. 17, 1956] but the Oregon Civil Rights Act
specifically precludes review in such a case by permitting ap-
peals only from orders issued after hearing. [Ore. Rev. Stat.
§§ 659.070, .080 (Supp. 1959)]. Oregon has, however, permitted
appeal to the Attorney General and then to the Governor.
[Interview With Administrator, Civil Rights Division, Oregon
Bureau of Labor, in Portland, Ore., Aug. 9, 1960.]
Bamberger & Lewin, supra at 572.
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of the department" does not preclude judicial review. It may
reasonably be taken to mean only that the Commissioner's deter-
mination shall not be subject to fa-ther administrative review,
that is, by either a hearing examiner or a panel of the State
Board of Human Rights. 240  Standing alone, it may even be
construed as laying the basis for judicial review by defining a
determination of no probable cause as a "final decision."
However, section 363.072(1) authorizes only the respondent,
not the charging party, to seek judicial review of final decisions
of State Board panels or, by necessary implication, of hearing
examiners. If the charging party is not given the right to obtain
judicial review of a final decision of a panel or examiner reached
after hearing on a complaint issued. by the Commissioner, it is
reasonable to conclude that the Legislature did not intend to
give him a right to obtain judicial review of the Commissioner's
determination of no probable cause.
24 1
Under these circumstances, the line of cases exemplified by
Jeanpierre v. Arbury 42 is not applicable. In that case, the court
stated that it is well-settled in New York that "in the absence of
a 'clear expression by the Legislature to the contrary', the courts
may review the discretionary act of an administrative officer or
body to determine whether the discretion has been exercised in
an arbitratory or capricious manner. " 243  After studying the
language and legislative history of the New York Law Against
240. Cf. Estep v. United States, 327 U.S. 114 (1946).
241. Nor does § 363.072(2), which states that district court review
proceedings shall conform to MINN. STAT. § 15.0424 (1965), afford a
basis for such review. It seems clear that the Legislature did not
intend to incorporate by reference the provision of § 15.0424 defining
the persons who are entitled to judicial review. Section 363.072(1) de-
fines those persons for purposes of the State Act. But even if all of
§ 15.0424 applies to the State Act, subd. I thereof affords judicial re-
view only to "any person aggrieved by a final decision in a contested
case of any agency." And § 15.0411(4) defines a contested case as "a
proceeding before an agency in which the legal rights, duties, or privi-
leges of specific parties are required by law or constitutional right to be
determined after an agency hearing." Under this definition, a deter-
mination of no probable cause would nct be a "contested case" because
neither the constitution nor any law of the state requires it to be made
only after an agency "hearing."
242. 4 N.Y.2d 238, 149 N.E.2d 882, 173 N.Y.S.2d 597 (1958) (per
curiam).
243. Id. at 240, 149 N.E.2d at 883, 173 N.Y.S.2d at 598. Cf. United
Elec. Contractors Ass'n v. Ordman, 258 F. Supp. 758 (S.D.N.Y. 1966),
aff'd per curiarm, 366 F.2d 776 (2d Cir. 1.966); NLRB v. Lewis, 249 F.2d
832 (9th Cir. 1957), affd, 357 U.S. 10 (1958); Anthony v. NLRB, 204




Discrimination, the court found no clear intent to preclude judi-
cial review of a finding of no probable cause. Such an intent,
however, may be inferred from the language of the State Act.
The Uniform Law Commissioners justified the provision for
administrative review of a determination of no reasonable cause
on the ground that judicial review is an "inadequate substitute
for Commission review because the court cannot disturb findings
of fact unless they are 'clearly erroneous'."244 Whether this
ground is well-taken or not, the justification for administra-
tive review of such a determination is even greater when there
is no judicial review. Administrative review may be provided
in a number of different ways within the framework of the
State Act, one of which would not require statutory change.
The administrative review provided by section 703(c) of the
Model Act has two advantages. By calling for a new deter-
mination by the agency responsible for the statute's enforcement,
it assures consistency in enforcement policy. At the same time,
because the agency is a multi-member commission, it is possible
for the new determination to be made by a member who did
not participate in making the original determination. It is more
difficult to attain these advantages under the State Act.
To entrust review of the Commissioner's determination of no
probable cause to a panel of the State Board or to a hearing
examiner would accomplish the second of the Model Act's ob-
jectives. It would also make it possible, if it were thought to be
desirable, to assure that a hearing examiner or panel which, on
review, reversed the Commissioner and found probable cause,
did not also ultimately adjudicate the case. But this alternative
would not also assure the consistency of an enforcement policy
which seeks to select the cases to be carried to formal hearings.
The Commissioner, responsible for enforcement, would not have
complete authority over enforcement policy, while the reviewing
hearing examiner or Board panel would have authority over, but
no responsibility for, enforcement policy.
The best alternative under the State Act as presently written
would be a delegation by the Commissioner to the Deputy
Commissioner of the duty to investigate charges and make prob-
able cause determinations under section 363.06(4) subject, in the
event of a determination of no probable cause, to review by the
Commissioner at the request of the charging party. This would
provide a new determination and at the same time make possible
244. MODEL ANTI-DisCRIMNATION ACT 31-32.
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a consistent enforcement policy. Such administrative review
could be instituted by the Commissioner pursuant to subdivi-
sions 2 and 9 of section 363.04 of the State Act. It requires no
amendment of the statute. However, the Commissioner prob-
ably has no authority to request the State Board or a hearing
examiner to undertake such review because their duties are spec-
ified in the Act and do not include this function.
If the statute is amended to incorporate the suggestion that
an Assistant Commissioner be provided to perform the ad-
ministrative adjudicatory function, he might also be given the
task of reviewing determinations of no probable cause. This al-
ternative would permit the Commissioner himself to participate
in making such determinations initially, but it would also create
the possibility that the Assistant Conmissioner might have to ad-
judicate cases in which he had previously made determinations
of probable cause. The question then would be whether this pos-
sibility is so undesirable that it is better to have the Commis-
sioner himself undertake the review function, leaving the initial
determinations to his Deputy. This is not the case. It should be
noted in this connection that section 704(b) of the Model Act
forbids a "member of the Commission or staff who filed or in-
vestigated the complaint or endeavored to eliminate the alleged
discriminatory practice by conference, conciliation or persuasion"
to "preside at the hearing or participate in the subsequent de-
liberation of the Commission." However, it does not prohibit a
Commissioner from presiding at the hearing or participating in
the decision of a case because, although he took no part in its in-
vestigation, he determined reasonable cause under sections 703
(b) or (c) of the Model Act.245
If provision is made for administrative review of initial de-
terminations of no probable cause, it may be undesirable to add
judicial review. Judicial review would tend to divorce authority
over from responsibility for enforcement policy. Furthermore,
it is difficult to see how the judicial review contemplated by
the Model Act would operate. No formal hearing precedes the
determination of reasonable cause uader the Model Act; no rec-
ord is made; no findings of fact accompany the determination.
How then, will the court decide, as the Uniform Law Commis-
245. See id. at 36, where the Uniform Law Commissioners justify
the position taken by "analogy to the case where a magistrate in a
criminal case is permitted to rule on probable cause for purposes of
issuing a search warrant without disqualifying himself from presiding
at the trial ... .
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sioners suppose, whether the findings of fact are clearly errone-
ous? Either a trial de novo will take place in the reviewing
court or, though the Model Act does not so require, an adminis-
trative hearing will be held and a record and findings of fact
made before the initial determination of reasonable cause. The
latter alternative is unwise because it would formalize and delay
a procedure which should be expeditious and geared to secur-
ing quick compliance. This objection cannot be made as strongly
if the hearing at the administrative review stage is formalized
or if a trial de novo is had in the reviewing court. It would then
be difficult to distinguish, in practical effect, a proceeding to re-
view the determination of no probable cause from a hearing on
the merits of the case, except for the fact that in the former
situation no one will have been officially charged with violating
the law. The same result might be achieved more simply by
eliminating the requirement that reasonable or probable cause
must be found before proceeding to the conciliation and hearing
stages and by giving every charging party a right to an adminis-
trative hearing if his complaint has not been disposed of to his
satisfaction and a right to judicial review of the administrative
decision at the close of the hearing. It is the determination of
probable cause which makes the agency the accuser of the per-
son charged with the discriminatory practice. In substance, then,
the requirement that a finding of probable cause must be made
before the agency may proceed to the hearing stage is vitiated
by the provision for administrative and judicial review of a
determination of no probable cause because there will be a de
facto hearing in the course of such review.
In any case, if administrative review is provided, the charg-
ing party should be authorized to present new evidence and to
make use of the subpoena power to obtain it.
6. Time Limits for Agency Action
The State Act does not specify any time limits within which
the Commissioner must make his substantive determinations.
Section 363.06(4) merely requires the Commissioner to make his
determination of probable cause "promptly." The Model Act
does impose time limits upon the Commission. Section 70,3(b)
expects that the Commission will make its determination of no
probable cause within sixty days after the complaint is filed. Sec-
tion 703 (c) expects that the complainant will file an application
for reconsideration of an order dismissing the complaint within
thirty days after receiving a copy of it and that a new determina-
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tion of no probable cause will be made within thirty days after
the application for reconsideration is filed. Unless the Commis-
sion has issued an order dismissing the complaint, section 704(a)
requires it to fix a time and place for hearing and to order the
respondent to answer the allegations of the complaint, within
sixty days after a complaint is filed, or within thirty days after
the filing of an application for reconsideration or an order dis-
missing the complaint. Finally, if the Commission fails to sched-
ule a hearing within the specified time or to issue an order within
one hundred and eighty days after the complaint is filed, the
complainant, respondent, Attorney General, or an intervenor
may petition the court for an order directing the Commission
to take action.
The Uniform Law Commissioners explain that
[t]he procedure under subsections (b) and (c) [of section 703]
could last 120 days if the initial finding of no reasonable cause
came on the 60th day after the filing of the complaint, if the
complainant waited 30 days before filing an application for re-
consideration, and if the Commission on review delayed 30 days
further before deciding that there was no reasonable cause.246
They then point out 247 that section 706(b) of the Federal Civil
Rights Act of 1964 states that no charge of an unlawful employ-
ment practice shall be filed thereunder in a state having an anti-
discrimination law "before the expiration of 60 days after pro-
ceedings have been commenced" under the state law (120 days
during the first year that a state law is effective).248 "Accord-
ingly," explained the Commissioners,'2 49
the complainant in a state proceeding that is delayed beyond
the 60th day from the time of the filing of the complaint will
have the option of turning to the EEOC [federal Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Commission] while the state proceeding is
pending. There seems to be no escape from this potential
overlap of jurisdiction without unduly reducing the time pe-
riods. In most cases the complainant could be expected not to
move to the EEOC immediately after the 60 day period has
expired because he has up to 210 days after the alleged unlawful
practice occured to file with the EEOC under
section 706 (d) of the Federal Civil Rights Act.250
The State Act completely overlooks the need for time limits
not only to minimize overlapping the jurisdiction of the federal
EEOC, but also to assure the charging party that the Commis-
sioner will act on his complaint within a reasonable period of
246. Id. at 32.
247. Id.
248. 42 U.S.C. § 2000 e-5(b) (1964).
249. MODEL ANTi-DScRnvmATiON AcT 32.
250. 42 U.S.C. § 2000 e-5 (d) (1964).
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time. Prompt decision is essential to encourage compliance with
the State Act and to enforce it effectively.
7. The Conciliation Stage
(a) Mandatory or Optional?
Section 363.06(5) of the State Act requires that the Com-
missioner "shall endeavor to eliminate the unfair discriminatory
practice through education, conference, conciliation and persua-
sion .... ." Section 703(d) of the Model Act provides that "a
member of the Commission designated by the chairman or the
staff may endeavor to eliminate the alleged discriminatory prac-
tice by conference, conciliation, and persuasion." It is not sig-
nificant that the State Act, but not the Model Act, includes "edu-
cation." It is, however, significant that the State Act, but not
the Model Act, makes the conciliation stage mandatory. There is
no reason to require the agency to go through the motions of con-
ciliation if, as the Uniform Law Commissioners comment, "it is
likely to be fruitless."' 251 Furthermore, authorizing but not re-
quiring conciliation avoids the possibility that a cease and desist
order against an unfair discriminatory practice may be set aside
by a reviewing court upon a judicial finding that it was not pre-
ceded by good faith efforts to eliminate the practice through
conciliation, as required by section 363.06(5). Not only is liti-
gation of this type of issue troublesome, but the possibility of
such litigation may also lead the Commissioner and his staff to
put too much stress on bargaining for an agreement rather than
on enforcing the State Act. The State Act should be amended
to make the conciliation stage optional, not mandatory.
(b) Enforcing the Conciliation Agreement
The State Act does not incorporate important provisions of
the Model Act which help to make the conciliation stage an im-
portant instrument of enforcement. Thus, section 703(d) of the
Model Act authorizes the Commission to enter into conciliation
agreements and consent decrees embodying all or parts of con-
ciliation agreements and indicates the terms upon which the
Commission may insist. It also requires the Commission to state
the terms of the agreement in an order. Section 707 entitles a
complainant to obtain judicial review of such an order. Section
703(e) requires the Commission to investigate whether the re-
spondent is complying with the terms of a conciliation agreement
251. MODEL ANTI-DIscM3INATroN AcT 33.
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which he made. Section 803 makes it a discriminatory practice
for a party to a conciliation agreement to violate its terms, while
section 707 authorizes the Commission to obtain a court order for
enforcement of its order stating the terms of a conciliation
agreement. "In ... some circumstances," the Uniform Law
Commissioners add, "civil contract remedies may be available
to the complainant." 252
The Commissioner of Human Rights may be able to incor-
porate most of these provisions of the Model Act in rules and
regulations issued pursuant to section 363.05(1) (8) of the State
Act. It would have been preferable, however, if the State Act
had incorporated these generally salutary provisions of the
Model Act.
(c) Right of Charging Party To Secure Judicial Review of
Terms of Conciliation Agreement
One may question the wisdom of the provision in section
707 of the Model Act authorizing judicial review of Commission
orders stating the terms of a conciliation agreement. The analo-
gous question under the National Labor Relations Act-after a
complaint has been issued, may the charging party obtain
judicial review of a settlement agreement to which he objects,
whether or not embodied in a NLRB order?-has aroused contro-
versy and disagreement among the courts of appeals.2 53
252. Id.
253. The context in which this question arises under the NLRA
differs from the context in which the issue is posed under the Model Act.
It is generally agreed that a charging party has no recourse, either to
the NLRB or the courts, if the General Counsel refuses to issue a com-
plaint. See cases cited note 219 supra. But § 707 of the Model Act
authorizes judicial review of an order dismissing a complaint which,
in every case, will follow a determination of no reasonable cause under
§ 703(b). For all practical purposes, an order dismissing a complaint
under § 703(b) is equivalent to a refusal by the NLRB General Counsel
to issue a complaint or by the Commissioner of Human Rights to issue a
complaint under § 363.06 (4) of the State Act.
It is generally agreed, too, that if the NLRB, after the conclusion of
a contested proceeding, enters a final order against the respondent but
decides against enforcement or decides to negotiate a compromise rather
than to insist on strict compliance, the charging party may not obtainjudicial review of its decision. Amalgamated Utility Workers v. Con-
solidated Edison Co., 309 U.S. 261 (1940); Steward Die Casting Corp. v.
NLRB, 132 F.2d 801 (7th Cir. 1942). No different result would appear
to be called for by the Model Act in an analogous situation. Section
707 of the Model Act authorizes the Commission and no one else to
obtain a court enforcement order.
In addition, there seems to be no dispute that a charging party
under the NLRA, as amended, has no recourse if he objects to an in-
formal settlement agreement with the "respondent" into which a NLRB
[Vol. 52:231
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The Third Circuit has intimated that, in such case, a charg-
ing party who objects to a settlement agreement with the re-
spondent, whether or not embodied in a Board order, is entitled
to a hearing on the merits of the complaint, a decision by the
NLRB, and judicial review. 254 The Third Circuit cases hold that
the charging party in such a case is at least entitled to a hearing
on his objections to the settlement agreement before it is con-
summated.2 5 The District of Columbia Circuit, on the other
hand, has held that a charging party may secure judicial review
of a settlement agreement to which he objects-at least if the
agreement is embodied in a NLRB order-and that, on such re-
view, the court will determine "whether the Board's action
[accepting the settlement agreement as the basis for its order]
was within the broad discretion we recognize the Board posses-
ses. '255 It did not, however, recognize the charging party's claim
to a hearing on his objections to the settlement agreement prior
to its consummation. Instead, it stated that it would accept "a
presentation on the record of [the NLRB's] reasons for accept-
ance of the stipulation as the basis for the order [embodying the
settlement agreement] notwithstanding the Union's [charging
party's] objections. '257
The Second Circuit rejected the position of the Third Circuit
and purported to accept that of the District of Columbia Circuit.
In reality, however, it departed significantly from that position.
In the case before the Second Circuit, the NLRB issued a Supple-
mental Decision and Order setting forth in detail the basis for
its approval of the settlement agreement. Therefore, the court
held that the charging party was not entitled to a hearing on
his objections to the settlement.258  Speaking for the Second
Regional Director or the General Counsel enters without ever issuing
a complaint. This situation has no counterpart under the Model Act
because § 703(a) thereof begins all proceedings with the filing of a
"complaint" which later may be dismissed upon a determination of no
reasonable cause.
254. See Leeds v. Northrup Co., 357 F.2d 527, 531, 533, 535 (3d Cir.
1966); Marine Eng'rs Beneficial Ass'n v. NLRB, 202 F.2d 546, 549 (3d
Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 819 (1953).
255. Leeds v. Northrup Co., 357 F.2d 527 (3d Cir. 1966); Marine
Eng'rs Beneficial Ass'n v. NLRB, 202 F.2d 546 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
346 U.S. 819 (1953). These cases do not make clear before whom such
a hearing is to be held.
256. Textile Workers v. NLRB, 294 F.2d 738, 741 (D.C. Cir. 1961);
315 F.2d 41 (D.C. Cir. 1963). See also Retail Clerks Union 1059 v. NLRB,
348 F.2d 369 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
257. Textile Workers v. NLRB, 294 F.2d 738, 741 (D.C. Cir. 1961).




Circuit, Judge Friendly added that if he were accorded such a
right, "the charging party would seem entitled to exact an
evidentiary hearing not merely on the reasonableness of a settle-
ment but on the final merits of t:ae charge itself."'25 9 Judge
Friendly here seems to reject the distinction between the judi-
cial review contemplated by the District of Columbia Circuit and
the position intimated by the Third Circuit, that is, that a charg-
ing party who objects to a settlement; is entitled to a hearing and
a Board decision on the merits of the charge. The Second Circuit
did not review the NLRB order, as did the District of Columbia
Circuit in its case.260
Judge Friendly argued that to accept the view that any
charging party who objects to a settlement is entitled to a hear-
ing on the final merits of the charge itself would give the charg-
ing party "a complete veto on the public interest in compro-
mise."'261 He insisted that the policy of the NLRA "requires
that the Board be recognized as empowered to determine when
the possibly slight merit of a charge is outweighted by the sure
and speedy concessions, the industrial harmony restored, and the
savings of Board resources which a settlement can achieve."2 62
Section 707 (a) of the Model Act does not go so far as to em-
power the complainant to veto a conciliation agreement and in-
sist upon a hearing on the merits of the complaint. It seems to
adopt the position of the District of Columbia Circuit that
there will be review of the conciliation agreement itself. But it
does not expressly require the Commission to afford a complain-
ant opportunity to object to a conciliation agreement and to be
heard on his objections before the Commission enters into the
agreement with the respondent. The Commission would have to
elaborate such a procedure to make a record on which review
under section 707(a) could be conducted. Alternatively, the re-
viewing court might remit the case to the Commission for such
a hearing pursuant to section 707(d) of the Model Act. Fur-
thermore, the Model Act does not adopt the standard of review
suggested by the District of Columbia Circuit. Instead, section
707(b) authorizes the reviewing court to reverse or modify the
Commission's order embodying the settlement agreement "if
substantial rights of the petitioner have been prejudiced because
the findings of fact of the Commission are clearly erroneous in
259. 339 F.2d at 801.
260. Textile Workers v. NLRB, 315 F.2d 41 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
261. 339 F.2d at 801.
262. Id. at 799.
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view of the reliable, probative and substantial evidence on the
whole record."
Nevertheless, if an evidentiary hearing is to be required on
a charging party's objections to a settlement agreement and the
agreement is then to be subject to judicial review on the record
made at such a hearing, the Commission might as well facilitate
matters by discarding the settlement whenever a complainant
objects to it and proceeding to a hearing on the merits of the
complaint itself.
In its petition for certiorari in the Marine Engineers case,2 63
the government argued that the NLRB must be allowed unre-
viewed discretion to enter into settlement agreements for the
following reasons, which expand Judge Friendly's argument:
[J]udgment must be exercised to determine whether
the charging party's objections stem more from its zeal than
from the inadequacy of the settlement, and whether on that ac-
count the charging party is seeking more than the circumstances
fairly warrant; whether lesser immediate relief by settlement
will do more to redress and prevent the unfair labor practices
than greater relief delayed by litigation; whether measuring
the risks of protracted litigation against the advantages, includ-
ing estimates of the sufficiency of proof and the soundness of
the legal position, the balance preponderates in favor of adjust-
ment over contest; and whether evaluating the sufficiency of
the settlement in the light of the demands on the agency's over-
all capacity, limited budget and personnel are better devoted
to other cases.2 6 4
These considerations also apply to the administration of anti-
discrimination laws. An agency is not likely to welcome an
administration hearing in which it must put evidence in the rec-
ord bearing upon the issues stated in the petition for certiorari in
Marine Engineers, or a judicial proceeding to review its conclu-
sion based on such evidence. The result may be to discourage
the agency from entering into a conciliation agreement to which
a complainant objects, no matter how unreasonable it deter-
mines his objection to be. It may also discourage the respond-
ent from entering into such an agreement, even if the agency is
willing, because the incentive to avoid a public hearing by doing
so will be destroyed.
It must be acknowledged that the interests of those whom
the antidiscrimination laws are intended to benefit may be prej-
udiced by conciliation agreements which are not subject to judi-
cial review and that it is important, in combatting discrimination,
263. 202 F.2d 546 (3d Cir.), cert denied, 346 U.S. 819 (1953).
264. Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari at 13-16, NLRB v. Marine
Eng'rs Beneficial Ass'n, 346 U.S. 819 (1953).
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to give them every possible recourse to vindicate their rights.
Nevertheless, effective enforcement of the antidiscrimination
laws is more likely to be attained by giving the administrators
unreviewed discretion to enter into conciliation agreements and
by holding them to account for the manner in which they exer-
cise this discretion through some means other than judicial re-
view. Similar considerations lead, as indicated above, to a re-
jection of judicial review of determinations of no probable cause.
It is not clear how the issue in question could arise under
the State Act and, if it did, how it would be decided. The Com-
missioner may enter into a conciliation agreement either before
issuing a complaint pursuant to section 363.06(4) (2), or after
issuing a complaint and setting it down for hearing pursuant to
section 363.06(4) (2) and section 363.071(1). In the latter case,
it is clear that the agreement could also be embodied in an
order of a hearing examiner or panel of the State Board of
Human Rights. There is no reason why it could not also be
embodied in such an order in the former case, because the Com-
missioner could always determine probable cause, issue a com-
plaint, set the case down for hearing, and then enter into the
conciliation agreement. To require the latter procedure, as
stated above, may remove some of the incentive respondents
have to enter into conciliation agreements and thereby avoid
being publicly named as probable viclators of the law. It would
seem that the Commissioner may issue rules under section 363.05
(1) (8) providing for the embodiment of conciliation agreements
in orders of hearing examiners or State Board panels, even if the
agreements are made before complaints are issued. A hearing
examiner or State Board panel, of course, cannot be required to
embody a conciliation agreement into an order under section
363.071(2) unless the examiner or panel decides that it is proper
to do so. To this extent, then, there would be some "review" of
the conciliation agreements entered into by the Commissioner,
but the Commissioner may adhere to them even if they are not
embodied in an order under section 363.071(2).
The difficulty would remain that section 363.072(1) of the
State Act authorizes only the respondent to seek judicial review
of a final decision of a hearing examiner or a State Board panel.
Even if this difficulty were overcome it would still have to be
held that a conciliation agreement embodied as an order of a
hearing examiner or State Board panel is a "final decision" for
purposes of the State Act. At first blush, it would seem that
it is. However, section 363.072(2) requires the district court
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to review proceedings to conform to Minnesota Statutes sec-
tion 15.0424, and that section affords judicial review only to
any person "aggrieved by a final decision in a contested case of
any agency." Section 15.0411(4) of the Minnesota Statutes de-
fines a "contested case" as a proceeding before an agency in
which the legal rights, duties, or privileges of specific parties are
required by law or constitutional right to be determined after
an agency hearing. It seems clear that the proceeding leading
to the conciliation agreement is not a "contested case" within
the meaning of section 15.0411(4). It would not be advisable to
take the position that such a proceeding becomes a contested
case because, in the interest of more effective enforcement, the
Commissioner decides to have the conciliation agreement em-
bodied in an order of a hearing examiner or State Board panel.
The issue of whether the State Act should then be construed as
requiring the hearing examiner or State Board panel to enter
such an order only after an evidentiary hearing at which the ob-
jecting charging party is given an opportunity to be heard
raises the policy questions that have already been discussed.
If the proceeding leading to a conciliation agreement, whether
or not embodied in an order of an adjudicatory tribunal, is not a
"contested case," the question would then arise whether the
term "final decision" in section 363.072(1) means a "final deci-
sion" in any kind of proceeding. In the context of the whole
State Act, it is reasonable to read "final decision" in section
363.072(1) as referring to a final decision in a contested case
which has been carried to a decision on the merits.265 Thus,
there would still be no judicial review of an order embodying
the terms of a conciliation agreement.
(d) Conciliation Proceedings Privileged
Section 363.06(6) of the State Act parallels the last sentence
of section 703(d) of the Model Act in forbidding the Commis-
sioner to "disclose any information concerning his efforts in a
particular case to eliminate an unfair discriminatory practice
265. It may be argued that this conclusion is not warranted because
Mynw. STAT. § 15.0424(1) also provides that nothing therein "shall be
deemed to prevent resort to other means of review, redress, relief, or
trial de novo provided by law now or hereafter enacted" and that
§ 363.072 (1) of the State Act provides such other means, namely, review
of a final decision in any kind of proceeding. But, in context, it is
reasonable to construe "other means of review etc." as referring to
methods of reviewing final decisions in contested cases other than the
method prescribed in § 15.0424.
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through education, conference, conciliation and persuasion," but
allowing publication of the terms of settlement of a case.
It should be noted that section 363.06(6) excepts from this
prohibition any disclosure authorized by other sections of the
State Act. Prior to the 1967 amendments, section 363.07(3) of the
State Act required SCAD to "receive in evidence [at a formal
hearing on a complaint] any evidence pertaining to the efforts of
the commission to eliminate the unfair practice through educa-
tion, conference, conciliation, or persuasion." Reading the two
provisions together, it is clear that the conciliation process was
protected at least until it was completed. Furthermore, SCAD's
former Executive Director has informed the author that the
word "not" was inadvertently omifted from the old section
363.07(3) and that because it was clear the Legislature intended
to exclude, not require the reception of, such evidence, SCAD
never made use of the literal language of the old section 363.07
(3).
In any case, the 1967 amendments repealed all of section
363.07, and the State Act does not now include the provision for-
merly found in section 363.07(3). Thus, the phrase in section
363.06(6)--"Except as provided in other sections of this chapter"
-does not seem to have any referent.
It is important to be clear on precisely what is now privi-
leged under section 363.06(6) of the State Act and its counter-
part, section 703(d) of the Model Act. The Uniform Law Com-
missioners tell us only that the Model Act forbids "public dissem-
ination of the details of the conciliation process without written
consent of the parties .... "266 These "details" would certainly
not include the fact that an effort at conciliation had been made
and failed. Indeed, this fact must be made public under the
State Act. The fact that the charged party offered to settle and
the terms of his offer could certainly not be disclosed. Most im-
portantly, the disclosure of any testimony or other evidence con-
cerning the charge of discrimination which the Commissioner or
his staff may have uncovered during the stages of investigation
and conciliation is not forbidden. While such disclosure may in-
hibit charged parties from talking freely with Department con-
ciliators, on the whole it is salutary not to forbid it. It should be
recalled that the State Act does not separate the investigation
and conciliation stages. Section 363.06(4) directs the Commis-
sioner to "inquire into the truth of the allegation of the charge,"
266. MODEL ANI-DscRn1mATioN ACT 313.
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and section 363.06(5) requires him to attempt conciliation "in
complying with subdivision 4." In any case, it would be impos-
sible to separate the investigation and conciliation stages and,
therefore, it would be extremely unwise to require the Commis-
sioner and his staff to separate what they learned when they
were investigating from what they learned when they were con-
ciliating.
(e) Who Is Subject to the Prohibition Against Disclosure?
While the prohibition in section 363.06(6) of the State Act is
imposed only upon the Commissioner, the Model Act imposes the
same prohibition upon all the members, officers, and employees
of the Commission. To effectuate the obvious purpose of the
State Act, the Commissioner should exercise his rulemaking
authority under section 363.05(1) (8) to extend the prohibition
to the Deputy Commissioner and all the employees of the De-
partment.
(f) Publication of Accounts of Cases
Section 363.06(6) of the State Act authorizes the Commis-
sioner to "publish an account of a case in which the complaint
has been dismissed or the terms of settlement of a case that has
been voluntarily adjusted." Section 703(d) of the Model Act
excepts from the prohibition against disclosure contained therein
"the terms of the conciliation agreement." But, this exception
in section 703(d) should not be interpreted to forbid the publi-
cation under the Model Act of accounts of cases in which com-
plaints have been dismissed. Nothing in the Model Act expressly
forbids such publication.
B. ITEmm RELnE
The new, highly significant provision for interim relief in
section 363.06 (4) (3) of the State Act is based upon section 703 (f)
of the Model Act, but unfortunately fails to adopt some of the
most important provisions of the latter section. As the Uniform
Law Commissioners explain, these provisions are intended to as-
sure "that complainants do not win meaningless victories, partic-
ularly in housing cases.12 67 While the Model Act buttresses this
assurance, the State Act makes it tenuous indeed.
Under section 703(f) (1) of the Model Act, the Commission
267. Id. at 34.
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may seek temporary relief at any time after a complaint is filed,
even before it has made its investigation to determine reasonable
cause. Under the State Act, however, the Commissioner may
seek temporary relief only after he has determined that "there
is probable cause to believe that a respondent has engaged in an
unfair discriminatory practice." By that time, in the words of
section 363.06(4) (3), the respondent may already have done, or
procured the doing of, an "act tending to render ineffectual any
order the commissioner may enter with respect to the com-
plaint, 268 which is exactly what temporary relief is designed to
prevent. The Commissioner should be authorized to seek tem-
porary relief at any time after a charge is filed. He can then
make such investigation as he deems advisable to decide whether
he should seek temporary relief. The respondent is protected
against arbitrary action by the provision in section 363.06(4) (3)
that the court may not grant temporary relief for more than ten
days "except by consent of the respondent or after hearing upon
notice to the respondent and a finding by the court that there is
reasonable cause to believe that the respondent has engaged in
a discriminatory practice." Indeed, this latter provision was in-
serted in the Model Act, from which it is taken, only because
the Model Act authorizes the court to enter an ex parte order
granting temporary relief even before a finding of reasonable
cause is made. The court should not be asked to make such a
de novo finding under the State Act.
The hardship that a respondent may suffer from being sub-
jected for ten days to a court order "restraining him from doing
or procuring any act tending to render ineffectual any order"
that may ultimately be entered-without a prior administrative
determination of probable cause-does not outweigh the hard-
ship that will be imposed upon the charging party by subjecting
him for an indefinite period of time to the risk that the charged
party will do or procure the doing of such an act.
In fact, the Model Act minimizes the risk to which the
charged party is subjected. Section 703 (f) (2), one of the most
innovative provisions of the Model Act, which is based on a
proposed amendment to the New York Law Against Discrimina-
tion,269 entitles the charged party "to recover from the state
damages and costs sustained by reason of the temporary relief
268. The reference to the "Commissioner" here is an obvious error
due to thoughtless copying of the Model Act. The reference should
have been to the order of a State Board panel or hearing examiner.
269. MODEL ANTI-Discn nNATIoN ACT 34.
[Vol. 52:231
ANTI-DISCRIMINATION ACTS
or restraining order" if "a complaint is dismissed by final order
of the Commission or a court." It is inexcusable that the 1967
Legislature deleted this provision.
Even more inexcusable is what was substituted for it. Sec-
tion 363.06(4) (3) of the State Act bars the district court from
granting any temporary relief "except upon the giving of secur-
ity by the person claiming to be aggrieved by the unfair practice,
in such sum as the court deems proper for the payment of such
costs and damages as may be incurred or suffered by the party
who is found to have been wrongfully enjoined or restrained."
This requirement will minimize resort to temporary relief be-
cause the victims of discrimination either cannot afford or will
fear to give such security. This is precisely why the Model Act
shifts the burden of reparation to the state, to be borne as part
of the cost of effectuating the high public purposes of the anti-
discrimination law.
Temporary relief is the key to effective enforcement of an
antidiscrimination law: without it, victims of discrimination will
be discouraged from making use of the law. It should also be
noted, with dismay, that the State Act requires the victim of
discrimination to furnish security to enable the Commissioner
to obtain temporary relief even when the Commissioner issues
the complaint on his own motion without a prior charge from
any person.
The lack of charity displayed by the Legislature toward vic-
tims of discrimination should be contrasted with the magnanim-
ity shown perpetrators of discrimination in section 363.15 of the
State Act. That section requires the Commissioner, at state ex-
pense, to "provide upon request and without cost to the respond-
ent a transcript of any hearing in which the respondent is a
party in interest. '27 0 The Model Act contains no such provision.
The State Act also does not include section 703(g) of the
Model Act which authorizes the Commission to grant a kind of
temporary relief itself after a determination of reasonable
cause. To discourage the sale or rental or real property after
such a determination, section 703(g) permits the Commission to
"cause a notice to be posted on all entrances to the real property
270. Although § 363.01(16) of the State Act defines a "party in
interest" to include "the complainant" as well as the "respondent, com-
missioner or board member," complainants were not also made the
beneficiaries of the generosity of § 363.072(1). Yet this generosity was
undoubtedly motivated originally, as the repealed § 363.07(3) evidences,




which is the subject of the complaint, for a period not to exceed
ten days." The Commission is then required to file a copy of
any posted notice in the same manner as a notice of lis pendens.
This will assure legal notice to prospective transferees that a
complaint is outstanding and that they will take the real prop-
erty "subject to the rights of the complainant and to the power
of the Commission to nullify a transfer of the real property."
Presumably, section 703(g) would not prevent a court from
granting the kind of relief it authorizes, pursuant to section
703 (f) (1).
The State Act should have included section 703(g) of the
Model Act. It may be argued that the Commissioner can grant
such temporary relief pursuant to rules and regulations issued
by him under section 363.05 (1) (8), but the explicitness of section
363.06 (4) (3) would seem to preclude this possibility.
Finally, even the Model Act does not go far enough in
authorizing temporary relief. Temporary relief is so vital a cog
in the legal machinery of an antidiscrimination law that, so long
as the charged party is reasonably protected against risk of loss,
the administrative agency (the Cormissioner under the State
Act) should be authorized to grant temporary relief whenever
it deems it proper. It should be empowered to take such action
even before finding probable or reasonable cause, and this action
should be effective until such time as the case is finally decided.
The charged party should be given the right to appeal to the
courts on the ground that the agency acted arbitrarily or capri-
ciously in granting temporary relief, in which case the court
should decide what temporary relief, if any, is appropriate.
C. THE ADJUDICATORY HEARiNG
1. Conduct of Hearing
The 1967 amendments repealed the preexisting hearing and
judicial review provisions of sections 363.07, 363.08 and 363.09 of
the State Act. Section 363.071 now provides that the hearing
before a panel of the State Board or an examiner shall be con-
ducted in accordance with the requirements of Minnesota Stat-
utes 1965 sections 15.0418, 15.0419, 15.0421, 15.0422, commonly re-
ferred to as the State Administrative Procedure Act (APA).
No major differences are discernible between the Model Act
and the State Act with respect to the conduct of hearings. Sec-
tion 704 of the Model Act contemplates that the hearing will be
conducted in accordance with each state's APA.
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2. Who Are the Parties to the Proceeding?
Under the old section 363.07, the complainant, as well as
the respondent and SCAD, was clearly a party to the formal hear-
ing. Even though the charging party is not now authorized to
seek judicial review under section 363.072, he is, apparently, a
party to the hearing called for by section 363.071. Section 363.01
(16) defines "party in interest" to include the "complainant,"
although "charging party" would have been the more accurate
term, since the Commissioner now is the only "complainant"
under the State Act. The State Act rarely uses the term "party
in interest" but refers often to "party" which should be taken
to mean "party in interest." Several provisions of the State Act
indicate that the charging party is a party to the formal hearing
under section 363.071. Section 363.06(4) (1) requires that written
notice of a determination of no probable cause be served upon
the "complainant" (charging party), as well as the respondent.
Subdivision 4(2) requires that a copy of the written notice of
hearing upon a complaint issued by the Commissioner be fur-
nished to the charging party. Under subdivision 4(3), it is "the
person claiming to be aggrieved by the unfair practice" who must
give security before the Commissioner may obtain temporary
relief. Section 15.0418 of the State APA provides that in any
contested case, "all parties shall be afforded an opportunity for
hearing after reasonable notice" and the term "party," which is
not defined in the APA, should be read to include any "party in
interest" as defined in the State Act. Finally, section 363.071(2)
requires the State Board panel or hearing examiner to cause the
findings of fact, conclusions of law, and preliminary order "to
be served on . . . the charging party by registered or certified
mail."
Because of his "direct interest" in the proceeding, section 704
(e) of the Model Act gives the complainant a right to intervene
in the hearing before the Commission, to present evidence, and
to examine and cross-examine witnesses.
One difference between the rights accorded the parties for
hearing purposes under the two Acts should be mentioned. Sec-
tion 709 (a) of the Model Act entitles any party "as of right to the
issue of [administrative] subpoenas ... requiring attendance
and the giving of testimony by witnesses and the production of
documents," but authorizes the Commission to vacate or modify
the subpoena on petition of the individual to whom the subpoena
is directed. This provision is intended to give parties before
the Commission a reciprocal right to require the presence of
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witnesses and the production of documents. Section 702(7)
of the Model Act gives the Commission its subpoena power.
Neither the language of the Model Act nor the comment of
the Uniform Law Commissioners makes clear whether a com-
plainant intervening under section 703(e) would be regarded
as a party entitled to subpoenas "as of right" under section 709
(a). No reason is apparent why the complainant should not be
entitled to the use of subpoenas to support his intervention and,
if necessary, an application for reconsideration of an order dis-
missing a complaint upon a determination of no reasonable cause.
Neither the State Act nor the State APA gives the parties to
a hearing before a State Board panel or examiner the right to
use subpoenas. Section 363.05(1) (10) of the State Act empowers
the Commissioner to "subpoena witnesses, administer oaths, and
take testimony and require the prc duction for examination of
any books or papers relative to matter under investigation or in
question." The Commissioner, of course, would have discretion
to exercise this authority at the request of any party to a hearing.
The State Act also grants this authority to "hearing examiners"
who, for this purpose, should be taken as including members of
State Board panels. Parties, then, could also request such hear-
ing examiners to exercise the subpoena power on their behalf.
The provision in section 709(a) of the Model Act is to be
preferred. A similar provision in the National Labor Relations
Act has worked well, and the Admirdstrative Conference recom-
mended its use by all agencies of the federal government. 27'1
3. The Pleading Stage
Section 704(c) of the Model Act spells out the rudiments
of a pleading stage which is not mentioned in the State APA
but which the Commissioner could call for by rule or regulation
issued under section 363.05(1) (8) of the State Act. Section 704(f)
of the Model Act states that if the respondent fails to answer the
complaint, the Commission or the hearing examiner may enter
his default but then must proceed with the hearing on the basis
of the evidence in support of the complaint. The Uniform Law
Commissioners explain that this provision "obligates the Com-
mission to satisfy itself by evidence in support of the complaint
that there is a prima facie case before entering an order against
271. See ADnIsTRATIVE COXFERNC:a OF THE UNiTED STATES, REc-





Although such a provision is not found in the State Act or
the State APA, and presumably an order could be entered
against a defaulting respondent without taking any evidence at
the hearing, it would be wise for the State Board panels and
hearing examiners to follow the practice which the Model Act
prescribes.
4. Rules of Evidence
The repealed section 363.07(3) provides that SCAD "shall
not be bound by the strict rules of evidence that prevail in courts
of law, but its findings must be based upon competent and sub-
stantial evidence." This provision thus embodied the "legal
residuum" rule of Carroll v. Knickerbocker Ice Co.,273 which has
been subjected to warranted criticism,2 74 since incompetent
(hearsay) evidence may under some circumstances be reliable
and probative. The State APA, now applicable to the State Act,
wisely rejects the "legal residuum" rule. Section 15.0419(1)
authorizes agencies in contested cases to "admit and give pro-
bative effect to evidence which possesses probative value com-
monly accepted by reasonable prudent men in the conduct of
their affairs."
Unlike the State Act, section 807 of the Model Act contains
the useful provision that in any proceeding thereunder, including
a court proceeding, "a written, printed, or visual communica-
tion, advertisement, or other form of publication, or written in-
quiry, or record, or other document purporting to have been
made by a person is prima facie evidence that it was authorized
by him." The Uniform Law Commissioners explain that this pro-
vision is based on the public accommodation laws of several
states "which place the burden on a proprietor to prove that an
advertisement or other document indicating a discriminatory pol-
icy by his establishment was unauthorized" and is intended "to
facilitate proof of all forms of discrimination. ' 275
272. M ODEL ANTI-DscimxiNATIoN ACT 37.
273. 218 N.Y. 435, 113 N.E. 507 (1916). The Workmen's Compensa-
tion Commission "may in its discretion, accept any evidence that is of-
fered, still in the end there must be a residuum of legal evidence to
support the claim before an award can be made." Id. at 440, 113 N.E. at
512.
274. See, e.g., 2 K. DAVIs, ADMiNsTRATIVE LAW TREATISE 291-303
(1958); 2 A. LARsoN, THE LAW OF WORKmEN's COATmSATIOi 295-97
(1952); Sovern, Review of Schwartz, An Introduction to American
Administrative Law (1958) 59 COLum. L. 377, 379 (1959).
275. MoDEL ANTI-DiscntIiNATIOw ACT 48.
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Finally, unlike the Model Act, section 363.02(1) (3) of the
State Act provides that the "employment of one person in place
of another, standing by itself, shall not be evidence of an unfair
discriminatory practice." While few would disagree with this
provision, it is hardly necessary.27 6
5. Elimination of Waiver of Administrative Hearing
The 1967 Amendments eliminated subdivision 6 of section
363.07 which gave the respondent the option to demand, at least
five days prior to the commencement of the hearing before SCAD,
a determination by the district court on the complaint. If a re-
spondent made such a demand, all proceedings before SCAD
ceased. So long as an administrative agency is established to
adjudicate complaints charging unfair discriminatory practices,
there is no reason why a respondent, and he alone, should be
empowered to circumvent the agency and resort to the courts.
If it is thought desirable to entrust the task of adjudicating such
complaints in the first instance to the courts, it should be done
in all cases. As indicated above, this would not be the most
desirable alternative and the elimination of section 363.07(3),
therefore, was welcome.
D. THE DECISION
1. The Findings Requirement
Section 363.071(2) of the State Act is substantially similar to
the repealed section 363.07(4) and section 706(a) of the Model
Act. It requires the State Board panel or hearing examiner,
upon finding that the respondent has engaged in an unfair dis-
criminatory practice, to "make findings of fact and conclusions
of law" and to issue "a preliminary order directing the respond-
ent to cease and desist from the unfair discriminatory practice
found to exist and to take such affirmative action as in the judg-
ment of the panel or examiner will effectuate the purposes of"
the Act.277  However, unlike the repealed section 363.07(5) of
the State Act and section 705 of the Model Act, the State Act
does not require the adjudicatory tribunal to make findings of
276. See Carter v. McCarthy's Cafe Inc., 4 RAcE REL. L. REP. 641
(Minn. Dist. Ct., 4th Jud. Dist., June 29, 1959).
277. Neither the repealed § 363.07(4) nor § 706 (a) of the Model
Act describes the order as "preliminary." Nor does this description of
the order appear to have any significance under the State Act. It goes
back to the earlier bill under which the State Board would have re-
viewed, de novo, preliminary orders of hearing examiners.
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fact and conclusions of law in the event it determines that the
respondent has not engaged in an unfair discriminatory practice
and, therefore, issues an order dismissing the complaint. This
was probably an inadvertent omission because section 363.071(3)
of the State Act implies that this will be done when it states
that if "the panel or examiner makes findings of fact, conclusions
of law, and an order in favor of the respondent, such order shall
be a final decision of the department." It is important that
persons filing charges under the State Act should know precisely
why they are not obtaining relief. Keeping them in the dark
will destroy their confidence in the State Act and its adminis-
tration.
2. The Affirmative Relief Authorized
Section 706(b) of the Model Act specifies, by way of illustra-
tion and not limitation, the kinds of affirmative action the Com-
mission may require of a respondent found to have engaged in a
discriminatory practice. The State Act did not adopt these pro-
visions of the Model Act. While the authority to require the tak-
ing of "such affirmative action as in the judgment of the panel
or examiner will effectuate the purposes of" the Act is a very
broad authority which, according to section 363.11, should be
"construed liberally," doubt and controversy would have been
eliminated by the adoption of section 706 (b) of the Model Act.
This is not meant to imply that there should be any doubt
about the authority of the State Board panel or hearing exam-
iner under the State Act to require the taking of the kinds Qf
affirmative action set forth in sections 706(b) (1)-(7) of the
Model Act. As the Uniform Law Commissioners state, "these
are standard affirmative remedies."278  There may be doubt,
however, about authority under the State Act to require the
cancellation of transfers of real property made with actual
knowledge or record notice of a pending complaint that has been
determined to have reasonable cause.279 Because of the impor-
tance of this remedy for the effectuation of the prohibition
against discrimination in real property transactions, the doubt
should be resolved in favor of the existence of such authority
under the State Act.
However, the State Act probably does not empower a State
Board panel or a hearing examiner to require "payment to the
278. MoDEL ANTI-DiscRurNATioN ACT 38.
279. See id. at 39 & § 706(b) (8) of the Model Act.
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complainant of damages for an injury caused by the discrimina-
tory practice and costs, including a reasonable attorney's fee,"
or to assess damages, as section 706(b) (10) of the Model Act
also authorizes, at $500 for each violation, unless greater damages
are proven.280
XI. JUDICIAL REEVIEW
A. WHO MAY SEEK REVIEW?
Prior to the 1967 amendments, section 363.08 (1) of the State
Act permitted "the commission, complainant or the respondent
. . .[to] institute ... a proceeding in the district court for judi-
cial review and enforcement of an order of the commission."
Section 707 (a) of the Model Act enables a "complainant, respond-
ent, or intervenor aggrieved by an order of the Commission" to
"obtain judicial review," and the Connission "to obtain an order
of the court for enforcement of its order," in a proceeding
brought in the appropriate intermediate appellate court. The
Model Act thus expands the right to obtain judicial review by
according it to "all proper parties to the hearing."28 ' Contrary
to the Model Act and the preexisting provisions of the State Act,
the 1967 amendments accord the right to seek judicial review to
respondents only. The right to seek enforcement of the order
is given to the Commissioner only.
Thus, section 363.072(1) of the State Act authorizes only a
respondent aggreived by a final decision of the board (or hearing
examiner) to obtain judicial review. Subdivision 2 of section
363.072 provides that the "district court review proceedings shall
conform to Minnesota Statutes, Sec-tion 15.0424." Conceivably,
it might be argued that the charging party may obtain judicial
review pursuant to section 15.0424(1) which accords that right
to any person "aggrieved by a final decision in a contested case
of any agency." Such an interpretation of the State Act would
bring it into conformity with the clear policy to expand judicial
review expressed in the State APA. Nevertheless, this reading
of the State Act seems to be precluded.
Section 363.072(2) provides that the review proceedings
shall conform to section 15.0424. This must be taken as a refer-
280. Section 704(b) (9) of the Model Act also authorizes the Com-
mission to order "payment to an injured party of profits obtained by
the respondent through a violation of section 606 .. . ." It will be re-
called that the State Act does not contain the antiblockbusting provi-
sion of § 606 of the Model Act.
281. MODEL ANTI-DiscuvrwxATIoN ACT 41.
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ence to subdivisions 2-5 of section 15.0424 and not to the provi-
sion according the right to review in subdivision 1 of that section.
This conclusion is compelled by the express, limiting language
of section 363.072(1). Furthermore, section 363.071(3) provides
that if the panel or examiner "makes findings of fact, conclu-
sions of law, and an order in favor of the respondent, such order
shall be a final decision of the department." This provision not
only states what would otherwise be the case-that the Com-
missioner may not review a decision of a State Board panel or
hearing examiner-but seems also to indicate that such a deci-
sion shall be a final decision so far as the Department is con-
cerned, in the sense that the Act does not authorize the Commis-
sioner, let alone the charging party, to seek judicial review of
such a decision.
Finally, section 363.10 of the State Act authorizes the Com-
missioner or the respondent, but not the charging party, to ap-
peal to the Minnesota Supreme Court from an order of the dis-
trict court issued pursuant to section 363.072(1). 2 82 If it had
been intended to give the charging party the right to seek judi-
cial review in the district court, the charging party would have
been given the right to appeal to the Supreme Court from an ad-
verse decision of the district court. Quite apart from the ques-
tion of the proper treatment of the charging party, it is anoma-
lous to give the Commissioner the right to appeal to the Supreme
Court from an adverse decision of the district court, but not the
right to ask the district court to review an adverse decision of a
State Board panel or hearing examiner.
It should be added that if the respondent institutes a pro-
282. Although the State Act does not say so, the general provisions
of MNN. STAT. § 605.09 (1965) would authorize appeal to the supreme
court from an order of a district court issued pursuant to § 363.091 of
the State Act. The State Act does not clarify the status of the State
Board panel or hearing examiner when a respondent seeks judicial
review of its order, or when the Commissioner appeals to the supreme
court from an adverse judgment of the district court. Undoubtedly,
the State Board panel or hearing examiner is an "agency" within the
meaning of § 15.0411; no other administrative adjudicatory tribunal is
involved. The respondent, therefore, will have to serve his petition for
review upon the State Board or hearing examiner, as § 15.0424(2) re-
quires. Section 15.0424(2) (b) provides that the "agency and all par-
ties to the proceeding before it shall have the right to participate in
the proceedings for review." But the State Act contemplates that the
Commissioner will defend the order of the State Board panel or hear-
ing examiner in the district court and, if he deems it advisable, appeal
to the supreme court from an adverse decision of the district court.
The State Board or hearing examiner should also be able to exercise
the right accorded by § 15.0424(2) (b).
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ceeding in the district court to review an order of a State Board
panel or hearing examiner, the charging party, as a party to the
proceeding before the panel or hearing examiner, would have
the right, under section 15.0424(2)(b), to participate in the re-
view proceeding. In such case, the charging party would prob-
ably also have the right to participate in the respondent's appeal
to the supreme court from a decision of the district court ad-
verse to the respondent.
In any case, the Legislature's failure to give either the charg-
ing party or the Commissioner the right to obtain judicial review
of an order of a State Board panel or hearing examiner favoring
the respondent is indefensible. It may also be of doubtful con-
stitutionality.
The supremacy of law, it is generally agreed, requires that
the person charged with discrimination, and against whom the
force of law will be exerted if he is found guilty of the charge,
must be accorded the right to obtain judicial review of an ad-
verse administrative decision.28 3 Charging parties, or complain-
ants, may be deprived of the right to obtain judicial review of
adverse decisions of State Board panels and hearing examiners
only on the theory that the statute is the sole source of their
claims. Therefore, the Legislature may condition, in any way it
pleases, the manner in which it decides to satisfy these claims.
In other words, the 1967 amendments may be read as creating
only public, not private, rights in the State's antidiscrimination
policy which the Legislature was satisfied to leave, for vindica-
tion, to the State Board panels and hearing examiners.28 4 On
the theory that only public rights are created by the 1967 amend-
ments, no serious constitutional question would be raised if the
Commissioner-complainant, but not the charging party, had been
given the right to obtain judicial review of an adverse order of a
283. See Brandeis, J., St. Josephs Stock Yards Co. v. United States,
298 U.S. 38, 77 (1936) (concurring opinion,):
When dealing with constitutional rights .. . there must be the
opportunity of presenting in an appropriate proceeding, at some
time, to some court, every question of law raised, whatever the
nature of the right invoked or the status of him who claims it.
It is clear from his concurring opinion that Mr. Justice Brandeis re-
garded as a "question of law" the question whether there was substan-
tial evidence to support administrative findings of fact.
284. Cf. Auto Workers v. Scofield, 382 U.S. 205 (1965). The situa-
tion in Scofield is distinguishable from that under the State Act be-
cause (1) the NLRA enables a charging party to obtain judicial re-
view of an adverse NLRB decision as a "person aggrieved" under § 10
(f) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 160(f) (1964); and (2) the Court read the
NLRA and the NLRB's Rules and Regulations as recognizing the ex-
istence of private rights within the statutory scheme. 382 U.S. at 218-21.
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State Board panel or hearing examiner. Is it constitutionally
significant, then, that the Legislature chose to rely exclusively
on the judgment of the State Board panels and hearing
examiners?
As we saw, however, the State Act defines the charging
party as a party in interest and thereby gives him the right to
participate in certain administrative and judicial proceedings
under the Act. To this extent, it "recognizes the existence of
private rights within the statutory scheme."2 85 More important
to the constitutional question, it is by no means indisputable
that the State Act is the sole source of an individual's right to be
free of discriminatory practices. It may now be forcefully
argued that every state has an obligation under the fourteenth
and fifteenth amendments to the United States Constitution to
secure the civil rights guaranteed by these amendments. Fail-
ure to discharge this obligation may lead, for example, to valid
federal legislation punishing private action interfering with the
exercise of these rights.286 The rights asserted by complainants
under the State Act, therefore, are rights which the Federal
Constitution intends them to have. They are rights which are
individual to the person and not merely "public rights" which
would not exist but for the State Act. On this theory, it may
not be frivolous to conclude that the supremacy of law and due
process require that charging parties be given the right to obtain
judicial review of adverse administrative decisions and that the
equal protection clause is violated by granting the right of judi-
cial review to respondents but not to complainants. To avoid
constitutional doubt, there is some basis for reading the State
Act, together with the APA, so as to give charging parties the
right to obtain judicial review. But, as indicated above, this
basis is very weak.
Whether or not the constitutional objection raised is weighty,
the 1967 Legislature's decision to deprive complainants of the
right of judicial review which they previously enjoyed is an un-
fortunate step backward in the evolution of the state's antidis-
crimination laws.
B. THE HEARING ON REVIEw
Prior to the 1967 amendments, section 363.07 (6) of the State
285. 382 U.S. at 218.
286. See United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1966). Six Justices
indicated they would uphold such federal legislation even if its effec-




Act provided that "at least five days prior to the commencement
of the hearing before the commission," the respondent could
demand that the complaint be adjudicated in the first instance
by the district court instead of SCAD. In that case, no further
proceedings were to be had before the Commission and the
district court was to proceed in accordance with section 363.08.
Nevertheless, subdivision 7 of section 363.08 required the district
court to "determine whether the findings of the commission
are supported by competent and substantial evidence, and
whether the order of the commission is supported by the find-
ings." Yet obviously, this standard of review could not be ap-
plied to a case brought in the district court under section 363.07
(6) because there would be no commission findings or order in
such a case.
The statute was equally confusing in the situation in which
a hearing took place before SCAD and judicial review of SCAD's
findings, conclusions, and order were sought pursuant to the old
section 363.08 (1), since subdivision 3 of that section provided that
the proceeding in the district court ",,hall be de novo and the per-
son complained against shall be entitled at his request to a trial
by jury." Even then, subdivision 7 of the section applied and
required the district court to "determine whether the findings
of the Commission are supported by competent and substantial
evidence."
The old provision for a de novo proceeding in the district
court on review of a SCAD order was even more indefensible
than the old provision giving the person complained against the
choice of a hearing in the district court in place of one before
SCAD, since the de novo proceeding, in effect, negated SCAD's
adjudicatory function even after it was performed. The attend-
ant delay also greatly discouraged complainants. No better rec-
ipe than these two provisions taken together could be devised for
the demoralization of an administrative agency. It gave the
agency every incentive to avoid hearings and to do everything
in its power to settle cases, even at the cost of strict compliance
with the antidiscrimination law. At the same time it gave per-
sons complained against the counter-incentive to refuse settle-
ments. All persons concerned seem to agree that this is just
what happened.
Section 363.08(7) of the State Act might have been read as
imposing its limited scope of review upon the district court even
when the proceeding before it was "de novo" pursuant to subdi-
vision 3 of that section. A de novo proceeding would then
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ANTI-DISCRIMINATION ACTS
have been taken to mean merely that a new record would be
made in the district court upon which the court would then
exercise the limited scope of review called for by subdivision 7.
But this alternative was foreclosed by the provision in subdivi-
sion 3 that "the person complained against shall be entitled at
his request to a trial by jury" in the district court. In such
case, it is clear that the jury would be making its own findings
of fact and not passing on those of SCAD. Nothing less was
apparently intended when the de novo proceeding in the district
court was before a judge sitting without a jury.287
In any case, the provision for a de novo hearing in the re-
viewing court has now been deleted. All hearings on complaints
issued by the Commissioner will be held before a hearing exam-
iner or a panel of the State Board of Human Rights. Judicial
review in the district court and appeal, if any, to the Minnesota
Supreme Court will then take place on the basis of the record
made before the adjudicatory tribunal of first instance, as sec-
tions 15.0424(4), (5), and (6) of the APA make clear.
C. THE ScoPE OF JUDicILa REvIEW
The repealed section 363.08(7) of the State Act called upon
the district court to determine "whether the findings of the com-
mission are supported by competent and substantial evidence,
and whether the order of the commission is supported by the
findings." Section 15.0425, which section 363.072(2) makes appli-
cable to proceedings instituted by respondents to review final
decisions of State Board panels and hearing examiners, imposes
a different standard of review. It provides that the district
court
may reverse or modify the decision if the substantial rights of
the petitioners may have been prejudiced because the admin-
istrative finding, inferences, conclusion, or decisions are ...
(e) Unsupported by substantial evidence in view of the entire
record as submitted; or (f) Arbitrary or capricious.
By contrast, section 707 (b) of the Model Act enables the review-
ing court to "reverse or modify the order if substantial rights of
the petitioner have been prejudiced because the findings of fact of
the Commission are clearly erroneous in view of the reliable,
probative and substantial evidence on the whole record."
We have already considered the reasons why the standard of
review embodied in the repealed section 363.08(7) is undesirable.
Furthermore, the standard in the Minnesota APA incorporated
287. Cf. Carter v. McCarthy's Cafe Inc., 4 RACE REL. L. REP. 641
(Minn. Dist. Ct., 4th Jud. Dist., June 29, 1965).
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by reference in the State Act is preferable to that of the Model
Act.
The Model Act's standard is based upon section 15(g) of the
Revised Model State Administrative Procedure Act, the opening
sentence of which, however, adds that the reviewing court "shall
not substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the
weight of the evidence on questions of fact." It is also the
standard which the second Hoover Commission urged as an
amendment to the Federal Administrative Procedure Act.28 8
While there is some controversy as to whether the "clearly er-
roneous" test calls for a broader scope of review than the "sub-
stantial evidence" test,28 9 there can be little doubt that a legis-
lative change from a substantial evidence test to a clearly errone-
ous test will be construed by the courts as a legislative decision
to impose a broader scope of review upon the administrative
agency in question. Whether a broader scope of review can be
called for in this area without requiring the reviewing court to
substitute its judgment for that of the administrative adjudica-
tory tribunal is extremely doubtful. even if the Model Act in-
corporated the first sentence of section 15(g) of the Revised
Model State Administrative Procedure Act.
Opposing the views of the American Bar Association's Spe-
cial Committee on Legal Services and Procedure in support of the
Hoover Commission's recommendation, Robert M. Benjamin
wrote:
[Enactment] of the "clearly erroneous" test would inevita-
bly be interpreted as broadening the permissible scope of judi-
cial review beyond the scope of the "substantial evidence" test;
and, if that is done, the result must be to authorize the substitu-
tion of judicial judgment for administrative judgment. The
"substantial evidence" test presently authorizes the reviewing
288. U.S. [HOOVER] COiMMISSION ON ORGANIZATION OF THE EXECU-
TIVE BRANCH OF THE GOVERNMENT, RiPORT ON LEGAL SERVICEs AND
PROCEDuRE 75-76 (1955).
289. Professor Davis thinks that it does, citing United States v.
United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948): "A finding is
'clearly erroneous' when although there is evidence to support it, the
reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and
firm conviction that a mistake has been committed." 4 K. DAVIs, ADIm-
isTRATIV LAW TREATIsE 118-26 (1958). This interpretation of the
clearly erroneous test renders meaningless the first sentence in § 15 (g)
of the Revised Model State Administrative Procedure Act. Robert L.
Stern also thinks the "clearly erroneous" test is broader than the "sub-
stantial evidence" test. Stern, Review of Findings of Administrators,
Judges and Juries: A Comparative Analysis, 58 HAv. L. REv. 88-89
(1944). The late Justice Vanderbilt did not. Vanderbilt, Introduction
to Symposium on Hoover Commission Report on Legal Services and
Procedure, 30 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1268 (1955).
[Vol. 52:231
ANTI-DISCRIMINATION ACTS
court to set aside any determination of the agency that is not
rationally supportable. Any broader test must therefore, by
hypothesis, authorize the reviewing court to set aside a deter-
mination that is rationally supportable. When a court sets aside
a jury verdict, the case goes back to a different jury, which will
be unaware of the court's action, and if enough juries reach the
same result the verdict will ultimately stand. When an ap-
pellate court reverses a trial court, the new trial may often be
before a different judge. With respect to agency adjudication,
however, the matter will always go back to the agency whose
determination has been reversed on judicial review. That
agency can hardly refuse to change its fact decision (by hy-
pothesis rationally supportable if it would not have been set
aside under the "substantial evidence" test) to accord with the
court's, i.e., the agency will be forced to accept judicial judgment
as superseding its own rational judgment. 290
It is true that an order of a State Board panel or hearing
examiner which is reversed by a district court because it is
"clearly erroneous" could be reconsidered by a different panel or
hearing examiner. But the Commissioner in such a case, unlike
a private party, would and should not seek such reconsidera-
tion unless he has additional evidence. If he has no additional
evidence, the Commissioner would accept the reviewing court's
judgment, as indeed he would even if the district court reversed
the order of the panel or examiner for lack of substantial evi-
dence to support it. The clearly erroneous test would merely
increase the number of cases in which reviewing courts could
reverse orders with finality.
The adoption of the clearly erroneous test in the Model
Act may be justified if the state adopting it has also enacted the
Revised Model Administrative Procedure Act. In that case, it
may be argued, the anti discrimination agency should be treated
like every other administrative agency in the state, but adoption
of this test in the State Act would have meant treating the anti-
discrimination agencies differently from all other administra-
tive agencies in the state.
D. RELATION BETWEEN JUDIcIAL REVIEw AD ENFORcEMENT
PROCEEDINGS
1. When May an Enforcement Proceeding Be Instituted?
Section 363.091 of the State Act provides that when "the
order of the department has become final," the Commission
290. See ABA, REPORT OF ABA SPECIAL COMNMnEE ON LEGAL SERV-
ICES AND PROCEDURE, 81 ABA REPORTS 493, 506-07 (1956); Statement
of Separate Views of Robert M. Benjamin, id. at 529-30. The American
Bar Association accepted the recommendation of its Special Committee
in support of the Hoover Commission proposal. Id. at 375-77.
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may request the district court "to order the respondent to comply
with the order of the department."
Thereupon the court shall issue an order to show cause directed
to the respondent why an order directing compliance should
not be issued. Notwithstanding the provisions of any law or
rule of civil procedure to the contrary, the court shall examine
at the hearing on the order to show cause all the evidence in
the record and may amend the order of the department in any
way the court seems just and equitable.
This section is not free of difficulty and ambiguity. In the
first place, the successive references to the "order of the depart-
ment" is confusing. The only similar reference elsewhere in the
State Act is found in section 363.071(3) which makes an order
of a State Board panel or hearing examiner in favor of the re-
spondent "a final decision of the department." Obviously, such
a decision needs no enforcement. Section 363.071(2) deals with
the situation in which a panel or hearing examiner finds against
a respondent and requires the adjudicatory tribunal in that event
to "issue a preliminary order directing the respondent to cease
and desist from the unfair discriminatory practice found to
exist. . . " It is this "preliminary order" which is termed the
"final decision of the board [or hearing examiner]," and of
which the respondent may seek judicial review, under section
363.072(1).
If the reference to "the order of the department" in section
363.091 is taken to mean the order of the State Board panel or
hearing examiner, when does this order become final? Section
15.0424(2)(a), incorporated by reference in section 363.072(2),
requires the respondent to institute review proceedings within
thirty days after the State Board panel or hearing examiner
serves the findings of fact, conclusions of law, and preliminary
order on him, or within thirty days after service of an order
finally disposing of an application for rehearing or reconsidera-
tion of the original order.
Certainly, the order of the panel or hearing examiner will
become final if the respondent fails to seek judicial review within
the time specified. Anytime thereafter, the Commissioner may
seek enforcement of the order under section 363.091. But what
if the respondent institutes review proceedings within the al-
lotted time? Does the order then not become "final" until it has
passed the scrutiny of both the district court and supreme court?
Such an interpretation would prevent the Commissioner from
filing a cross-petition for enforcement when the respondent peti-
tions for judicial review and would. unduly delay the issuance
of the court's enforcement order.
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The repealed section 363.08 (8) of the State Act contemplated
a combined judicial review-enforcement proceeding. It provided
that on review of a SCAD order, the district court "has power
* . . to modify the order of the commission in any particular; to
order compliance with the order of the commission; to issue its
order modifying the order of the commission and enjoining com-
pliance therewith .... ." Section 707 of the Model Act also au-
thorizes such a combined proceeding. The State Act should also
be interpreted to permit such a sensible result. To this end, the
final order of the department, referred to in section 363.091,
should be taken to mean the final decision of the State Board
panel or hearing examiner which may be subjected to judicial
review at the instance of the respondent under section 363.072.
The Commissioner could then bring an enforcement proceeding
even before the respondent sought judicial review, as indeed
SCAD could under the repealed section 363.08(1) and the Com-
mission may under section 707 of the Model Act.
2. Standards for Reviewing Order
The nature of the determination which the district court
must make before it may issue an enforcement order is also un-
clear. Section 363.091 of the State Act says that "the court shall
examine at the hearing on the order to show cause all the evi-
dence in the record and may amend the order . . . in any way
the court deems just and equitable." Presumably the court is
authorized and directed to do this even if the respondent fails
to seek judicial review within the specified time. The repealed
section 363.08 (7) required the district court in that case to "deter-
mine whether the findings of the commission are supported by
competent and substantial evidence, and whether the order of
the commission is supported by the findings" and subdivision 8
authorized the court "to modify the order of the commission in
any particular."
Thus it is not clear whether the requirement of section
363.091 that the enforcement court "examine at the hearing on
the order to show cause all the evidence in the record" means
that, if the respondent has not sought judicial review within the
specified time, the court must nevertheless review in accordance
with the standards of section 15.0425; or that the court must
examine all the evidence in the record only to help it exercise its
authority to amend the order in any way it deems "just and
equitable." The latter interpretation would appear to be
sounder. It is not conclusive that the language of the repealed
1967]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
section 363.081(7), which embodied the former interpretation,
has been deleted, because the draftsmen of section 363.091 prob-
ably did not focus on this problem. A respondent who does not
seek judicial review within the specified time is in default. It
is reasonable, then, to empower the Commissioner to obtain a
court enforcement order without having to show that the order
of the State Board panel or hearing examiner satisfies the stand-
ards set forth in section 15.0425. This is what the Model Act
clearly allows. Section 707 (f) thereof provides that if a proceed-
ing for judicial review is not initiated within thirty days after a
copy of the Commission's order is received by the respondent, the
Commission "may obtain a decree of the court for enforcement
of its order upon showing that a copy of the petition for enforce-
ment was served on the respondent and that the respondent is
subject to the jurisdiction of the court."
The Model Act does not even seem to authorize the enforce-
ment court, as does section 363.091 of the State Act, to amend
the order in such case.2 91 But on this point, the State Act is pref-
erable, at least so long as the Commissioner is required to seek
an enforcement order even if the respondent does not seek judi-
cial review. As Professor Jaffe has said, a court "should rarely
be required-nor should it be thought that there is any inten-
tion to require it-to participate actively in the enforcement of a
judgment which it finds offensive."292
Both the State Act and the Model Act, however, may be
justly criticized for requiring the administrative agency to se-
cure a court enforcement order when the respondent has failed
to seek judicial review within the specified time. In this respect,
the provisions of the Federal Trade Commission Act should
have been followed. Section 5 (g) of the FTC Act states that an
FTC cease and desist order shall bezome final if the respondent
fails to file a petition for review within sixty days from the date
of the service of the order upon him. 2913  Section 5(1) of the
FTC Act subjects the respondent who violates a final FTC order
291. This conclusion seems to follow from a reading of § 707 of the
Model Act as a whole. However, the Uniform Law Commissioners do
not make this point in their comment. They merely say that § 707(f)
"simplifies the enforcement process by removing the onus from the
Commission of supporting its findings in court with 'substantial evi-
dence' if its order is not challenged by a party to the hearing." MoDEL
AcT AI-I-DscmmimATIoN ACT 43.
292. Jaffe, The Judicial Enforcement of Administrative Orders, 76
HARV. L. REV. 865, 869 (1963).
293. 15 U.S.C. § 45(g) (1964). The 60 day limit is imposed by
§ 5(c) of the FTC Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45(c) (1964).
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to a civil penalty of $5000 for each violation.294 This FTC pro-
cedure also makes sense in the civil rights field, in which the
administrative agency almost never is given adequate funds
for its work and should not be asked to assume unnecessary
burdens.
Section 363.091 of the State Act authorizes the enforcement
court, after examining all the evidence in the record, to "amend
the order . . . in any way the court deems just and equitable."
Section 707(b) of the Model Act authorizes the reviewing court,
at least when a proceeding for judicial review has been initiated
within the specified time, to "modify" the order "if substantial
rights of the petitioner have been prejudiced because the find-
ings of fact of the Commission are clearly erroneous in view of
the reliable, probative and substantial evidence on the whole
record." Since the Model Act envisages a combined judicial re-
view-enforcement proceeding, the same standard is set forth to
guide the court in reviewing the Commission's order and in
entering its own order enforcing that order.
The State Act, however, seems to set up two standards to
guide the court even in a combined review-enforcement proceed-
ing. The review is to proceed according to the traditional scope
elaborated in section 15.0425, but even if the order of the State
Board panel or hearing examiner passes muster under the tradi-
tional scope of review, the court may still amend the order "in
any way" it "deems just and equitable." In all probability, how-
ever, the enforcement court would use the "just and equitable"
standard even under the Model Act.
29 5
E. THE STAGES OF JUDIcIAL REviEw
The process of judicial review under sections 363.072 and
363.10 of the State Act and section 707(e) of the Model Act will
not be expeditious because two courts will be involved, the
supreme court of the state and the reviewing court of first in-
stance. The final form which the 1967 amendments took in this
respect, however, is a decided improvement upon earlier bills
which called for initial adjudication by a hearing examiner, to be
followed by a de novo hearing and decision of the State Board of
Human Rights, review in the district court and, finally, appeal
to the Minnesota Supreme Court. Nevertheless, the system of
administrative adjudication and judicial review now provided in
294. 15 U.S.C. § 45(1) (1964).
295. See text accompanying note 292 supra.
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the State Act may still produce undue delay and discourage
those who put their faith in the new Department of Human
Rights.
The repealed section 363.08(3) tried to solve the problem of
delay by requiring that "trials or hearings arising under this
section shall be given precedence as nearly as practicable over
all other pending actions." Section 707(b) of the Model Act con-
tains a similar provision, but it is optional because "of different
state policies toward favoring any class of cases in this way. '296
The 1967 amendments incorporated no such provision. It is very
doubtful, however, that such provisions succeed in expediting
the favored class of cases.
It has been recommended above that the task of adjudica-
tion should be entrusted, in the first instance, to an Assistant
Commissioner of Human Rights. His decisions and orders should
be subject to review directly by the supreme court, as are deci-
sions and orders of the Minnesota Industrial Commission award-
ing or disallowing compensation under the Workmen's Compen-
sation Act.297 The district courts of the state are experienced
in conducting trials, not reviewing records of administrative ad-
judication. Furthermore, it is likely that cases on review in the
district court will ultimately wind up in the supreme court.
To allow direct appeal to the supreme court, therefore, will not
add appreciably to the burdens of the supreme court. It will
permit more expeditious relief to be granted in a class of cases
in which speed is of the essence if those for whose benefit the
antidiscrimination laws were enacted are to continue to have
faith in then.
If these recommendations are not followed, it would be pref-
erable, on balance, to skip the process of administrative adjudi-
cation altogether and empower the district courts to hear and
adjudicate, in the first instance, all. complaints issued by the
Commissioner, with appeal of the district court decisions to the
Minnesota Supreme Court.
XII. SANCTIONS FOR VIOLATION OF STATE ACT
A. CONTEMT PROCEEDINGS
The Model Act does not attempt to specify the nature of the
contempt proceedings to redress or punish violations of final
court enforcement orders. Prior to the 1967 amendments, sec-
296. MODEL ANTI-DIsCRIINATION ACT 42.
297. Mrxx. STAT. §§ 176.471 & 176.481 (1965).
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tion 363.09 of the State Act provided that any person who shall
wilfully violate any final district court enforcement order "shall
be cited to the district court for and as being in contempt" and,
if found to be in contempt, "shall be punishable under Minnesota
Statutes, Section 588.10, which provides for imprisonment for not
more than six months, or a fine of not more than $250, or both."
Although the 1967 amendments repealed section 363.09, Minne-
sota Statutes, chapter 588, relating to contempts, continues to
apply. Section 588.01 (3) (3) defines as constructive contempt
"[d] isobedience of any lawful judgment, order, or process of the
court." Chapter 588 does not make clear who may institute the
contempt proceeding, but seems to authorize the Commissioner
or the charging party to initiate such a proceeding.29 8
B. DAMAGES TO VICTIM OF DIsCinv ATIoN
It will be recalled that section 706(b) (10) of the Model Act
authorizes the Commission to order "payment to the complainant
of damages for an injury caused by the discriminatory practice
and costs, including a reasonable attorney's fee" and to assess
the damages at $500 for each violation, unless greater damages
are proven. The State Act contains no such provision and such
authority would probably not be included in the general power
granted the State Board panel or hearing examiner by section
363.071(2) to order the respondent "to take such affirmative ac-
tion as in the judgment of the panel or examiner will effectuate
the purposes of" the Act.
However, if the respondent violates a final court enforce-
ment order and contempt proceedings are instituted, some in-
demnity to the injured party may be decreed by the court. Thus,
section 588.11 of the Minnesota Statutes provides:
If any actual loss or injury to a party in an action or special
proceeding, prejudicial to his right therein, is caused by such
contempt, the court . . , in addition to the fine or imprison-
ment imposed therefor, may order the person guilty of the con-
tempt to pay the party aggrieved a sum of money sufficient to
indemnify him and satisfy his costs and expenses, including a
reasonable attorney's fee incurred in the prosecution of such
contempt, which order, and the acceptance of money thereunder,
shall be a bar to an action for such loss and injury.
298. Sections 588.02 and 588.11 seem to assume that a "party to an
action or special proceeding" may institute the contempt proceeding.
As we saw, both the charging party and the Commissioner are defined
as parties in interest by § 363.01(16) of the State Act and the charging
party will be a party to the proceeding before the State Board panel or
hearing examiner and to any action before the district court or su-
preme court instituted by the respondent.
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It should be noted that section 583.11 does not authorize the
award of any liquidated damages, or of damages as a penalty,
yet such an award is essential to effectuate the purposes of anti-
discrimination laws "when complainants suffer a discernible loss
that is speculative in amount, as in the case of discrimination
in housing or by a place of public accommodation. '299 Section
588.11 also makes the indemnity it provides exclusive of any
other civil action for damages by the injured party.
C. LICENSE REVOCATION
Section 706(c) of the Model Act requires the Commission
to certify to the appropriate licensing agency the fact that it has
determined that a respondent operating by virtue of a license
issued by the State or a political subdivision or agency thereof
has engaged in an unlawful discririnatory practice, if it finds
that the practice was "authorized, requested, commanded, per-
formed or knowingly or recklessly tolerated by the board of
directors of the respondent or by an officer or executive agent
acting within the scope of his employment." While section 706
(c) makes the Commission finding of a discriminatory practice
binding on the licensing agency, unless it is reversed in the
course of judicial review, section 805 of the Model Act merely
authorizes, but does not require, the licensing agency to "take
appropriate action to revoke or suspend the license of the re-
spondent."
The Uniform Law Commissioners explain that license ter-
mination, "though a severe remedy, may be necessary to cope
with flagrant violations of the Act, particularly in the absence of
general criminal penalties.."3 00 They go on to say that
to assure that the remedy is limited to flagrant cases, and is not
applied when a low-level employee discriminates, the subsec-
tion adopts a standard similar to section 6.04 of the Model
Penal Code for finding a corporation guilty of a crime-the
practice must be authorized or at least recklessly tolerated by
the board of directors or an officer or executive agent acting
within the scope of his employment.3 0 '
Having assured that the remedy will be limited to flagrant
cases, the licensing agency should have been required, not merely
authorized, to take some appropriate action. Indeed, the agency
administering the antidiscrimination laws should itself be em-
powered to revoke or suspend licenses in such cases.
299. MODEL ANTI-DIScRIMVINATION ACT 39.




Criticism may be more appropriately leveled at the State
Act which contains no provision at all respecting license revoca-
tion for flagrant violations of the State Act. However, the Gov-
ernor may have authority, by executive order, to direct that li-
censing agencies shall take appropriate action against a licensee
who has been found guilty of a discriminatory practice prohib-
ited by the State Act. Whether or not state licensing makes the
acts of the licensee the acts of the state for purposes of the equal
protection clause of the fourteenth amendment,302 the fact that
the licensee may operate only with the state's permission should
obligate him, as a matter of state licensing law, not to discrimi-
nate against any member of the public for invidious reasons. It
is interesting to note that the Governors' Codes of Fair Practices
in New York, Michigan, and Pennsylvania impose such an obli-
gation upon licensees.303 Furthermore, the licensing agencies
themselves may promulgate rules making it clear that discipli-
nary action will be taken against licensees who violate the State
Act. 04 These agencies, however, are more likely to act if the
Governor takes the lead.
D. CONTRACT TERmiNATION
Section 706(d) of the Model Act requires the Commission to
certify to the contracting agency the fact that it has determined
that a respondent has engaged in an unlawful discriminatory
practice in the course of performing under a contract or subcon-
tract with the state or political subdivision or agency thereof,
if it finds that the practice was "authorized, requested, com-
manded, performed, or knowingly or recklessly tolerated by the
board of directors of the respondent or by an officer or execu-
tive agent acting within the scope of his employment." As in
the licensing case, while section 706(d) makes the Commission
302. See Harlan, T., Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 41 (1883)
(dissenting opinion); Douglas, J., Reitman v. Mulroy, 87 S. Ct. 1627,
1635-37 (1967) (concurring opinion); Lombard v. Louisiana, 373 U.S.
267, 281-83 (1963) (concurring opinion); Garner v. Louisiana, 368 U.S.
157, 183-85 (1961) (concurring opinion). But see Black, J., Bell v.
Maryland, 378 U.S. 226, 333 (1964) (dissenting opinion); Williams v.
Howard Johnson's Restaurant, 268 F.2d 845 (4th Cir. 1959); Slack v.
Atlantic White Tower Sys., 181 F. Supp. 124 (D. Md. 1960).
303. The texts of these codes are set forth in SI.AED, STATE ExEcu-
TIVE AUTHORI= TO PROMOTE CIVM RIGHTS, Appendices A, B, and C (The
Potomac Institute, 1963). For the pertinent provisions concerning licens-
ing, see id., Appendix A, at iii (New York); Appendix B, at vi (Michi-
gan); and Appendix C, at xi (Pennsylvania).
304. Id. at 10-12.
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finding of a discriminatory practice binding on the contracting
agency, unless it is reversed in the course of judicial review, sec-
tion 806 merely authorizes but does not require the contracting
agency to do something about it. The contracting agency may
(1) terminate a contract or portion thereof previously entered
into with the respondent, either absolutely or on condition that
the respondent carry out a program of compliance with the pro-
visions of this Act, and (2) assist the State and all political
subdivisions and agencies thereof to refrain from entering into
further contracts, or extensions or ofhher modifications of exist-
ing contracts, with the respondent until the Commission is sat-
isfied that the respondent will carry out policies in compliance
with the provisions of this Act.
While the State Act does not contain these provisions of the
Model Act, section 181.59 of the Minnesota Statutes requires
every contract with the State or a political subdivision thereof
for materials, supplies, or construction to embody an agreement
that the contractor or subcontractor will not discriminate in
employment against any citizen of the United States "by reason
of race, creed, or color."305 Violation of the agreement is made
a misdemeanor. In addition, the State or political subdivision
may cancel or terminate the contract in the event of a violation
and may compel the contractor to forfeit all money due or to be-
come due under the contract for a second or any subsequent
violation.
By executive order in 1963, Governor Karl F. Rolvaag desig-
nated the Commissioner of Administration to investigate com-
plaints of violation of section 181.59 and to conduct hearings to
determine the facts. The Commissioner was authorized, upon a
finding of violation, to "suspend, cancel or terminate the con-
tract" and upon a finding of a second or subsequent violation,
also to "declare all money due or to become due pursuant to
such contract, forfeited to the State o:l Minnesota."
As in the case of a licensing agency, the contracting agency
should be required, not merely authorized, to take some action
against a state contractor or subcontractor who is found to dis-
criminate in employment. Minneapolis' new Civil Rights Ordi-
nance takes action along these lines. If an order is issued there-
under ordering a city contractor to cease and desist from engag-
ing in discrimination in connection with the contract, the ordi-
nance requires the City to withhold up to fifteen per cent of the
contract price until such time as the order is complied with or




the contractor is adjudged not guilty of the discrimination.30 6
The City is also authorized to cancel, in whole or in part, the
contract of any contractor who violates the ordinance and the
contractor is made liable for any costs or expense incurred by the
City in obtaining from other sources the work and services to be
rendered or performed or the goods or properties that were to
be furnished or delivered to the City under the contract.
307
The new St. Paul Civil Rights Ordinance seemingly does not
go this far. It merely directs the administrative agency it
creates, as does the Minneapolis ordinance, to determine whether
persons who contract with the City are obeying the ordinance,
but it does not expressly provide the additional sanctions set forth
in the Minneapolis ordinance. 30 8 But, of course, the provisions
of section 181.59 of the Minnesota Statutes still apply.
E. CnmvNA PENALTmES
Neither the Model Act nor the State Act makes it a crime
to violate any of its provisions. On the other hand, the St. Paul
ordinance makes a violation of any of its provisions a misde-
meanor punishable as such.30 9 The Minneapolis ordinance sub-
jects any person found guilty of violating an order issued by the
Hearing Committee of the Enforcement Section of the Minne-
apolis Commission on Human Rights to a fine of not more than
$100, or imprisonment for not more than 90 days, for each of-
fense.310 However, the criminal penalty under the Minneapolis
ordinance is not in addition to, but takes the place of, the con-
tempt sanction for violating such an order. The criminal pen-
alty under the St. Paul ordinance is in addition to the contempt
sanction."1
Criminal penalties are particularly helpful in enforcing the
prohibitions against discrimination in public accommodations
and public services. For example, it is made a violation of the
Minneapolis ordinance for any official, commissioner, agent, em-
ployee, or servant of the City to fail to comply with any of the
ordinance's provisions relating to any matter within the scope
of his official duties.3 12 The risk of a criminal penalty, which
306. MINNEmOLIS, MInN., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 944.040(a) (1967).
307. Id.
308. SA n'T PAUL, MINN., LEGISLATnE CODE (1967); MINNEAPoLIS,
Mlr., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 944.060(d) (10) (1967).
309. SAINT PAUL, MINN., LEGISLATIVE CODE (1967).
310. MINNEAPOLIS, MINN., CODE OF ORDINANCES §§ 944.070(i), 944.090
(1967).
311. SAINT PAUL, MINN., LEGISLATIVE CODE (1967).
312. MINNEAPOLIS, MmN., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 944.050.
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may result in his dismissal, is an effective sanction to assure that
every City employee will obey the ordinance.
Equally important, the criminal penalty will also reflect the
community's judgment of the moral quality of the discriminatory
act and may thereby facilitate compliance with the antidis-
crimination law.
F. ARE THE REmEDIES PRovIDED BY STATE ACT AND MODEL ACT
ExcLusvm?
May the victim of discrimination elect to skip the adminis-
trative process and bring an action for damages or an injunction
directly in an appropriate state court? The Model Act is silent
on this question, but section 363.11 of the State Act provides
that nothing therein
shall be deemed to repeal any of the provisions of the civil
rights law or of any other law of this state relating to discrim-
ination because of race, creed, color, religion or national origin;
but, as to acts declared unfair by section 363.03, the procedure
herein provided shall, while pending, be exclusive.
There are antidiscrimination laws other than the State Act
in Minnesota, and the remedies they provide are saved by section
363.11 of the State Act. Thus Minnesota Statutes section 507.18
(4) makes any person who enters into a restrictive covenant pro-
hibited by subdivision 1 of that section "liable in a civil action
to the person aggrieved in damages not exceeding $500." Sec-
tion 127.07 of the Minnesota Statutes subjects to a $50 fine any
member of a school board who votes for or fails, when present,
to vote against the "exclusion, expulsion, or suspension from
school privileges of any person entitled to admission to the school
of such district" on account of race, color, nationality, or social
position. Section 127.08 of the Minnesota Statutes also pro-
vides that
[a]ny [school] district ... classifying [into different schools or
departments] or separating any of its pupils... upon any such
ground shall forfeit its share in all apportioned school funds for
any apportionment period in which such classification, separa-
tion, or exclusion shall occur or continue.
Section 181.59 of the Minnesota Statutes makes it a misde-
meanor for a state contractor or subcontractor to discriminate
in employment and also subjects the contractor or subcontractor
who discriminates to the risk that the contract may be cancelled
and, for a subsequent act of discrimination, that money due
under the contract may be forfeited.
Section 327.09 of the Minnesota Statutes also prohibits dis-
crimination by public accommodators. But when the 1965 Legis-
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lature made it an unfair discriminatory practice under the State
Act to violate section 327.09, it also repealed the preexisting
provision of section 327.09 that a violator thereof "shall be liable
in a civil action to the person aggrieved for damages not exceed-
ing $500." From this action, it may be inferred that the Legis-
lature intended to exclude any general civil action for damages
against persons allegedly engaged in unfair discriminatory prac-
tices proscribed by the State Act from the remedies provided
by the State Act. To give section 327.09 some independent sig-
nificance, it might be used as the basis for an injunction suit by
the victim of discrimination.
However, it should be pointed out that section 363.11 makes
the procedure provided in the State Act exclusive "while pend-
ing." It would not produce a sensible result to read this provi-
sion to permit a charging party to resort both to the State Act's
procedures and, if he ultimately loses, to an action for damages
or an injunction in an appropriate state court. This provision
could, however, reasonably be read to give a victim of discrim-
ination an election to bring such an action or seek an adminis-
trative remedy, but not to do both.
The Legislature should clarify this matter by granting this
option expressly. It should also authorize the recovery of
liquidated and penalty damages and a reasonable attorney's fee,
as well as court-appointed counsel for victims of discrimination
who cannot afford to engage counsel. In addition, the Commis-
sioner should be empowered to intervene in such litigation. The
way victims of discrimination would choose to exercise the op-
tion given them by the recommended legislation would test
administrative effectiveness and spur administrative action. In
order to assure fair competition between the judicial and admin-
istrative processes, the State Board panels and hearing examiners
should also be empowered to order respondents to pay damages,
including liquidated and penalty damages, and a reasonable at-
torney's fee, to charging parties.
XIII. RECORD-KEEPING REQUIREMENTS
Section 708 of the Model Act enables the Commission, by
regulation or order, to require every person subject to it to make
and keep records relevant to the determination of whether dis-
criminatory practices have been or are being committed; to pre-
serve such records for specified periods; and to make reports
therefrom. In investigating complaints, the Commission is
granted access "at any reasonable time to premises, records and
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documents relevant to the complaint and the right to examine,
photograph and copy evidence." Information obtained by the
Commission from such records and reports and investigations,
however, must not be made public "except as necessary to the
conduct of a proceeding under" the Act.
These are important provisions. Effective enforcement of
an antidiscrimination law requires that the administrative
agency not sit back and wait for individual complaints, but that
it ferret out patterns of discrimination in the areas covered by
the law and act to eliminate them. Trhe record-keeping require-
ments are an essential foundation upon which to base such
affirmative administrative action.
The State Act does not contain. provisions comparable to
section 708 of the Model Act, except that section 363.05(1) (10)
of the State Act empowers the Commissioner to compel the pro-
duction of testimony and written data. However, by rule or
regulation pursuant to section 363.05(1) (8), the Commissioner
may impose the record-keeping requirements of section 708 of
the Model Act.
XIV. RELATIONS BETWEEN DEPARTMENT OF
HUMAN RIGHTS AND LOCAL CIVIL RIGHTS AGENCIES
Prior to the 1967 amendments, the State Act did not attempt
to regulate the relations between SCAD and the local civil rights
agencies in any way. As a result, jurisdiction in many cases
was concurrent. The 1967 amendments and the Model Act deal
expressly with the relations between the state and local agencies.
But the manner in which the 1967 Legislature adopted some, but
not other, provisions of the Model Act indicates that it did not
pay serious attention to the problems which the co-existence of
state and local agencies raise.
A. Is THE STATE ACT A GENERAL ENABLING STATUTE?
Section 902 of the Model Act enables any political subdivi-
sion of the State to adopt and enforce an ordinance prohibiting
discrimination "not in conflict with a provision of this Act."
Section 903 authorizes it to create a local commission "to promote
the purposes of this Act." The Uniform Law Commissioners
are not very helpful in explaining that by an ordinance "not in
conflict with a provision" of the Model Act they mean an ordi-
nance which prohibits discrimination "to the extent not incon-
sistent with the Act. '313 In the light of the objectives of the
313. MoDEL ANTI-DSCRIMINATION ACT 49.
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Model Act, this provision should be read generally as authoriz-
ing local ordinances which give to their beneficiaries protections
which are at least as great or greater than those afforded by the
Model Act. It is not suggested that this rule of construction
will solve all the problems that the language of the Model Act
raises. The State Act seems to avoid these problems, although
it creates others of its own.
Before turning to the State Act, it should be pointed out
that section 904 of the Model Act sets forth the powers which
local commissions may be given "in addition to powers authorized
by other laws." The powers set forth are patterned after those
granted the statewide Commission, except for the power to hear
and adjudicate complaints and issue remedial orders. The Model
Act seems to envisage, however, that such authority may be
granted by laws other than the Model Act, including local ordi-
nances. But if it is desirable to decentralize efforts to eliminate
discrimination, as the Uniform Law Commissioners state,3 14 the
Model Act itself should have authorized local commissions to
have all the powers of the statewide commission.
The State Act does not contain the enabling provisions of
sections 902 and 903 of the Model Act, nor the provisions of sec-
tion 904 which set forth the powers which local commissions
may be authorized to have, yet a number of its provisions assume
and look to the creation of local agencies. Thus, section 363.05
(1) (20) directs the Commissioner to "develop and disseminate
technical assistance ... to agencies and officers of govern-
mental . . . agencies," and section 363.05(1)(22) directs him to
"make grants in aid to the extent that appropriations are made
available for such purpose in aid of carrying out his duties and
responsibilities ... ." Furthermore, sections 363.115 and 363.116
authorize the Commissioner to refer matters involving discrimina-
tion to local commissions and local commissions to refer such
matters to the Commissioner.
It may be reasonably argued that these provisions of the
State Act impliedly enable local authorities to enact civil rights
ordinances and create local administrative agencies. But the
absence of the equivalent of sections 902 and 903 of the Model
Act is not the only difficulty with this argument. The 1967
Legislature thought it necessary, in the face of the amendments
to the State Act, to pass special legislation granting additional
powers to the Minneapolis Fair Employment Practices Commis-
314. Id. at 48.
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sion315 which would have been unnecessary if the State Act was
a general enabling statute. The 196'7 amendments to the State
Act, therefore, cannot be reasonably read as granting blanket
authority to the political subdivisions of the state to adopt civil
rights ordinances and create local commissions. Wisdom would
have dictated the adoption of the general enabling provisions
of the Model Act, but amplified as recommended above.
If the State Act were read as generally enabling localities
to pass civil rights ordinances and create local agencies, no other
state legislation would be necessary to give them such powers
as the local authorities may decide to confer, because section
363.115 of the State Act indicates that the Legislature meant by
a "local commission" any "agency of a city, village or borough
created pursuant to law, city charter, or municipal ordinance,
and conferring upon the agency powers including, but not lim-
ited to those which are conferred upon the commissioner 316 by
the State Act. Thus, although the Commissioner does not have
the authority to hear and adjudicate complaints and issue reme-
dial orders, a local agency would be recognized as such under
the State Act if it were given such additional powers.
If, however, the State Act is not read as a general enabling
statute, then of course local commissions may be granted only
such powers as laws other than the State Act permit.317 The
provisions of sections 363.115 and 363.116 of the State Act will
then become applicable even if a local commission, pursuant to
such other laws, is given powers in addition to these conferred
upon the Commissioner by the State Act. The State Act will not
stand in the way of a grant of such powers to local commissions.
B. OPTION OF CHARGING POLIcY: REFiRRAL OF MATTERS BY LOCAL
AGENCIES TO COMMISSIONER
Under section 363.116 of the State Act, the charging party is
given the option of filing a charge either with a local commission
315. [1967] Minn. Laws 900, approved May 24, 1967, the day before
the 1967 amendments to the State Act were approved.
316. MInN. STAT. § 363.115 (1965) (emphasis added).
317. The scope of the authority of political subdivisions of the State
to adopt civil rights ordinances and create local administrative agencies
will not be considered in this Article.
Perplexing questions of consistency with the State Act will also
arise. For example, is the provision of the recently enacted St. Paul
Civil Rights Ordinance authorizing imbalance plans in conflict with the
State Act which contains no such provision? Or can it be said that
the St. Paul ordinance affords greater protection than the State Act to
minority-group members in this respect?
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or the Department of Human Rights. If he files with the one,
he is precluded from filing the same charge with the other.
When a charge comes to its attention, the local agency is required
to inform the charging party of this option, but no similar obli-
gation is imposed upon the Commissioner. Finally, this section
authorizes a local commission to refer a matter under its jurisdic-
tion to the Commissioner.
The Model Act, on the other hand, does not require a com-
plaining party to choose between the statewide Commission and
the local commission. Section 906 (a) authorizes a local commis-
sion to refer a matter to the statewide Commission, but section
906(b) goes on to provide that at any time after a complaint
(charge) is filed with it, the statewide Commission may request
a local commission to transfer any related proceeding to it. If
such a request is made, the local commission must "take appro-
priate action to implement the transfer." The Uniform Law
Commissioners comment, however, that if local commissions are
given power to hear and adjudicate complaints and issue reme-
dial orders, "concurrent jurisdiction can be provided for."3 18
In such a case, there would be competition between the statewide
Commission and the local agencies. This may be salutary. How-
ever, to prevent both the statewide Commission and the local
agency from hearing the same case, either simultaneously or
successively, arrangements could be made so that each agency
would notify the other of every complaint it receives and adopt
the policy of not acting upon any complaint first made to the
other. The City of Minneapolis has already taken steps toward
such a policy. Its ordinance provides that "[n]o matter shall
be heard or complaint issued pursuant" thereto "when the mat-
ter has been previously considered by the State of Minnesota
Commissioner of Human Rights as a matter within his jurisdic-
tion."3 19
The provisions of section 363.116 of the State Act are ill-
considered. The charging party should not be required to
choose between the Commissioner and a local civil rights agency.
The charging party cannot be expected to know whether the pro-
tection afforded him under the State Act will be the same or less
than that afforded by a local ordinance and local commission.
The obligation of the local agency to inform the charging party
of his option under section 363.116 and of his rights under the
State Act cannot be relied upon to give the charging party all
318. MODEL ANTI-DIscRIMIATION ACT 51.
319. MINNEAPOLIS, MINN., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 944.110 (1967).
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the information he will need to know to exercise his option intel-
ligently. The suggestions made above for a concurrent jurisdic-
tion are satisfactory so long as the protections afforded under
the State Act and the applicable local ordinance are the same.
They are not completely adequate if the local ordinance af-
fords greater protection than the Stale Act. To meet this situa-
tion, the Commissioner might be required to transfer to a local
agency any case in which the local ordinance affords greater
protection than the State Act. Certainly the Minneapolis agen-
cies should not construe the abstention provision in their ordi-
nance to require them to abstain in any case in which they can
give greater protection than the agencies under the State Act.
The State Act should also adopt the compulsory transfer
provision of section 906(b) of the Model Act which requires the
transfer to the statewide Commission of proceedings before local
commissions "related" to a complaint (charge) filed with the
statewide Commission-but only, of course, when the state-
wide agencies can give relief which is as adequate as that af-
forded by the local agency. This provision, the Uniform Law
Commissioners tell us, is intended to assure uniform interpreta-
tion and enforcement and to avoid duplication of effort.3 20 As
the State Act is now written, one may envisage a charge filed by
one person with the Commissioner and by another person with
a local agency, against the same employer and involving the
same practice. Not only would there be duplication of effort in
this situation, but there is no assurance that the outcome would
be the same.
In fact, to assure uniform interpretation and enforcement
of similar provisions, it may be desirable to go further than the
Model Act and authorize the Commissioner to require a local
agency to transfer any case to him, whether or not related to a
charge already filed with him. The Commissioner has statewide
responsibility for effectuating the purposes of the State Act; he
should have commensurate authority to do so. His good sense
may be relied upon to use the power of compulsory transfer
sparingly, for the interests of his own Department will be ad-
vanced by decentralized, effective administration and enforce-
ment of the antidiscrimination laws.
Although section 363.116 of the State Act is inadequate, the
suggested relations between the Commissioner and local civil
rights agencies may be effected by agreement among them. The
320. MoDEL AN[i-DiscrImiATIoN AcT 51.
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Commissioner should take the initiative to secure such agree-
ment through the powers given him in sections 363.05 (1) (20)
and (22).
C. REFERRAs BY Tm COMMISSION'ER TO LoCAL AGENCIES
Section 363.115 of the State Act follows section 905 of the
Model Act almost verbatim in authorizing the Commissioner to
refer matters involving discrimination to a local commission,
whether or not a charge has been filed with the Commission-
er.3 21 The Model Act here has in view primarily a local commis-
sion without power to hear and decide complaints and issue re-
medial orders. Thus, if a complaint (charge) has not been filed,
section 905 (a) of the Model Act and section 363.115 of the State
Act authorize referral of a matter to a local commission "for in-
vestigation, study and report." If a complaint (charge) has been
filed, they authorize referral of the complaint (charge) for in-
vestigation, for determination whether there is reasonable cause
to believe that the respondent has engaged in a discriminatory
practice, or for assistance in eliminating a discriminatory practice
by conference, conciliation, or persuasion.
Does section 363.115 of the State Act, then, authorize the
Commissioner to refer a charge to a local agency for the purposes
specified above and, in addition, for hearing and adjudication
and the issuance of remedial orders? This section, too, is in-
tended to permit the Commissioner to decentralize his activities,
but there is as much reason to permit the decentralization of
administrative adjudication when that is deemed advisable by
the Commissioner and the local agency possesses the requisite
powers. Such decentralization may be authorized by section
363.115 if a liberal construction is given to the provision therein
that "[u]pon referral by the commissioner, the local commission
shall make a report and make recommendations to the commis-
sioner and take other appropriate action within the scope of its
powers.3
22
321. The unthinking manner in which § 905 of the Model Act was
followed is indicated by the fact that § 363.115 authorizes referral of
matters involving discrimination "because of race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin." These, of course, are the reasons for discrimination
proscribed by the Model Act, not the State Act. The reasons pro-
scribed by the State Act, it will be recalled, are "race, color, creed,
religion, or national origin." Careful perusal of § 363.115 will also show
that its language, in a number of other ways, does not fit the pattern of
language used in other parts of the State Act.
322. MmIN. STAT. § 363.115 (1965) (emphasis added).
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Despite the apparent mandate 1o the local commission to
take other "appropriate action" within the scope of its powers
upon a referral by the Commissioner,323 the Commissioner is not
forbidden to refer a charge to a local commission with the re-
quest that it merely report back if its conciliation efforts fail but
not hear and adjudicate the case. The Commissioner must have
the utmost flexibility in making arrangements for the decentrali-
zation of activities under the State Act.
So far, it has been assumed that efforts to eliminate dis-
criminatory practices can best be decentralized by creating
autonomous local agencies under local law, with powers at least
as extensive as those conferred upon the Commissioner, State
Board panels, and hearing examiners by the State Act. Central-
ization, however, may also be effected by setting up local offices
of the Department of Human Rights and choosing hearing exam-
iners from the local bar, or local members of the State Board,
to adjudicate complaints. Indeed, section 363.05(1) (3) author-
izes the Commissioner to "establish End maintain . . . necessary
branch offices at any location within the state." To decentral-
ize in this fashion may have its advantages. It would eliminate
the duplication of administrative effort; assure uniform policies
and consistency in their application; and, possibly, facilitate the
recruitment of abler people. Nevertheless, decentralization by
encouraging the creation of autonomous local civil rights agen-
cies under local law is the wiser course. This will add layers of
political responsibility for eliminating discriminatory practices
to the responsibility imposed upon -the Governor by the State
Act and should help to effectuate the purposes of the State Act.
This objective cannot be accomplished by setting up branch of-
fices of the Department of Human Rights.
323. Section 905(b) of the Model Act, it should be noted, provides
that the local commission "shall make a report and may make recom-
mendations to the State Commission and take other appropriate action




















































































o W~)U+ to 4
0 0. k4 _ '0 c>- , a) .
CU o .2 o Oop
" 
i
"I.n ;4 ; .Q "
0 to0* ,S0 E
go W- 0 0 -ct 0
80 ~ ~ ~ w 3-.
- + r- c
C ) o -  ,o
P0s k U "1 0 -
0q. 0 mu+. 0 m
"0
4 





0" d r . .- 0 wo
o .d 0 . a)c ra ,-,.0...
C.) cc







~W +.-'-0C asW 0U- 0 Cka
0U 0 0
V 02
,to 4..*' - P
0U~~ cdQ
CUH a)o U,
S:4 0 - CU cd
% 0
aw , is4.
04 cuC ~ ~ 0 >f C
m 0 0 w
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 52:231
I ;-,
asO ;=i0 h
b.n o oU o
;4 A bn
oo




U a) 10 tw09P






























44 1- ;-, P4 0 40
0 0 0 04
4)
0 0 U 4
P4 W 0
0 P *4:.. a);> 0) aj2 i
0 0 a .00' ca
;4 ~ ~~~~ C) 10- o"-ra , 0
r" -)~ 0 C,..-' 0 Ca)
-4 W;4. 0
.0~ 0t18
cd 0 u c(D 40 0 o a)-
q4 " - :
t 4 'a 0 0 R ) 0 4)p.
o ~ ~ w u ' 0- 0c
m P4
a )0 0 0 s
000 0~oo
C). CD 0* ocq -H
0 4U c a 4) 0)4 E4 ca
411
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 52:231
cii - 0 Pm 4
oc
0 Q ,cis w 0 Ci
CdD
q 4 - --c
0 0 i ,-J, a ,Cd r,2
0 0 0---
0
Cd Cd V >
0.-0 P ; F4 0 +
cd di cc0 di
0 -I-4
- 0~ 0 d.
0- c-4* "
04 ~ D - CS~4-
0 WL 0 .
W ddi41Cd- .a
0 0 'd C,
0 4~d a
0d C' a







0 w as mO 0

























0asI 0 r I I 6. 0 cu >
A > ; $-0 P . a
- S0 4 , - o . &
r0-4 0 U.lo .J
cd ~ * 1 d a @
cda)
L) 0oo o6 kPct 0 cd-4 0
U.- 4 .00 cd . 0 P.4 0
o k0 .o S a)
' 0 k 0-
42) - M-a +. U0
,-.00 °  0  ~ *~ 0 ' ' ' '
d• - '4.
0 ~ ~ ~ ~ a)a)Qkt
"- ~ ~ ~ C C,.d.- 4-, bD" a) "uo s °
.o ~o .oo mi . o ra as
-E- -Co's as a) -, a 4
0 0 ' (D W > ,
. - 04- 0
P"2 , ~ k~ 0 k C) ,0 a) 4
$4 0 og 0r
U O -o-a) ' ' a 0 cc ;
P4~O Ns as
21 cu 0 Hc 0 c"0 a)
asasa 00 rI 42 0).0
W 0 E - 0 a
cu .
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 52:231
ANTI-DISCRIMINATION ACTS
l 0' 0 cu " d =  W (L) -H 0 0) ,
144 4 U
• 0 h , as- 4 . oo, 0. o 104-c• '
.- 0 ) 0. : ta
,' P' --W k. 0 4. CIS 4 1 N
+ C0TS 0 0 >
I.... .. + " o o 4 o 0 ,
En p 0 0 Co k k 0 ,.0 CUZ
d0 0 -4 0 " T
Cu,. 0
_.
4" - 4 P4--. ,"1-1 4 ( 0 -4 0 0'
C .o T 4- k :> -1 "
..,Q4C (L) l: 00 0z. 0 0 C 4.a
o cu.
00,-




o~ > . 4
- ~ ~ j ct0) boa ) $4C
k ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 2C CUC d (ma )cs *
* ,..w cm 0 . wCo k P-4 k0) 0 4
0)P P 0 0-4 u4 ra U~r2 4-r - t
1967]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 52:231
00 C.) $+4
m 0 +0 0 P44
'04 0 42C . G) a
as 0 0
t cli 0- 0t )-d c 0 .
SO0~ 0 4 0 0 O 0
40ci 0 ;1
0 cts 0 0 w O a : 0 Ho0  (D
0 cz . w 0
U2 u 2 to .C .
~0c 0 0 1 4* * l
0' ccl0a) p
,--I twI
0~~~P 0 C c P
cu 0 o 4 - 4
P..~.~ CLd 0 4 il


































































.., .. w' --' o 0 0
w,_ k.. b- n 0- 0
000 .0-,- t P--4 o
P4 W,. ,a,).. 4 a)
s-1'- mI-
as 6"4 , 0 0,- 0
k 0 1 P4
4Co2b O00u
cd (v ~ ' CU2
0-cu~C go o10 :* : 0 0 Q
$441- 0 Pfl-r w k
$4 0u 0j cu gI- k C
k as I~ 0 0
,00 0*~
cu 0) 0 Wc








O4~- = 0,0Po -~4 0005
EnW C 43-4 a) ;0 -4
d CH%* 4 A
r- a) U.. )




C=fO 00 0 U
U 0 r u 
r































; o t 00 0 P4
U * 4- - * 4d f Vt o
"a tn 0o "= ° -4 40'
;j Cu (O=
• ,.el ko ul a) 0 ,-
mu in u 0 0 .





a)h ci 0. 0 M t -x ,.
k 
00
0 r, -2 CL4
t0 a 0 P4 Cu 00 (D S.4 0
., 0 FA -E-- j a 2 0:4.m k P Z,
Id - 0 -0 4.n
+oC) k 0
S . o "'
cu ,QP4 a) o











MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 52:231
1967] ANTI-DISCRIMINATION ACTS
od 0 e =.o " d " b- .Q)
M~ ct C dcdC
00 U ;4 ) a)4 C + 0 DCU




k - a)~ w ,clf.C")C 4. I €  -c.
€4 0 0 > 0 p ) m "
0. rd 0
oo 1 .p
r44 0 0 C.- 0-0 .- s -
cd $4 a) 0;Ic1 00
7Aa)- a 4 D Cc$ C.)a'd45
,-s 
0  4 P, l ; '-' a) Cosa)w 0
4 a --. t, +. ;4 C
C.) Ct >Cp
r C)
.0 .o 0 C0 1,
C).- 03 7. 0U~o~
0 -4~- C)) go544i.0. Cu 54 ~ 0~ (D4. '
, ) , 0P4 k c
af 0 P, a) a )
C, $. cd_ G, 9.F 40 0
P., Z ,
a) .cm as _,q.0~ 0 w : 0,.,m .4a roe ...9 k m . .. o .
0 0+ C
~.m. o 0  O_, 0)~-
CU P 4 k. k A 0 W U
k 0  00CdP4
-4,0 0,  U d PAH 0 4 c, ; 8
CU+.0 U C W
a)) a) 0+ cc
to, P4 ) u~ CUs co )
a) W 4 -4-- V P
























A' . -v0i 0 W$on.5a c--o e . o-0 Ik
ow -k - 0 -a) r;80 -
bn... o o 5. .
.. +.
,." J 0* r d o C
0 o,0 W a) Uo o
$i : ,' m' cc 0 k 0) 0' ' En .
0~~I~~ 4 MP d
--a
.o .cts o : "(Do , a) 0
03 0 4 w o .-
to 0 o A4 14
$4 ..j2 t.O4 .4 I 0+
00 cc 0 0-I 0 p4 t
04 wI2 O0CC W ) 4C
0 a)~ o 4 )-4
'4. '. - -- .4 0
P ,. 0 0 4 .
,.d r. > 0 o ,-d0 -' .. " C,. 's ' 0 4 ". 0 g o''
''' l o P o.- -





4- r 4 ri2.-XU
0 -0.) rn 4
Cl, ~ U 0,~c~
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
).4 P
0 Q + 40
-40 0 $4 ~0
0n. 0




























4I ni 1 0 1 1 1 1 -I. I 'r •$
+. .2 o 5
k m 0 P-1 0- ;'"  4 0
-o - 025
9. . o, r. d ( a) o. :, --
I> P4 -0 1 ,4 0 (, 0 .N, 0 u W, CIS od
,o o ' o ..  -- o 4. . . . . . .
o Oo o 4 • . o r o oo
cd as oQ o.° P4s '- g cu " = " "  -











































~ o~ : o w
0 CU~
t;,+0

























A n rd cs 0- 4 c u $s :4 .n
, 0 -1- Jrd cd p Q 4-
0 oH P4 k 0
P . 4 0-- a) 4 09
0 . U . V"u 0~
X 0 r.r 0 ' CtS
.,to 0-4
o .. 0
. - , 0 / "
.0 td.o 00 -,5U -V
4 ~ 0. a) 0 )
C.) U -m 0d~c 0.crgs
;-4-4 0 1) -
d) - p CSr

























c u 5 -0a
;.,,
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 52:231
d4 C cao 0 oo o
4 - 001 +Q'C) oOd.
O 0~ S! p-l 00 Z ,q 0 .0p 4 bLc O $4 4 W 4
.2 V, D v40 _d 0r
CD •1 CC k "o RA 0
0 0 00
V w .2 - (
od .dk42 4 o ;I 'nk
k o o 0 k CS
;..5cu 0 o-0 , 00 Cd 'o 4 r-.4
,- 0 n -d V• - a) 0 - Z4.,k 0a
Q 4w 0 0 0. 0 k
-rq -4 4, k 0
U2 2 -W0w -H a) woo
oo 0 4 O 0 o : -
,-0 . d 0 c" " -4 ^,
;3 k k- )cV 40 0
o , co d
l~~9" . 0.-d . ¢
;j ,1 0 . 2 0 P40..0 O = 1
k~ CH c k() )40c 144
C00 D0 A04.!a
0-- to m, cs P4 o
40 
- o 0 " "4
.- co O 4i k A-0








0- 14 1' 4 0 " 4 -W 0 0. - '-
u
0 
_. 44.S) 0 0
0 k- i CH. 0
0 0. 0 - 0 •.4 ;54 ci ! ul 
0 0
• 0 0 F-IC.) 0"P"-
k4 jfl0 a)
" t o w P.1 > k . r l
ra g~ 0+ 0
rd 0 - k U a"
4
. 0 " 0 ow
oo.- 0 l 0
Q) W0 -u
0 a'd- " (v
0 14 00 r-i
kF- 000 b-cs 0 4 )
asA 40-4-iF- 0 F-i 00


















,-,w EDi* 9b p
U2 Cc$ 0 s-




P, P d 4
1967]
.!cd ;~F 4Z. 94o-
--d
P., 0 0 0
. o m



































co k, 0 ,~
0I- as 0
000
So - 0 0, $1 o :ji -.- o'
0,- " d a) * 0-4 4 "-> t- d n0
a)d Od o
C, 4 4 w. :0 0 - < o ,- d Eci 00 cu P4 0 C)p; a)d r-4 a) o e 4 - a) H 41 o .. . ,P: 4 41 P,0 ;, ..-
c2 (1.-o r4;i t0 0 0 o u o -N
• o o. o . ~ o
0 ~ ~ ~ 4 0.4--.__ ~ ~
~
a) C S - , -- 0'
a) F' i P4 "  . . ' o
Cd - 0 a) Id 0 0 - - ,'o
S- a) d c w 2 . . 0. 2 )
in a) a).- b o
02 a) 's-, 0 0 a)
H P4 0
OCOU 4 4 -44
ca s a bDC) a C



















0r >0 c z >c,4 
'
P40sP M4-0 ;
as 4 a) 0
a) - 0 CU
0 En > -~~~
oId ~ 0% 0ul 0 0 4
,r 0 E- W 00
;I g 4- 0 4 W 0
cz b~- 0 0 0 4, U




cis C. h :
cd CCfdO
4 0-o:s 0 o0
Sa) a) 10 04Wkt-4bk 0d0
J-.~O 4) - a 00 @
'H :j 'C) 0 C U a
:;! g " -v ~ u o -m 4 0
0- p4~a 3 _ T 2 CU
'Ht P, 0 0
;j- a) 0 '-sa)4
C4do.4U+ c.
'H pq. w 0 0+ WC wC' 44 P Z0C1
1967] ANTI-DISCRIMINATION ACTS 401
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 52:231
a)u0 0d&
0 C2' 4 c) ) D0 ohI t
c ~ ~ *~u C' D rl -4) m CU co
C'sc C' CC), ci) +
'.H cu~~~ 0 > 4Q 4 ) t 0
o- 0 .W 04 0 C a
&, Cu; 75
0 "o.r 4 : I a) (D~0 0 n k Cd




cu 00 0 SCU 4 to 0
W P4 a C
A~ q
-4 o rn cOdC -0 :, 0 > c -I a
0 cc kl -01 0 u . 0 _
0 00 04
*.u a) k~ cua 0 0~Cl 0 0
cdw - "ci 0i to -
0. a)0
14 0$ cz 00~ W od;P4 d)cc - 4 ca'- EaCs r
U, m~ rd7 w rd 0 C.) 0 400
0 1 t AJ ~ a) t - ) - C 0 .
4 C) a) toa, t
IN ,0 CU ~ 4- a uc W 0g
0+ w Koq- asC)0 ~~
m as k 0~ r.~
S4 0 :, , l s;)
0 O rdC, d a , g 4 0, Cl 0
0z 41*El C) 0 0 'z P4+'
C"- -o~ 4~ 0-
0 ak~4: 0 *n P - s 0 c' -
k PC0 ( .,F4a t 0 C )a' C (D -, +~d l C IS
0 0X a)l (D CIS P4 00)
.C'480- 's - t ~. CIS P 00 cis ..
CD ~ ~ ~ 0 0 aU0 0 10c 4 --
41 C) w - r40 A> 0 k 0-1-
,04- ;, 4 0 + s-4 Q0 - 04 0 ;> P 0 d+
4 as
C, Cc, agP+, 0, kAP 'd C0 -_ -g~ > 40
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 52:231
to . ' +30 0
0~ .0
;>w 4-C4r d W W4 CnC, 0 f- 0 ) j 4
0~ Q 0 4 a
odr- 4, 0s r 0)A) as U +~C)() O 0 P C -
1967] ANTI-DISCRIMINATION ACTS
4L a) to 1 1 4 (2 -
.n ;>4 0 cd 00c
rin vu 0, Cu 0 .r,
- ri kId 4 c ip t
En 0+,0b
W A
(D Cu - 0 Cu ;
P4 Cu 0A 0
ciuc0 c" zo 0
ko k~ 00 dk
SCu) rd a) mu C
U~ r- Cuu0 H 0 n P
cu + r "Cu 0 P4 a)
(1) Po o -8 o r
2 $' 10T to Cu > P4+~0 0 02~
0 ;- 0) 0 a)
k ctl +- "u 4 p ;. Cula,
04 0U 0 Cuto
, ' 0 4 0 ul.
a0 'd 4 tD0 1)0 o
0- 4 t'm1 o
~~~ 4.~
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 52:231
Eaa
ots0 a CU 4
0 Ea 0
+u a) 0 -I
0 P, - -I-
k, -,0
0 )+ c +
o 0 "a) - 44 4
cu o Z -P. 0
10 0 t .-4 W P
;. O-o
0 .0.-: _ o t o
P, o 0 .
k ~ a)rn;-
l:: ::o "8O s _ d c






















m ) a)s a)
a) yr
a) - -- 0 U
Crd 41
ca) ;4 CU a)
a)o~.
.3 ,-' >ts 0~~g~ UC
ci 0
W~~,a 0. 00~C ~ a
..- 0 k a) 0d
0 0 c b -i CE a 
> UUCC ;j 0 a)+00 k ) a
1967]
















Ea I - I g -0 co
&0n in C% 0 4!4
10 04 0
P~~ 4 c' 0f"0a 40 4) a -d ciED 0 .
En a Pke ko
asrr.ad- c k R
" V 24 0
0 C 90 oPr 'U b P4Oe En6C SW 4
mr.is !a -a" a) ;a-,) rd
'0 0- k 0 00 41 0.' C
C4.4 PU rd Q1 'o .a-,o C rad
o N .2 -4s c 0 q-' 4Ca) a 4- 0 0-
W+ 0
0~ cdC a) )P4~~A CI 0
40C .0 0 4- kU CD 0 004 o40 Pqoa
0-- ~~~ oe b0asPws
o' 'kCr
U3 0 l-4U02U .j 4-CU 0 'd
P4 dg CU4
k~~~ 0, a)A 4a st cc
0, cc 0 g o%0
Ca~ 0 4i4'
:JC cu m 
-4-4 0
k 0 CIS * ~
0GHird E14. 41 4,d ~ 0D O- vC
a) ~ 4..U 4as 10 m c do co bD W ;4
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 52:231
0 CO , (1) a) 4).4 P ;.4 -4- 1 1 1
.,_ pZ 6 6 4 4 0 F (1) ;4
41 as " (3) ;4 0 P4 0 04
C,3 0 0. P., P P4
t04 CH
Cd 41 0 0) -,-,) 0 P P UN 0 UO 0 40 p 44 00 P4 0 a) z Cd 0 0 >1 1;U3 4 toH (L) +, p a n,
> 0 W 0 ;-. $24 pz to d U3
a) - 0 a) CZ P', P >.O -A 43 cz 0.5 w
cts ;q Cd 4 ;4 > > CL)
P-r (D Cis104-0-- Cdcis
d) cd .2 a 42 -q, :3 -Q m -'- 0 r 0 0 0 bJDm W 4 Q)En 0 4 tL -Q 4, .- 4 as w P bG > 'CES 4-4
cd4 M 4 I'd >'A T 0)
Cd (L) 0 W ra 41 CISU2 as 4to Ul 0 : .- (3) 0k 01 0 p u
U2 0 0 bD 0 0 -c-,Is 0 ro
cd CH 0 P-1 &a P H ;.4 a)En a) n 0 U a) P- 0
tO+ - a) 0 CH 0 C;S 4 C03
a) P 0 (L) 4
r-q cu r. * k 0 0 4-3 Tao U2
0 0 ra 0- rd 0) - >, r. in C) 4- curA 0q.. _, U3 g Q) a) 4 Cd (L) 0 0 P4as C ca ;z
a) 10 10 CIS cd 0 a)41) Q r 0 4 (D (1) 4! E-41 4 CJ k 4 P4 C-)4 0 a) >, cd -0 0 C) .) 0
" k rd 04- En k W C;s k 0 (1) 0 0 (L)E-, 4 Cd 04 a) 0 0 0 0 P4d Ei -Ij CU k 4- $2' (3) r-1
C-11 " 4 ".- :j - .- >, 0 r 104 P4rd M rd X, -0 d
0 CD 42 . rn, 0 k Cd ca tH k U., a)
- 0 a) C.) 0 La bz 0 0 0 CZ P4,d 0 P 0 cd
> >1 CIS CU a) -4 0 0 0 1100 cd
cd - k 
0 En
cz 0 (1) 4 P-- cd >-, (L) P m bo cd pU2 j W4 CD;> ,o 0 0 rCj CD Cj 0
4 ca 0 41 CL) -4 4 4P4 0 - 4 P. 0 U) CL)cu cd 14 - P4
0 4 0 0 0 cis 0 6,0 t04Acis C;s 4 rn 41 a) q).C) c 0 (3)
0 ra 0 Ul (L) ca A cu C', m
4 CIS 0 04 co - 44' 0b,04 co4, tw0 P4 
4 41) 
cu
as Q) -d 0) m cd (L) EQ 4- Q) j) CU 10 P41+4 41 p 41 0 4
e-) 0 41) 0 C's rcs X r a) A
P4 Q 0 0 P4 Wd 0 0 0
Ei u t4 (L) 0 ca
-0 bj0 cd 0) cd 00 a) k"




P4" 00CISi cc$0c 0 k k -
'Hi 0i a,) $: U coa
W0 0 rn i p4p Al -'
,r. PTh -0 4 A0)n W v
04-i 0) L-'
0 0 0C
k 4' - . n 0in t
co 41. 
-4
;4 k a -4-- - 4 +3
a) d aCZ0 4 U a 0 8' -J 0 H
go - ci), -d 0
0 q1
as4 * asO~ l ;ain cu 0 0 Ln).
01 a) m 4 ~ 0iono U ) +
0 0I' cu 0 )4 l L rlE
(L ..'isdD9!~ ~~0 k0)).'-'4 4 tt
in0 0 a) Cl4 ul()
0w cUt 0' -W U2 -- 0
0. C.j0)L 1- 0i cu+ to P 2 c.
0L P~ 0. q- 0





rd4 nCd 0) ;
En (L r.)ca 0
4 cu *0
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 52:231
C) ~ % Al . ~
to 0c. a 0 C-) - 114 CU 0-a)
0 0 V 4~4S 42 'd 0 r.
P4 -4 ) .q 4  I
0U C 3 9C~4 ~ $a
r ,4 0 a ) 4 , w ; t
&-0 4 0 C) 4O ~t co a, 4 C)
a)14Q (L)4+ ~CU U U2 CUW CIS+ Cd41 9i 0cz
H ~ ~ 0 d O~ 4- CU)0 0 I.,4 -4 .CU 0tor
0~o 0 4) Q4 044 g!4 -04- 44 r U * .-
0 UU<l+ m1 ~ 00 0 CU C
~~41-41-X rc; ++ ct 0 .. -4 C ~ - 4 C C O
r -4 - 4 j. + _41 -0 r2
a)~ C U :0=Q P n
2 H CS C2..4 ~ P n4 k .
_. 0 CIS cd a 0 (CD C) 4 Q C 0 4) 0M w 5 0
0')() )aj u '
04 -4 U0:3a0
W. +- 's U
>1CS 0c; cCUr -0 0 A L
0 U )0 a
cu()0:!Q a )0r$>.r't 
+
U2 0 D Z-na
k. 0 - 4 4 0 P
1967] ANTI-DISCRIMINATION ACTS
ID) . d m . 0 I .4 a). to U2n (L) -4- 1" 4) En2
k Ca 0 1)4 r 4 +4 rr0 Cd 04k
wH 4)4W0)
k~iS 00-
a) cu cd4 a)~ o:
co Qf* 0 P4
4 k _ 414~
a) )  : 000
cu 4-u w 0C
cu 12 q- cis.. C.
4 rd Q))  W )
Cud ~ 0
0 r,- 6O CU 4) 4)
C(SCZ_: C En oC.C.
0,01-44CU)e O,91cs L 0
~% o
o. P r) c) 4,) o CD)40 CC~ O4 -Q; 04 P4 )- 4CU 03
~
0 414- $4
4 Q) c) v) iC;.- cu0 4)! 0
a) a k c cu
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 52:231
a, go 0~ ~ a)'- k
"INDWC 0)Id a) 4
~~cn4~ o~o .0 o.a 4 S.,-c
,-,-,-, C  ,Ca.C-2 ;- 0 ro 0
E-q~i r R.*~ El a) cd ."i
4ri 0  (1 4 0 0
0. 0 n
m :0 4N > C's 0 $
P-1 o., (D 0 0 4- i+4- rn P o>
P-1 ~ ~ ~ C k a)** a)Cl) z U o 44.
W - . 0 .,
W o a o 0) ) Mo .-4 a C a0 U.-0a 0 la 0 4 $: Ur$ 2
S-- -o a U kC). .0 (1 ) 0.
*. 2. tL C '' C 02R ('L) C AO"'a)
-4 rr- l I - I - .n
r4 co 0" . . .k as Cd 0 - r4 avU )I42) ;-4 (  0 Eio q-- 0 0_ o~ P4 cu -.(
0 ) A j - k-(L ' )a
a ,- , 00 0 0-1 -
0 4 o k.a w o
"i • o". 00 '°
Cl) 0 ; )C)k C )
4 ",, o Ta o kI 0 o a) F- (1 > C
H 0 ) ! !0 gP . 0 k Aa 4"
cc.a) ) C w 4.
C" -U- -L 
- d  
w k
.. r- >' o k" '  0 " 0 42-, P 0 u ca l .
Ca Ord C1eE 4 a
04 - (L)~~ ) uwoEi- Ca 0 a) r4P1r
H n L) 4 4 0 ul.Ca'
k Ca I) w C's ' ) a n 0
a) s a)) Ia)- k
a) - ro ~as ~ P4 0 4 a)
co r )0 Q)~ " O-4 Ei Eq C .) cd wCa "
1967] ANTI-DISCRIMINATION ACTS
"0 WHO r 0 0 t. 0:: 4-, Q 0 "'d ,C .9 -0 " "'-H -Da) co - (D ao 0 0
,0C cz w 0 0: "0 w -- ~h -
0 U0 0,r-* (D ro 0i J
t o co. co 0 .D .- "m cd O P4
U/] • 1 CU- 4 ¢d l;Z ",-" q-
o aD a co a d ' t o o
2' 0 0 -1 >A ' j- 04 t ; l0 4
'+40a) 0 "a) O
4 P Q M - - a) j IS, Oro a)co .)2 a) 0.
a) 0 0 (v as , E ' " "04 a
'"A ,t 0 0 - u O "
,.el ~  ~ r bD1 u k - oc.-4o "
a) 0)CUO,00 0
0 -; 0: 0' M0 Q
a) a) 4; 0 IH d) rd
0 as M a) ~ w. a) k -d
t U 4 a
. o o .IOU +2 o 7L , 4,0 ,. t o . on a)
W) -44 a)~ _r )b )4 .,  -





Co 0P- 0 k a) 0)
a)u CU CU 0-
4 p cc w r -4S a a cu 2, 2 .2 r 0-Q -0 a a ; -c 40 i d - 0>- 4
a)a) 
_o b 0r >X CCSb
n-, O ; C's +- 0 ,- P4 0, k. as 0 . "-  (-, V ' .O
rn a o -o;8 4N c E; a) r as w i 0 -0a
co ) Cw.2'a) 0 0 a) a) .r
p .O0 1 0 * ' -ij 0 CU ~ +
ME-oa 4w 4' -Qz <4
-1Eow 0ci CO a)4 p 0f
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
as (1 Cd0cd 
I
taO k0 ~ C cu k Q
4 - k 0 
0oC'
?A - 4 4
0s crr 0 bp
U~r (1 D-IP4r
a)-, - j ) r
C. 0 4 0 A ' 000 w l
ci 0 0 4) u 0 0 k k c .
E- a a .) N..() L Qa) ~ -dcu acl ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ + 4- ' dko q bDa 3 P 4
(j) ~~0 kC)I
-w0. () C4 c








- 0 - 0
a) ca w;o



































• 4. ...t 0 '- 4.4
.0






o 0 1, a, -,°









0~ a) 0;.40 c
4 0C11 0
0 m CD r
'4- 02 a) . . o a)
&a C Ug
1967] ANTI-DISCRIMINATION ACTS 419
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 52:231
1967] ANTI-DISCRIMINATION ACTS
1 4 I; I I 0 &0 1 1
0Aw u _- k 0 g 4 W .,k 4  0
4, P4 q4)C EjW
'd~ 'd "0 R 0 0
.o : .l : o o ;w ~ .





P, 1 o . 0 0 r. bm a) 2 0 0~ 0) (1) ;> b.0' 4
0) b/2r 2n P- 0 r- C0 Ct P4 V ' d
W 0 -.-t ij c - "l 0.4 + c-
a- b : 0 -




a) 2P C --
0) C ras 0 o$ k 0 a) a)~~C
.- .. 0 410H
,-) U a) .d) u 0 .,,P,4 ¢, ; '' , =-
k 0 'kEaE - cu0 ) . .40
MINNESOTA LAW' REVIEW [Vol. 52:231
m 4~i 0
0 0
0 2 4 t 4 0d a a)
0 00
0 a)
cz 4 0 P4
0 1H wC~ 0c
+0 co _ 0-
0
0) 0 P,- w1
*rn A' CZ r dP
W E









CD a) od r
rd 0 10 0. - ctscz S: 0 t
1967] ANTI-DISCRIMINATION ACTS
( V 0 0a ) 0 C j d o 0  ) 0 cd C 0
o ~ j P4 a) 4 , o P - o 0. <0ot 0 g ' I o-
c s A o oo-4
"r ' . L.J, 4 '
0 Q 0 -
0 : S ., _ ,) ., ; s 0
rdI +~ k uo T: 0 044u
" o " c " a) , 0 j 0 o O '
. ' O 0 
0 
' : ' ,-
4 ,- :(74 L- 12 D 0 04
W ;:: € . .d ,- 0 0 0 a), - o 0 ,
.5 ~ ~ C W~ U2 k/ 4 0U 0 0 a
0 *, P 4-+ ' " ,
c^ o .0 ,O k 'H 0 "0 C' E "
0 k. cd g a o 0 o,) >,' o >. U k )
0 : d 0 4 U o-'
uu U 0V- o u4 P,4+













r-I C.)a ,-4 4-
P-0





















*' ,.T 0 . U., a) a)- a) a-s
,- WU . • . ' 0.- 0 c>s " W as F- ul .
0. a o .. ,_ , ML) a) -I. ; .7- (L 'o 0 q
.,I > a I a) . o , ,
a) , 4 (,) 0 rc, Ed 4) ,2 m o > .
"a)- -) a) a") o.,- o. 10- .o as (.) .,_
as <0 T . o > CH 0. -4 -0 > co C) 0
0 45 rcl > 0  __ -4 r- 10 0 ,-. P4
o~~~~ j cS-'
k (
,.- . '.. -, 
m ,-,o -
00 0 4 0:)
as , as-,'" 0 0 43l , ,Q l: .r ,. ' - -
a)(i -- , cor 0 0.c a)" 0 -b0 4m
C). -o' C' P >t o o
•0 "4 ;q 41 ) TO ,( c um s O*4+ &,Q c - so0 CisU ,C) 0 2 P kC
o _A t= o s - ',-
H -- -0 o. L r ,$ , H 1=: ,. ,c -( -:.,4~
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 52:231
0
;4' )-4 -Ia)*,. D CO
.. &4 ... .0 o(D~~C C. CO
-4 oo C a)
02 0
bz 14- ., .j -
00 _ - t
>- a)a)A~
a•. .114 0 o n 4k
(1 I4..) 1-4 -' 0  ;> 0 C i PQ) CD > - )-Q' a) w
10 ;4d (L 0,0 C dL
.) cH 10 ;4 q- 0
U2 0, >,,- (L dCE
$4 14 C.
C)4a CoC 0 P 0 Q 0 04 4
0 0 4- k )24
+;'t ) Cs .41 I ;E- 2H co,' > 2 rLJ C) 00--~-+ H 0 (L) P4 ~4 4W
1967] ANTI-DISCRIMINATION ACTS
0 o 00
P 0 Cdcd~ cd co t f :




0 ;4 ~ w 00* .-I* o O-
a) .1- -0 4o 48 ir
4 0 _ * ,-1f -2 ; l- : c
bz0 ldS4 -0
0~ Id
0  o4 0'dc
a) 0 0 ) S 4 ;
0 W 0 ~ U 0 * .,q ;0w P4. ;4
k) A ) P : 1
L cd _4 g.
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 52:231
0 Cr1 0. 41 + Ct V ~ CZ: 4
0 0 O100 44
0' C2 0 -X - .Oa0
0 0 0 0
0 CA
to0)-a Cr+) r a) u Cr o 0
'44~~- P ;c~ . J-5 0 0 o ) c
40 0 -'m
4- 0 P~
4- U 3p -





P 0  4 04E
CZ rn 0 zP c
C- Cr1.4- 0 Q1 n4
1967] ANTI-DISCRIMINATION ACTS 431
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 52:231
M ?o E.6H _0- 2 L, a L
w 0 -" 0
o o t H -
0- 42 9 ko
0 . ,. 0 i 0
0o Oro 00
CD (D CJ 0  QC4 - !
0 0 ,








0- P4 0 0Ida"0 ~ ooo
0 0-4cr






P- o C) " 01





,l 0 w -- " O ..
1967]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 52:231
+ 40 0 h
Ct 0 8 0 0, 4 0 0 -X W,, >- 'I 0 : 00I0
+ 0 : ,. 0
0 t D .> a) rn ,. )
-44 >u~ > 0 M 4
42 0 0 0 k
kI CIS-- *
0 '" o4  +o~ ,4 o.4 "  B 'C.)
"0 ' 4 > ' . o 2 € - .
cl o0 bD, ~ ~
.-1 0) .4..,4to; r , - r, th CI0
04 kO 
- Z 0 44
+- 0.'0 .. r!4 - 0 O-0
0.0 0 4ok
r. ." 0 a) 0 ) k -CD 0 0 a ) l
Cu Cun Cu 0..- 0 1- . ,
o b CA o J) -01" .. . P,
CISC. 0 C w
C' .- . 0 oO ,.- 150 00.. o .P40-- a 0 . U 8 )- k a) i C 4 0
o ,. - CIS 4, U P r-4 S."' .2 k 4., 0),U
0,r _0 oH ri 6 
-o oa
0 .0 . C d 00 .-.
C o 0 r-s 0 C 3
rd 1-.4 - 23 O> i " 0 - 'j Co 4 0,. -I.
ra ~ ~ ~ O f 0a0 C s$I'I> C ts4 Cu
4) P c cs 0 Uo 3k00 0 0
0'c 0 i a) C54S - Q, 0 " _
..- 4- 01 
-4 04 4 OuD 4 O .*,*
, .,- 0 "14+ '0 C o -- 0 k CZ ., Cd
o0
*n P0 0 3 L C
-H- 0 4 4 n r
(3) 0 4u (1) a 41 4 00
Ea U ) dou '0. Q C2 P4~u
a) J. In. P4O~ u 0 9~
U2~ *44 0  D 's-
0 gc 4 0 4-
;j. Hu C u Cu C',S C' 0 o~
0 0 0~ 
- ~ 0
rn Un C5
k Cs r raa 0 a
-4 to CC z
0 04 0 ~ -4 0-
1967] ANTI-DISCRIMINATION ACTS
o o
, , c ci 0 00 o
U 0 , c
o , 0 0U4 , 4*0 CQ s 0 U W
k -H .
O'4 -., d 0 w
cua)ct -4- 
a
a) -- s ISl o 4 p-, CI g.,
to U2 0 cd0
- -0 0cd~+ 0
0 o4
0-k 0 ' k
o ts o --- r
0 -4.
co _. rS4 od F4 e . o.
ts 0 V) a)
r A , 4 A .
0 CuL 0 i
- g 0 .044 3 41
Cu 0 -A r o I!
k 0cu
cH 0 (L)A 4' --
a) 034 0. ts 0
a) CIS
44 C) U2 P CA k$1
X:-"P

